Small B17 bomb bay and bomb load

[Jon]

Thanks Vinman for the last post you placed.

Yes i agree 110% that US bombing in world war two was a massive contributor to the final victory.
My question certainly was not aimed to attack the B17 it was just out of interest thats all.

Regards
Jon

[mhuxt]

Make it stop Ruy, please.

[Smudger Smith]

Originally Posted by Vinman

Hello Jon,
Yes, I will answer your question. The B17 did not carry the same bomb load as the Lancaster. But, if you read my first post, you will find that on average, the Lancaster carried around 5000-6500 lbs per A/C and not the max that it was designed to do. Again, it depended on the range and type of target.
The point that I am trying to make is that on average, the Lancaster, Halifax, B17 and B24 were flying missions with more or less the same bomb loads.
Those three KEY EXAMPLES of RAF night raids that I posted, have the stats.
No one is trying to belittle Bomber Command, I certainly am not. The whole Allied contribution to the destruction of Europe, was a team effort.
However, one must admit, that the USAAF was a huge factor in winning the war.
Vinman.

Dear Vinman,

I have for the past few hours been viewing a number of Avro Lancaster & Short Stirling squadron ORB’s, I have 16 Lancaster and 8 Short Stirling squadron ORB’s.



The following is a typical bomb-load for the Avro Lancaster, I have chosen four targets at various ranges.



Avro Lancaster Mk.B.I & III

• April 14th 1945. Potsdam. No.138 Sqdn ORB, average load, 1 x 4000lb + 7 x500lb. Total: 10,500lb
• April 19th 1945. Munich Pasing. No.138 Sqdn ORB, average load, 4 x 1000lb + 10 x 500lb. Total 9,000lb.
• September 3rd 1944. Eindoven. No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 11 x 1000lb, + 4 x 500lb, Total : 13,000lb.
• September 20th 1944 : Calais : No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 11 x 1000lb + 4 x 500lb. Total : 13,000lb

Avro Lancaster Mk.B.II

• June 23/24th 1944 : Le’Hey. No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 11 x 1000b + 4 x 500lb, total 13,000lb.
• April 26/27th 1944 : Essen, No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 1 x 2000lb + 84 x 30lb + 105 x 4lb + 943 x 4lb : Total 8,692lb
• March 31st 1944 : Nuremburg, No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 1 x 8000lb + 90 x 4lb L Total : 9,360lb.

4. November 22nd 1943 : Berlin , No.514 Sqdn ORB, average load, 1 x 4000lb + 360 x 4lb + 90 x 30lb + 24 x 30lb. Total : 8,860lbs.



Short Stirling Mk.B.III

• October 8th 1943 : Bremen : No.196 Sqdn ORB, average load. 270 x 4lb +64 x 30lb +2 x 1000lb + 1 x 1000lb : Total : 6000lb
• March 27/28th 1943 : Berlin, No.214 Sqdn ORB, average load. 1 x 2000lb + 1 x 1000lb + 1 x 500lb + 90 x 4lb : Total 3,860lb
• January 14/15th 1944 : V1 site, France : No.214 Sqdn ORB, average load. 24 x 500lb : Total 12,000lb.
• August 27th 1943 : Nurnburg : No.214 Sqdn ORB, average load 510 x 4lb + 30 x 4lb + 48 x 30lb : Total : 3,600lb.

Vin, your average Lancaster bomb load of 5000-6500lb per aircraft seems slightly out. The above figures are actual bomb loads, taken via the squadron ORB.



The above figures relating to the Avro Lancaster tell the real story.



The figures you have provided Vin are doubtful, however what is not in doubt is the courage and sacrifices of both Bomber Command and US 8th & 15th Airforces.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by Smudger Smith

I have for the past few hours been viewing a number of Avro Lancaster & Short Stirling squadron ORB’s, I have 16 Lancaster and 8 Short Stirling squadron ORB’s.

Are there any flyable Lancasters, Halifax or Stirlings these days?

I've seen many of the American World War II types at airshows or flying over my house (including B-17s and B-29s) but we don't get many British warbirds over here. A few years ago I did see a Griffon-engined Spitfire put on a demonstration. It was quite impressive, and I'm sure a Stirling buzzing the local airstrip would also attract some attention.

[George Hopp]

Thank you, Smudger and Juha, for your considered and valuable comments on my posting. First, Smudger, I do think it would be more accurate to say, "I have never read such rubbish;" rather than, "I have never heard such rubbish." But, that’s only my opinion. And, thank you also for being so objective and rational, it’s such a welcome relief from the crazies who sometimes pop out of the woodwork in these threads.

I am a bit confused as to why I should consider myself naïve about the accomplishments of Bomber Command just because one of its groups happened to come from Canada. Incidently, from a Canadian who served in one of the other Bomber Command groups: while 6 Group may have had a good record in the air, on the ground the aircrew were generally considered to be a bunch of "loud-mouthed, beer-swilling louts." But, I guess they wouldn’t be unique in that.

You are totally accurate when you say that, "The contribution of the US 8th & 15th Air Force(s) was without doubt massive and decisive ...." That is exactly what I was saying: The efforts of the USAAF – including the 9th Air Force – were decisive, and were what made D-Day, and an Allied, rather than a Soviet, western Europe possible.

Where we might disagree ever so slightly is the part about "Both (Bomber Command and the USAAF) worked together towards victory, side by side sharing the same dangers." If you read about the politics of Bomber Command, you would see that Bomber Harris was dragged, kicking and screaming, into the idea of using his command against anything but cities, because he felt that other targets were simply too small to be effectively attacked at night. And, you might note also that whenever the opportunity presented itself, he would quickly switch away from other targets to attack another city. So, yes, BC did attack transportation and oil industry targets, but it was certainly not with the heartfelt blessing of the CinC. But, you appear to allude to that very thing when you say that Bomber Command "made mistakes, and should perhaps have changed its bombing policies sooner."

So, really, Smudger, our postings seem to indicate that we are in almost total agreement with each other, only using different words – welcome to the world of the naïve with political stances.

As a postscript, Juha, I feel that the majority of the strategic bombing that took place after the Allied armies were established in France, was superfluous. Since the transportation facilities were being smothered, it really didn’t matter what was produced or refined, because only minute amounts of it would ever reach the fronts.

Thank you again for both your comments.

PPS. For Nifty. In Canada we have one flying Lancaster; and a Halifax is being restored, but whether to flying status I don't know, but don't think so.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Six Nifty .50s

That may have been true about rail lines, but not in general.

For example, in July 1944 the RAF area bombed Caen in front of the British Army which was stalled outside the city. The Bomber Command raid was completely unnecessary, doing more to help the German Army than damage them. Very few German troops were inside Caen and many French civilians were killed by the bombs. Later, some of the bombing survey teams discovered that the British Army advance was actually delayed more by the huge bomb craters and piles of rubble that blocked their path through the city.

The bombing of Caen was a tactical mission, though as you say it was more of a hinderance than a help. The 8th AF also did some tactical bombing in Normandy, even killing some of their own troops, included a general.

[Smudger Smith]

George Wrote :

Reading the official histories clearly shows that while the British were burning cities and killing civilians, the USAAF was decimating the German fighter arm, destroying the German war-making capacity, bringing transportation in western Europe to a virtual standstill, and making D-Day possible.

It is because you make such an unsupported and obviously incorrect generalisation I replied to you above post. It’s the type of statement I expect from the present day PC brigade tabloids.

My opinion of Bomber Command was clearly recorded on post 17. I stand by it.

It’s obvious that we do not read the same histories, I could the record the number of times the US bombers bombed targets over cloud, but I want, this is not the place to go over the same old ground.

[Jim Oxley]

There is indeed a very misguided belief that the 8th AF (and 15th for that matter) only attacked military targets and did not target, or bomb, cities.

It is of course far from the truth.

That's not to say that there was not a very basic divergence by RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF on strategic bombing at the very highest level. There was. It part it was due to the fact that Britain had had it's cities bombed, America had not. There was definitely a revenge element involved on the part of the political leaders of Britain, from Churchill down. And it should be noted that the policy of night bombing of Cities was well in force before Harris came to control Bomber Command.

The difference in bombing philosphy had much to do with the aircraft each country fielded. Britain found out very early in the war that it's bombers could not survive in the air against the modern fighters of the Luftwaffe. And so switched to night bombing - as did the Luftwaffe when faced with equally strong opponents in the BoB.

The USAAF believed totally in the powerfully armoured bomber, and that it could penetrate successfully in daylight. And because it could bomb in daylight the 8th had the luxury (if you like) of selecting specifc military targets. Yet still they managed to not only miss their targets, and bomb cities, they even on occasion bombed the wrong country!

Mind you Bomber Command also were guilty of this on several occasions.

Aerial bombing is an emotive subject, let alone whether day or night bombing was preferable. Any judgements must be made based on the moral view that applied in the 40's, not now.

The same applies to the USAAF's indiscriminate fire bombing of Japanese cities in late '44 and '45.

There are a number of very fine books on the subject, however most deal in isolation with either Bomber Command or the 8th Air Force. One excellent book that has recently come out deals with the bombing campaign against Germany as a whole, and draws many interesting findings on the bombing campaign based on the combined effects by both Britain and America.

I thoroughly recommend it, it's title is "The Bomber War, The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany", by Robin Neillands. ISBN 1-58567-457-5

[Juha]

Hello George

the transportation facilities were being smothered before D-Day and during the summer 44 by both the USAAF and RAF and besides most of the German military supplies got to the front or at least near of it. There were delays, sometimes crucial, but by drasticly curtailing French civilian rail traffic and non-essential German rail traffic most of the essential supplies, troops and equippment got to or near the front. IIRC only after late Feb. - early March 1945 German transport system was in such a chaos that it had decisive impact.

But we are now rather far from the original question. IIRC B-17 was design on a spec which was meant to produce a new bomber. The number of engines was not specificed but the assumption was that the end product would be a twin-engined medium bomber as was the other contender which also got into production, Douglas B-18. I'm not want to downgrade B-17 which was a truly excellent design, only to show how far-sighted the Boeing design team and also USAAC top brass were on this occasion.

Juha

[Laurent Rizzotti]

Originally Posted by Six Nifty .50s

That may have been true about rail lines, but not in general.

For example, in July 1944 the RAF area bombed Caen in front of the British Army which was stalled outside the city. The Bomber Command raid was completely unnecessary, doing more to help the German Army than damage them. Very few German troops were inside Caen and many French civilians were killed by the bombs. Later, some of the bombing survey teams discovered that the British Army advance was actually delayed more by the huge bomb craters and piles of rubble that blocked their path through the city.

Yes, the support of ground troops by heavy bombers in WWII often proved to help more the other side. But once more if you compare both RAF and USAAF involvment in such missions, you will see that both air forces failed in this achievement, both either hitting their own troops or missing enemy troops and creating rubble that helped them later.

Probably the worst idea ever by Allied bomber commanders was the decision to bomb Normandy cities to create roadblocks with their rubble on D-day and the days after. British and American raids killed thousands of French civilians in two days and German reports showed that their troops were almost not delayed at all. Fighter-bombers were far more useful to delay them and far more precise.

I think both air forces have in common to have seen their original conceptions fail. But both changed and their efficiency increased during the war. My own opinion is that bombing results of the RAF were most efficient at any time than USAAF. But the main contribution of the 8th AF still IMHO is to have defeated the German Luftwaffe in the air, killing thousands of German fighter pilots in 1944 and thus winning air superiority over Europe.
Even if both airforces became more and more powerful and precise during the war, German production increased in 1944. Only when both airforces targetted together the oil factories had they a decisive influence on the German war machine.