Tactics question

[John Beaman]

I am posing what may be a stupid question. I, apparently, do not understand Luftwaffe fighter tactics as well as I thought I did.

I have been reading Volumes 9/I, 9/II, and 9/III of Jochen’s magnificent Jagdwaffe series. He has conveniently organized the Abschusse sections most often by Stab, I, II, and III Gruppen as opposed to a straight day by day for a whole Geschwader. As I was reading, I realized that during this time period (Dec ’41-Jan ’43) the Geschwader Stab had some peculiar claiming patterns. The short of it is that the Kommodore had, by a vast number, the majority of claims. In the cases of JGs 54 and 77, 100% of the Stab claims were by the Kommodore; in other units over 98%.

Now, if I have tactical doctrine down right, the Kommodore’s Stab would be a schwarme of 4 a/c, 2 rote, the Kommodore leading one rote and another pilot leading the other. Each would have a wingman to cover them. The two rote leaders were the “hunters” and the wingmen covered them. The schwarme would work together as four when necessary, such as the event of a heavy attack or against large numbers; i.e., the second rote would then be more of a covering force more than a hunter.

Copying the Luftwaffe, the RAF and USAAF worked this way and the Germans originated the “finger four” concept even to using more of a “fluid four” later.

So, my question is, why are there virtually no claims by other Geschwader Stab members and in some cases zero over this period? Usually, during this period, the Jagdwaffe was operating as “hunters”, i.e., on the offensive so both rote leaders should be hunting and making claims. It boggles the mind that Gollob could make over 70 claims in this period and no one else in the Stab did. What were they doing?

I would appreciate some insight.

[Graham Boak]

If you read the stories about Marseille at the top of his scoring run, the remainder of the team were simply standing aside and admiring the skill - whilst presumably guarding his tail. There may also be an element of greed, of course. If there was to be a kill, the boss was allowed to get it. Or perhaps insisted? Comments have been passed elsewhere that the Luftwaffe fascination - if not obsession - with building the scores of their leading aces may not have been the most optimum way of fighting the war.

[FalkeEins]

..rather recalls Günter Seeger's protestations on losing out on a 'kill' during the French campaign as reported in the new JG 2 history .." everyone knew the Kommodore's eyesight was poor ..but what could I say .." (or words to that effect..)

[Sylvester Stadler]

There were occasions when the Stabschwarm did not have the aircraft or pilots to fill a flight of four and other pilots and/or aircraft were borrowed on a temporary basis. When such a borrowed pilot scored a kill while flying with the Stab, the kill would also be credited to that pilot's unit and not necessarily to the Stab.

[kalender1973]

Who was a members of stab schwarm? TO, Ia, Adjutant?. Did we know any outstanding fighter?

[Leo Etgen]

Hello Kalender1973

One formidable Stabsschwarm that immediately comes to mind is that of JG 2, which in summer 1941 included Oesau (127 victories, RK-S, killed in action 11 May 1944), Leie (121 victories, RK, killed in action 7 March 1945), Pflanz (52 victories, RK, killed in action 31 July 1942) and Seeger (56 victories, RK). Another noteworthy Stabsschwarm was that of JG 51 in summer 1942, which included Nordmann (77 victories, RK-EL), Müncheberg (135 victories, RK-S, killed in action 23 March 1943) and Boos (42 victories, DK-G, killed in action 21 April 1943).

Horrido!

Leo