Book on French AF 1939-40?

The only reason why I mentioned Kirkland is that his article is in ENGLISH as demanded by him who started this thread. Contrary to what you seem to think a lot of what Kirkland wrote does make a lot of sense. It is true, for example, that after an incredible defeat ON THE GROUND (a scandalous army defeat) the French Air Force was used, by the army generals who were the main culprits but were appointed by Pétain as top commanders of all French forces (except Gamelin), as a scapegoat to get rid of any responsibility in the defeat. Virtually everything was the Armée de l'Air's fault.

It is interesting to know that from 1933 (when Hitler came to power) through 1940 the French army and navy commanders were incensed at every single centime spent on the Air Force, on these glamorous fancy "acrobats". They fought bitterly to prevent the Armée de l'Air from receiving any money at all, if possible - or only for recce. Only their own recce and close recce aircraft and a few fighters for their protection interested them. Accordingly French bombers were precious few in May 1940 (but this changed rapidly) and there were not enough fighters to face approx. 3,500 aircraft actually engaged by Germany. Together, the Allies could engage about as many fighters as Germany so they were about even BUT Germany deployed 1,120 twin-engined bombers plus 342 "Stukas" which suffered appalling losses at the hands of Allied fighters, mainly French, and Allied AAA, but there were simply too many - not Stukas but twin-engined ones.

I wouldn't simply discard Kirkland and I have been working on this very subject for 30-40 years (which admittedly doesn't make me unfallible). We should read his contribution, and many others, carefully.

A very true remark has been made often by historians : in the 1940 French Campaign (only) the Germans had got a very big, very "unfair" advantage : according to Hitler's and Göring's nazi methods and habits they risked everything at once, no matter the cost, in an effort to force a quick and definitive decision. The Allies never had the stomach to do such a thing, they always wanted reserve forces, thought of a "long war" and husbanded with their air forces, especially the UK. Germany won (this time only) - at a high cost for the Luftwaffe but to them this didn't matter. What did was the result. They all were convinced that after their incredible success the war was over, that they had won ; most people all over the world believed this too.

It should not be forgotten that the key to the 1940 German success was the big breakthrough at Sedan, across a rather big and wide river (the Meuse) mainly with 7 of the 10 German armoured divisions! This operation was incredibly risky : it was simply madness. No reasonable C-i-C would have accepted these terrible hazards but Adolf Hitler was not reasonable, he was a fanatic and a lunatic. Nonetheless he had foreseen that the French would be too slow and not react properly in time. So to speak, the French moved on foot when the Germans attacked with fast vehicles at 30 mph or so. Too bad Hitler was so right. If the French generals, mainly Huntziger and Georges, had reacted simply in a normal way (without needing to be military geniuses) the German forces would have been stopped in their tracks BEFORE crossing the Meuse and they would have suffered appalling losses, their offensive would have been dead by 14 May... This same Huntziger became the French C-i-C after the defeat!

To sum up, this unique German victory was the result of a madman's gambling. It worked fine this time, afterwards it didn't... All discussions about the respective air forces etc. are very interesting but the German victory was won on the ground, mainly with ten armourded divisions deploying about 1,000 real tanks plus 2,000 small, vulnerable tankettes (the French alone had got 3,300 real tanks, all with a good armour and most of them with a good gun). The German air force supported the army and made their victory quicker and easier but it didn't win the French Campaign : the German army did, mainly thanks to a crazy attack plan which worked.

May I repeat once more that even 1944-45, in spite of their fantastic air superiority and - as a whole - good strategy and tactics, the western allies and the USSR still needed millions of men on the ground and tens of thousands of tanks etc. to win the war in Europe. They would not have achieved this with their aircraft alone.