Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944

[Broncazonk]

Big question here, I hope the experts on the list will consider the question and respond.

Pertaining to the pilots of the Jagdwaffe circa January, 1944, Defense of the Reich / West: What was on their minds?

I've got:

Determination, in slowing the bomber campaign and saving German cities

Resignation, in knowing that they couldn't.

Desperation, at the growing imbalance of power.

Frustration, with their own organization.

Confidence, in their abilities.

Was there anger? Was there irrational thinking yet? Were they hyper-focused on the mission, to their commitment to the people in the cities?

What was the essence, the major themes in their thinking at this critical time?

Was there a feeling that they were losing; was there a growing sensation that all was lost in January, 1944?

Bronc

[David Brown]

Surviving.

[Broncazonk]

Surviving. I've been thinking about that, but how was that imperative displayed on the ground and in combat? You could only have certain amounts of engine trouble before everyone was looking at you. The only example I can find in combat is A LOT of pilots did a split-S after a single pass on the bomber streams. A split-S ended the mission because the fighter could never get back up to altitude.

Anyone?

Bronc

[Nick Beale]

I suggest reading Ian Kershaw's book "The End" for a discussion what kept the German war effort going in the last months of the war.

[Larry deZeng]

Over on AHF just a week ago there was a thread about "survival" attitudes among Luftwaffe fighter pilots during the last year of the war. According to after action reports, diaries and postwar interviews with American fighter pilots, "it was not uncommon" for Luftwaffe fighter pilots to bale out as soon as an enemy fighter got on their tail. Although there were a few cases of this, I think all of us know that this was not "common" practice. Most of the pilots, especially the new ones, were far more afraid of what would happen to them if they refused combat and got caught. Morale in the Jagdwaffe stayed pretty high right to the end of the war. But it was mainly loyalty to their unit and Kamaraden rather than to A.H. or Fatboy Hermann that kept them fighting.

[Oberst]

Ok usually not just one Allied fighter, many allied fighter. And to 'bail' without combat damage was NOT for the most part being afraid, Combat ready German Pilots were few, German planes were many.. save your arse and fight another day. The 'ONLY' thing Luftwaffe pilots were afraid of was pulling their ripcords EARLY.

There were many cases of 9th (15th? Can't remember off-hand) AF B-24 that the crew bailed when a single 109 pulled onto thier six o'clock too.

Gruppen leaders were starting to ignore stupid/pointless orders from up high, and were concerned about the survival of there men. It does not mean they were cowards, not at all.

Anyways, what changed for 1944 heres a couple of points:

~ conversion of Fw190 units such as Jagdgeschwader 300 to the Sturmbock role. For example, on 7 July 1944 Eighth Air Force bombers belonging to the 492nd Bomb Group were intercepted unescorted. The entire squadron of 12 B-24s were shot down. The USAAF 2nd Air Division lost 28 Liberators that day, the majority to a Sturmbock attack

~ Ignoring Göring's lunitic fringe

[Broncazonk]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Gruppen leaders were starting to ignore stupid/pointless orders from up high, and were concerned about the survival of their men.

~ Ignoring Göring's lunatic fringe

Yes. Thank you, Oberst.

Beyond the famous, "You will shoot down a bomber on every mission or die trying," order, are there other examples of stupid/pointless orders that would be illustrative?

Bronc

[Broncazonk]

Question: I've seen more than a dozen examples in gun camera film (1945) of outboard 20mm or 30mm ammuntion boxes detonating violently on FW-190 A-8's when under fire from behind from .50-cal. The wing shears off in a massive explosion when that happens.

If a pilot (or unit leader) wanted to delete those outboard cannons on the FW-190 to remove that specific danger AND improve the flight performance of the aircraft, did they have the authority? Would they have gotten grief from higher authority for wanting to do that?

I've read that Pips Priller and other Experten did exactly that--remove the outboard cannons.

Bronc

[Oberst]

Yeah sure, General Galland's famous refusal of Göring's orders, the pilots revolution, etc.. Prime example of stupidity is Operation Bodenplatte.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Ok usually not just one Allied fighter, many allied fighter. And to 'bail' without combat damage was NOT for the most part being afraid, Combat ready German Pilots were few, German planes were many.. save your arse and fight another day. The 'ONLY' thing Luftwaffe pilots were afraid of was pulling their ripcords EARLY.

Ditto American crews. That being said group and squadron leaders in 8th FC had a standard lecture if anyone was Suspected of shooting a LW pilot in a chute. One of my father's was "Remember there are a lot of bomber crews in chutes before you even Consider shooting at the other guy". unarmed guys in chutes were shot at occasionally by both sides - as well as murdered after surrender.

There were many cases of 9th (15th? Can't remember off-hand) AF B-24 that the crew bailed when a single 109 pulled onto thier six o'clock too.

Sources?



Anyways, what changed for 1944 heres a couple of points:

~ conversion of Fw190 units such as Jagdgeschwader 300 to the Sturmbock role. For example, on 7 July 1944 Eighth Air Force bombers belonging to the 492nd Bomb Group were intercepted unescorted. The entire squadron of 12 B-24s were shot down. The USAAF 2nd Air Division lost 28 Liberators that day, the majority to a Sturmbock attack.

True - at great cost... and bigger successes on September 27 near Eisenach and November 26 at Misburg.. all at even greater cost to themselves

~ Ignoring Göring's lunitic fringe

January 1944 was probably not as great a psyhological problem as May 1944 when the full shock of the P-51 had made the practice of staging for bomber attack out of range of escorts very difficult.

Only one Group of P-51s was operational in January 1944. Only five at the end of April - but they were credited with more LW fighters than all the ETO P-38s and P-47s combined by early June.