Night-fighter losses on 1/2 January 1944

[Pete A]

Hello everyone,
I was hoping that my fellow readers of this terrific forum may provide some input to a few questions I have.

On the night of 1/2 January 1944 the RAF undertook a raid on Berlin. The Germans lost 15 aircraft that night. 4 fell victim to British aircraft with a further 11 losses due to poor weather.

How was the morale in the Luftwaffe night-fighter crews at this time? Also, were the Luftwaffe aircrew lost this night experienced (eg. had completed a full flying training syllabus and not a reduced flight hour program, been flying night-fighters for an extended period, etc.), particularly those lost due to the poor weather conditions?

Thank you for your time.

Pete A.

[Peter Spoden]

Hello Pete,
Good questions!

1. Morale among German nightfighters was always high in those days. If you have seen a young dead mother still with the burnt baby in her arms in our devasted towns, then you knew what to do.

2.IFR training and combat training was good until 1944. I needed 27 months on flying schools and radar training in special squadrons before sending to missions in August 1943.

3.Losses among "Wilde Sau" pilots (109 and 190) were higher because of low IFR qualification. High Command stopped "Wilde Sau" by 1-mot later on.

4. During Berlin Raid 1/2 Jan 1944 RAF lost 28 of 421 dispatched Lancasters. Harris had to stop Berlin Raids a few months later because of heavy losses.

A Dutch researcher Theo Boiten is hopefully publishing "Nacht Jagd Diaries" in 2008 after more than 10 years studying of 7500 claims on both sides.
Maybe this brings more light in this terible and tragic air war,
best regards
Peter Spoden

[Pete A]

Hi Peter,
Thank you so much for your response. Obviously the training in your time was comprehensive and the morale very high.

When do you feel there was a change in the night-fighter crew atmosphere? No doubt it was due to a number of reasons over a period of time, but what in your view are the significant events that diminished the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe night-fighter arm (eg. the need to fly at tree top height to avoid RAF night-fighters, the jamming of communications by the RAF’s 100 Group, the unserviceability of aircraft, lack of fuel for operations, etc.)?

Does anyone else have an opinion on the events or lack thereof that curtailed the Luftwaffe’s night-fighter force?


Kind Regards
Pete A.