Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?

[tcolvin]

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the BofB, is there any dispute about the point made by Clive Ponting in his book '1940, Myth and Reality', that the BofB was won largely, but not entirely, in spite of the RAF's generalship.

1. Left to their own devices, the RAF would not have had an effective air defence system in 1940. Their preferred strategy was defence through attack with the bomber. The industrial capacity necessary to outproduce the LW in fighters was created by a decision of Cabinet in November 1938 that overruled the RAF. The RAF's Dowding System of air defence was made possible by political decision-making.
2. British fighter production, repair and storage systems were reorganised successfully by Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production as a result of its separation from the Air Ministry in May 1940. The result was that British fighter availability increased from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at end October, while German fighter availability declined over the same period from 725 to 275.
3. By contrast with the success of non-RAF management of aircraft supply, the supply of pilots was left in RAF hands with nearly disastrous results. The pilot training system was inefficient with 4,000 training aircraft producing 2,500 pilots in the 12 months preceding the summer of 1940, while Germany produced one pilot per training aircraft. Even so there was no real shortage of British pilots with 9,000 available to fly 5,000 aircraft. The RAF nevertheless managed to create a shortage by; over-allocating pilots to squadrons (26 pilots for 20 aircraft); allocating 70% of available pilots to non front-line positions (20% to vital instruction, 20% to continuing training of pilots after they had qualified, and 30% to office jobs because the RAF insisted on all staff jobs being filled by pilots).
4. The RAF starved the vital 11 Group of Spitfires, giving it a split of 70% Hurricanes/30% Spitfires while other less critical Groups had a 50/50 split.
5. 11 & 12 Group airfields had resident Blenheim night-fighter squadrons throughout the BofB when their space could have been utilised by Spitfire day-fighters. Coastal Command and FAA airfields in 11 & 12 Group areas were not switched over to day-fighters.
6. Squadrons when re-deployed took all of their fitters and spares with them which removed the squadron from combat for a week. Pilots who landed at a strange airfield had to return to base before being redeployed, instead of re-engaging from where they landed and returning to base later. The GAF later showed how fighters could be deployed across the length of Germany and be refuelled, rearmed and serviced by any airfield unit.
7. In summary, the RAF in general stubbornly adhered to tradition and hidebound procedures even at a time of national emergency. The BofB was decided by; Britain's ability to outproduce Germany in fighters; Dowding's System of air defence (the exception that proved the rule); LW mistakes in equipment and strategy; RN destruction of the German destroyer fleet in Norway; and geography.

Tony

[Ruy Horta]

Have you read Terraine's "The Right of the Line"?

IMHO an excellent analysis of the RAF during the war.

I'm enjoying the BBC's BoB season, but have shut off my "critical" filter to simply enjoy the myth

Regardless how you look at it, the Battle of Britain was an epic fight and the mythical part of it is just as important as the cold facts.

Yesterday watching Ewan and Colin McGregor was pure joy. With just enough drama added to include a perfect lump in the throat at the end. I have a soft spot for Ewan as an actor, his brother looks like a nice guy as well.

The docudrama adaption of Geoff Wellum's "First Light" is a nice example that such an approach to history can work (helas no points for History Channel, or the Cheap Reenactment Channel, which is what it should be called).

I think the success of The Battle of Britain is the success of the myth, which is as ingrained in the national ethos today, as it was back then. It was an epic victory, adding some extra drama and excitement just adds to the overal magnificence.

Do we really have to think about the fact that the RAF had a force multiplier with radar, defensive combat over friendly territory and the short legs of the Jagdwaffe?

That the margin was even smaller if we just count fighters, as the bombers were just flying targets when it comes to air combat?

Finally that an RAF defeat in the south, that is losing air parity, would still leave any hypothetical invasion force that had to face the might of the Royal Navy?

Britain was hardly the "small" isolated european country of the myth

It was one of the biggest empires the world has ever seen, albeit in decline. An empire with still the largest and arguably most powerful navy in the world.

The Kriegsmarine had shot its bolt with the Norwegian invasion. The surface forces would have been of little effect in a German invasion of the south coast of England.

The British people might have feared an invasion (and fear is a great way to mobilize the people in time of crisis), but how many really thought in terms of defeat?

Hind sight is 20-20 granted, but Britain's defense was formidable and the RAF was only the first hurdle, not even the most difficult one...

My thought are in no way to detract from the courage that was shown on a daily basis by all those young men from the RAF that risked their lives in an effort to defend their country. Far from it, like I wrote earlier, I didn't get a lump in my throat and moist eyes for being a cynic as I watched both shows.

In the end I love the myth and have only the highest regard for the few.

[glider1]

If I can take these points one at a time

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the BofB, is there any dispute about the point made by Clive Ponting in his book '1940, Myth and Reality', that the BofB was won largely, but not entirely, in spite of the RAF's generalship.

1. Left to their own devices, the RAF would not have had an effective air defence system in 1940. Their preferred strategy was defence through attack with the bomber. The industrial capacity necessary to outproduce the LW in fighters was created by a decision of Cabinet in November 1938 that overruled the RAF. The RAF's Dowding System of air defence was made possible by political decision-making.

I think its fair to say that it was made possible by Political pressure but it did come from Dowding ie from the RAF. Politically it made sense to put the money into aircraft as thats the headline that politicos like. From a strategic position the money was best spent on radar.

1. British fighter production, repair and storage systems were reorganised successfully by Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production as a result of its separation from the Air Ministry in May 1940. The result was that British fighter availability increased from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at end October, while German fighter availability declined over the same period from 725 to 275.

Production is always best kept away from the Air Minestry and kept in the hands of someone who knows about efficiency.

1. By contrast with the success of non-RAF management of aircraft supply, the supply of pilots was left in RAF hands with nearly disastrous results. The pilot training system was inefficient with 4,000 training aircraft producing 2,500 pilots in the 12 months preceding the summer of 1940, while Germany produced one pilot per training aircraft. Even so there was no real shortage of British pilots with 9,000 available to fly 5,000 aircraft. The RAF nevertheless managed to create a shortage by; over-allocating pilots to squadrons (26 pilots for 20 aircraft); allocating 70% of available pilots to non front-line positions (20% to vital instruction, 20% to continuing training of pilots after they had qualified, and 30% to office jobs because the RAF insisted on all staff jobs being filled by pilots).

The only part of this that would agree with is the 30% in office jobs. Training is too important to be left, its a mistake Germany made during the war. 26 Pilots for 20 aircraft I agree with as it gives the squadron some staying power, as tired pilots can be given a day off. PLanes are more easily replaced than pilots. German air units had an equal number of aircraft and pilots and soon had more aircraft than pilots to fly them. By 28th September they had 712 servicable Me109's but only 676 pilots.

The RAF starved the vital 11 Group of Spitfires, giving it a split of 70% Hurricanes/30% Spitfires while other less critical Groups had a 50/50 split.

This I agree with totally

11 & 12 Group airfields had resident Blenheim night-fighter squadrons throughout the BofB when their space could have been utilised by Spitfire day-fighters. Coastal Command and FAA airfields in 11 & 12 Group areas were not switched over to day-fighters.

The night fighter squadrons had to be in the best place to intercept german bombers and by default that meant fighter command airbases. Also I wasn't aware of a lack of space being an issue and as a result taking over more bases would not have helped much.

Squadrons when re-deployed took all of their fitters and spares with them which removed the squadron from combat for a week. Pilots who landed at a strange airfield had to return to base before being redeployed, instead of re-engaging from where they landed and returning to base later. The GAF later showed how fighters could be deployed across the length of Germany and be refuelled, rearmed and serviced by any airfield unit.

I can understand taking the fitters with them but would agree to leaving the spares behind. Also I agree that the Luftwaffe did show more flexibility than any other airforce during the war when it came to units landing at different stations.

1. In summary, the RAF in general stubbornly adhered to tradition and hidebound procedures even at a time of national emergency. The BofB was decided by; Britain's ability to outproduce Germany in fighters; Dowding's System of air defence (the exception that proved the rule); LW mistakes in equipment and strategy; RN destruction of the German destroyer fleet in Norway; and geography.

My Father once told me that we had won because we made less mistakes than the Germans but that probably applies to any battle or conflict.
David

[Nick Beale]

Tony, I know you love doing this "why everyone was wrong" thing but in this case it wouldn't have hurt to read a little more widely before cranking up the old contrarian routine. This was all said years ago in Dizzy Allen's "Who Won the Battle of Britain?"

I have seen arguments (possibly in Angus Calder's "The People's War" or Len Deighton's "Fighter" but I couldn't swear to it) that Beaverbrook's achievements were as much a myth as anything else you cite. For instance it is arguable that he arrived too late to affect much during the BoB itself and that his measures achieved short term success at the expense of mid-term chaos (and exhausted workers who started making mistakes) that then had to be sorted out.

When you write "the RAF in general stubbornly adhered to tradition and hidebound procedures … Dowding's System of air defence [was] the exception that proved the rule" you're just trying to have it both ways. in the late 1930s the RAF ordered fighters and started building an air defence system to defend against an attack by unescorted bombers from Germany. There was no air defence system like it anywhere else in the world. That system and those aircraft proved good enough to handle attacks by escorted bombers coming from France in 1940. All in all, I'd say that was a pretty impressive feat of planning and implementation.

The German pilot:aircraft establishment of 1:1, their training infrastructure and their "fly-till-you-die" system (no tours of duty, just the odd break beside a lake) were all part of Germany's failure to plan for anything but a short war.

In 1940 Luftwaffe Intelligence was a contradiction in terms.

The Spitfire and Hurricane were designed from the outset to carry eight machine guns, the Bf 109 for two (perhaps on the basis that if it was good enough in 1917 it was good enough in 1935). The Bf 109 of 1939, playing catch-up, had half the Spit/Hurricane armament and in mid-1940 it jumped ahead for a short time.

You mentioned the Blenheims: a Blenheim achieved the first ever kill with airborne radar during the Battle, something the Luftwaffe couldn't manage for about another two years.

Nobody got everything right but the RAF still won the Battle of Britain.

[Kutscha]

I think there is a sickness in British society these days.

Clive Ponting certainly did not do much, if any, research.

British fighter production, repair and storage systems were reorganised successfully by Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production as a result of its separation from the Air Ministry in May 1940. The result was that British fighter availability increased from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at end October, while German fighter availability declined over the same period from 725 to 275.

Single engine fighters Date: 28.06.40

Bf109s - 1107 on hand, 856 serviceable
Pilots - 1126 present, 906 ready

Single engine fighters Date: 28.09.40

Bf109s - 920 on hand, 712 serviceable
Pilots - 917 present, 676 ready

Single engine fighters Date: 28.12.40

Bf109s - 829 on hand, 586 serviceable
Pilots - 915 present, 711 ready

http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm

Squadrons when re-deployed took all of their fitters and spares with them which removed the squadron from combat for a week. Pilots who landed at a strange airfield had to return to base before being redeployed, instead of re-engaging from where they landed and returning to base later. The GAF later showed how fighters could be deployed across the length of Germany and be refuelled, rearmed and serviced by any airfield unit.

Keeping the 'team together is a good idea. Taking spares with the squadron helps with logistics. You know what you have and don't have.

What a nightmare for FC control trying to co-ordinate these odd a/c into the battle.

Considering that most of the airfields in 11 Group were FC airfields I don't see much problem re-arming and re-fueling.

Actually a Fw190 could not be re-fueled at a Bf109 base unless there was C3 fuel present and certainly could not be serviced.

[Kutscha]

Disposition of RAF FC squadrons on Aug 13 1940. One thing to keep in mind is the nearness of 10 and 12 Group Spitfire bases to 11 Group.

10 Group

No. 87 Squadron (Hurricane
No. 213 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 238 Squadron (Hurricane)

No. 92 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 234 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 609 Squadron (Spitfire)

No. 247 Squadron (Gladiator)

No. 604 Squadron (Blenheim)

11 Group

No. 17 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 32 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 85 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 56 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 151 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 501 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 615 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 111 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 1 (RCAF) Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 1 (RAF) Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 257 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 43 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 145 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 601 Squadron (Hurricane)

No. 54 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 65 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 74 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 266 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 610 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 64 Squadron (Spitfire)

No. 600 Squadron (Blenheim)

12 group

No. 73 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 249 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 46 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 242 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 229 Squadron (Hurricane)

No. 616 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 222 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 611 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 66 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 19 Squadron (Spitfire)

No. 264 Squadron (Defiant)

No. 29 Squadron (Blenheim)

13 Group

No. 607 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 3 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 504 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 232 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 605 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 253 Squadron (Hurricane)
No. 245 Squadron (Hurricane)

No. 41 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 72 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 79 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 603 Squadron (Spitfire)
No. 602 Squadron (Spitfire)

No. 219 Squadron (Blenheim)

No. 141 Squadron (Defiant)

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-30.html

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

The Spitfire and Hurricane were designed from the outset to carry eight machine guns, the Bf 109 for two (perhaps on the basis that if it was good enough in 1917 it was good enough in 1935).

I don't know for the Hurricane, but the Spitfire was designed for four MGs originally, then came the Air Ministry's specs for eight machineguns, leading to the re-design of the wings which were now of elliptic form.

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

The Bf 109 of 1939, playing catch-up, had half the Spit/Hurricane armament and in mid-1940 it jumped ahead for a short time.

If you mean the introduction of cannon armament, it was introduced on the E-3 first (two MGs, two cannons), and the E-3 production run parallel to the all-MG E-1 from the end of 1938.

You mentioned the Blenheims: a Blenheim achieved the first ever kill with airborne radar during the Battle, something the Luftwaffe couldn't manage for about another two years.

In all fairness, neither could the RAF for about another six months if I recall correctly. Its true that the first AI systems were employed in 1940 by a Blenheim, but it was more an experimental set in field test rather than anything more serious.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

The Spitfire was designed for four MGs originally, then came the Air Ministry's specs for eight machineguns, leading to the re-design of the wings which were now of elliptic form.

I'll take your word for it, although the specification was issued a year before the first Spitfire flew. The point is that the Air Ministry (or Ralph Sorley) had studied armament needs and come up with the 8 MG specification. They were thinking ahead.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

If you mean the introduction of cannon armament, it was introduced on the E-3 first (two MGs, two cannons), and the E-3 production run parallel to the all-MG E-1 from the end of 1938.

So the Bf 109's cannon came years later than the 8 MG specification — which was kind of my point. Also consider what was actually in service. Wasn't the Bf 109 D in use in the Polish campaign and (as an earlier post on this thread said) the E-1 a significant element of strength in the BoB?

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

In all fairness, neither could the RAF for about another six months if I recall correctly. Its true that the first AI systems were employed in 1940 by a Blenheim, but it was more an experimental set in field test rather than anything more serious.

From memory, RAF night fighters practically doubled their kills each month through the Blitz months of 1941.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I'll take your word for it, although the specification was issued a year before the first Spitfire flew. The point is that the Air Ministry (or Ralph Sorley) had studied armament needs and come up with the 8 MG specification. They were thinking ahead. So the Bf 109's cannon came years later than the 8 MG specification — which was kind of my point.

My point is that they were hardly the only ones, the major difference being that while the RAF was increasing the number of guns for its fighter specifications, others were on the path of opting for cannon armament.

The March 1933 specification of the RLM - which ultimately lead to the 109 - specified either

-a single, very powerful but heavy 2cm MG C/30 Motorkanone
- two engine cowl-mounted 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns, or
- one lightweight, engine-mounted 2c MG FF cannon with two 7.92 mm MG 17s.

Regardless, the competing German firms seems to have been putting with a twin cowl MG at the start (which was pretty much standard for the biplanes they replaced anyway), but the idea for heavier armament was there, from the start, and the technical aspects of the planes clearly anticipated such (see use of side mounted superchargers of the engines - this made engine mounted guns possible).

The British AM's revision for specs for gun armement (8-gun batteries) came in April 1935.The French were also adopting engine mounted cannons for the fighters at about the same time, and the Soviets were absolute pioneers of cannon armament on their I-16s AFAIK.

Also consider what was actually in service.

The eight-gun Hurricane came into service in the end of 1937, I don't know how many were in service during 1938, but I'd risk saying not many. At the start of the war there were still just about 500 produced, equipping 18 Squadrons (so roughly 2-300 being in service).

The first Spits came into service August 1938, but production was so slow they couldn't even muster a full Squadron until the end of the year, when the cannon armed 109E production started. The Emil then very rapidly started to equip units - I believe a large number of airframes were already produced, they were waiting for the Daimler-Benz engines to arrive. The Jumo powered 109D, that was the sole type employed in September 1938 (780 or so in service) was rapidly replaced by Emils by the start of the war; in July 1939, there were already some 500 Emils (and 50 of the old Doras) in service, and this roughly doubled by the end of September 1939, with some 90% of the 1125 available day fighters being the most recent type (see: http://ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se30939.htm).

In short, effectively (meaning: in meaningful numbers) cannon armed 109s and eight gun Hurricanes/Spitfires came into service at about the same time.

Wasn't the Bf 109 D in use in the Polish campaign and (as an earlier post on this thread said) the E-1 a significant element of strength in the BoB?

I believe it (the Dora) was, moreover it made up something like half the 109 force over Poland, but that force was rather small (200 or so, with the rest guarding the German air space from the West), and overall it was being phased out completely and for all practical purposes.

As for the E-1, it seems to have been produced parallel and with roughly the same production ratio as the cannon E-3 until early 1940, and made up about 35-40% of the force during BoB.

I've always wondered why this was so; there's an early war propaganda picture showing two 109Es in flight, and the leader is flying a cannon E-3 while the wingman an all-MG E-1.

I was wondering if there was some tactical doctrine behind it, stipulating that the leader responsible for the attack will be flying a heavier armed aircraft, with armament suitable against bombers, while a wingman with an armament more suitable against fighters will be protecting him..? It should be noted that it was an exception for a fighter to be armored until mid-1940, so MG armament would be still effective. IMHO it would worth looking at if JGs were equipped in such fashion, with an equal mix of E-1s and E-3s.

[glider1]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I don't know for the Hurricane, but the Spitfire was designed for four MGs originally, then came the Air Ministry's specs for eight machineguns, leading to the re-design of the wings which were now of elliptic form.

Its my understanding that the change from 4 to 8 guns was done at the mock up stage before production started.

In all fairness, neither could the RAF for about another six months if I recall correctly. Its true that the first AI systems were employed in 1940 by a Blenheim, but it was more an experimental set in field test rather than anything more serious.

The first radar kill by a Beaufighter was in November 1940 and the first Blenhiem NF kill was in July 1940. There were of course other kills between the two and whilst I do not doubt that there was a lot of development in this time, there wasn't a 6 month gap.