Last Days of the Luftwaffe - comments

[edwest]

This new book by author Manfred Griehl is for the specialist reader only. It is enjoyable to read because of his concise and clear writing style. I hesitate to call what I am about to write a proper review since I lack the necessary expertise to truly evaluate the information cointained therein.

The book begins by outlining the changes being made to the process which decided which aircraft would be be produced, encouraging production with the fewest changes and procuring the necessary raw materials and personnel. This included flak weapons as well. This streamlining included the addition of a figure who would eventually head most of the German secret weapons programs, SS-Gruppenfeuhrer Hans Kammler.The production goals for each aircraft type are then given, running a little past the middle of 1945. The introduction ends with a photo of the interior of one of the Kuno manufacturing facilities. This is the first time I've seen such a photo.

The first chapter covers which aircraft would be assigned to which Gruppe(n), Geschwader, etc. This covers plans to the end of 1945. For example: "Two Gruppen of LG 1 would receive the Ju 388 K-1 instead of Ju 88 A-4."

And...

"It was believed that two Jabo Gruppen could be formed between August and the end of December 1945 using Ju 388 J-1s or J-3s."

There is a photo of two rows of Fw 190s discovered by American troops in a railway tunnel. I am unfamiliar with this photo. I am almost certain that these aircraft could be recognized by their camouflage pattern alone. No numbers are visible.

But, many of these plans would come to nought. "Once the rearrangement of the bomber formations was given up as impossible, the fighter and Jabo units were given absolute priority."

By page 17, one wonders why the author presented these plans since the book is peppered with references to most of the plans never coming to fruition. The aura of futility permeates the book.

Chapter Two gives references to the Luftwaffe's successes against Allied bombers in 1943 and the resulting decline. Reference is made to "railway tunnel Objekt 217 B-C at Tischnowitz" which began producing the Bf 109, protected from Allied bombs. Production information is given for the Bf 109 K-4. "Most of the machines of this type had a DB 605 DCM engine." Production of the K-6 is also discussed, which was planned for the summer of 1945. A list of units supplied with the Bf 109 K-4 is given as of mid-April.

This is followed with a discussion of plans for the Fw 190 A-8 to D-15. A particularly bad photo of an Fw 190 D-9 is included. This is followed by other bad photos that make me wonder what the author was thinking or perhaps the publisher is to blame. Next, the Ta 152 is discussed. Example: "Most of the 21 Ta 152 H-0s were received at KdE; Luftwaffenkommando Reich took seven more and another went directly to III./JG 301." Accounts are given about attacks against the Russians using D-9s with AB 250 and AB 500 containers. Mention is also made of a few activities of II.(Sturm)/JG 300 against Allied bombers.

Ram-Fighters are covered next. Hitler went along with the concept "if unwillingly," but refused to order it. He would not stand in the way of those who wanted to volunteer.

Chapter 3 covers the Me 262 and some operations over the Reich. Production and aircraft actually distributed to various units is covered. A list covering all types delivered as of 10 April 1945 is given, including those used in testing, industry and research.

Next is the 1 TL fighter. A wind tunnel model is shown with a single engine attached to a short spacer along the lower midline, just ahead of the fuselage center. The Ta 183 is discussed, followed by the Me P 1101, the P 1110, P 1112, the Lippisch DM 1 and P-13a, and finally, a mixed power Focke-Wulf design. But, by 12 April 1945, work had to be given up.

Chapter 4 covers He 162 development, testing complications, including the loss of twenty pilots of JG 1. Then the rush to retreat by members of Heinkel Sued in the face of the Russians. Problems with fuel, Allied fighters, and the final disposition of delivered aircraft are given.

Chapter 5 gives the disposition of the Jabos and Blitzbombers. "In the last few nights of April 1945, crews of SG 1, who had been at Gatow/Mecklenburg until 26 April, sortied to relieve the pressure on Berlin."

And...

"... on the night of 1 May, some of the 39 Fw 190 F-8s attached to III./KG 200 dropped containers of supplies to the defenders."


continued...

[edwest]

A power struggle is then described: "On 30 March Kammler ordered all available Blitzbombers transferred to IX. Fliegerkorps. General der Flieger Josef Kammhuber intervened and diverted two-thirds to JG 7 and the other third to KG (J) 54 on the orders of the Luftwaffe General Staff once the Reichsmarschall had refused to hand Kammler unlimited power over IX. Fliegerkorps."

Next is mention of the He 132, followed by the EF 126, the Ar 234 and night fighters in the Jabo role. A specification sheet for the Ju 88 G-7 is printed, of which one experimental example was built. Drawings are shown for the Do-335 B-6 and Do 350.

Next we are treated to an account of the training of Hitler Youth as pilots and attempts by the SS to establish their own flying corps. Photos of the Stummelhabicht, a converted Grunau Baby for prone position flying, and a bizarre glider called a Liegekranich. A poor quality photo of the only known He 162 S training glider is shown. These gliders were provided to train young pilots to fly the various rocket fighters coming into production. A drawing of a truly bizarre glider(?) with a BT 1400 attached is also shown.

The next chapter covers air to air rocket developments, followed by the Horten Ho IX, and the SS takeover of the Go 229. Next, the Ho XVIII and JU 130, plus mention of the Me P 1108. The author makes the statement: "Exhortations to step up the pace to build a large jet bomber in March 1945 resulted from the dreams of a leadership blind to the unstoppable approach of defeat." and ends with "Not until a day or so before Allied forces reached the bombed-out factories or tunnels in which production had been concentrated did the last SS man give up, throwing down their weapons and leaving to their own devices the slaves who had survived."

It is here where I must respectfully disagree with the author. In painting such a picture, he diverts from his role of meticulous researcher to personal opinion. To which, of course, he is entitled.

But I wish to point out the following: "And the Strategic Bombing Survey demonstrated conclusively that the bulk of German capacity to produce was intact. In spite of all damage, German industrial capacity was greater at the end of the war than at the beginning. The greatest single bar to production was the breakdown of all transportation; and this had largely been brought about by the Germans when they blew up their own bridges." Richard Sasuly, Chief of Financial Intelligence and liaison of the Finance Division of United States Military Government, from the book, IG Farben, dated 1947.

Chapter 8 discusses Me 163 operations, development of the Ar E 377, He P 1068 Julia, later, the P 1077, the Eber, Rammer and Fliegende Panzerfaust, plus the Natter. On the latter project, the SS was pushing heavily for continued development. Mention is made of "...the Malsi equipment which had a target-finding range of 21 kilometers up to a ceiling of 12 kilometers." Next, a manned Rheintochter, Me 263/Ju 248, and various Me 262 developments. Various other machines are discussed, including a photo mentioning "Several Fi 103 were captured more or less intact during the final Allied advances." And I have indeed seen photos of several such machines lying in streets, giving the impression that they had been used operationally as transports, perhaps for special missions. A photo is shown of an Fw 190 F-8 with (small) A3 + 18 on the ground in a derelict state, flown by KG 200. A good photo of a Bu 181 with a top wing mounted panzerfaust is shown, with a Mickey Mouse holding a panzerfaust with the head pointed down in a dash outline shield. A dash outline of what may be another emblem appears just behind the cockpit.

Chapter 10 covers Mistel use, along with plans plans for types using as yet unbuilt aircraft, or, in one case, a V 1.

Chapter 11 covers flak rockets. Mention is also made about the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Werner von Braun which was brought about by an attempt to recruit him to the SS. "Braun's refusal led to his arrest by the Gestapo on 15 March 1944 for 'suspected sabotage of V-weapons'." Interesting.

Also interesting: "When Peenemuende and Karlshagen were partially evacuated on 31 January 1945, Himmler gave Kammler command of Armeekorps zbV ('for special purposes') which now became the overseer of all rocket warfare."

I should comment on the fact that there were published reports of Allied bomber crews encountering what they called "mini V-2s" on their way to targets.

Chapter 12 starts with radar. A very interesting photo of many Wuerzburg radar under construction is shown. Centrimetric radars were now going to operational units. "These were modern 9-cm FuG 240 and FuG 244 radars." Next, jet night fighters.

Chapter 13 covers miracle weapons. Atomic weapons are dismissed with the claim that no documentary evidence exists. This is not true. One document records a German eyewitness in an aircraft. The American document, dated 24 January 1946, rates the source B (usually reliable), 1 (confirmed by other sources). The event occurred in October 1944.

Next are chemical and biological weapons. Here, the author, who has already acknowledged the encroachment of the SS and the use of slave labor, does not mention a rationale for the lack of use, by the Germans, of the three types of nerve gas then available, already packed into artillery shells and releasable by aircraft. The author indicates that "...there seems to have been some kind of tacit understanding between the various belligerents that even in defeat they would not resort to chemical or biological weapons."

This seems to be in stark contrast to the SS fanatics and the madman in charge of the war. An eyewitness account tells the following:
"In the Urlau ammunition depot near Leutkirchen in the Allgaeu, 10,000 tons of normal ammunition and over over 20,000 tons of poison-gas ammunition were stored: blue-green and yellow-cross grenades as well as large quantities of Tabun, the newly discovered nerve poison. Their explosion if the enemy came near had been expressly ordered by Hitler."
The German Army Medical Corps in World War II by Alex Buchner (translated from the original German edition), published by Schiffer, 1999.

He ends the chapter by reporting that the A-9/A-10 Amerika Rocket "...was far from ready for testing in 1945, never mind reaching operational status." This is contradicted by a report by Donald Putt published in the March 1946 edition of SAE Transactions (Volume 54), which indicates: "First experimental article date [A-9]: 1945." Included is its use in conjunction with the A-10.




Ed

[FalkeEins]

..Ed.. thanks a lot for going to the trouble. Have been looking for something like this. Haven't seen this volume anywhere yet. Never too sure with Griehl. Who is/are the publisher & translator ? Is this a title you recommend? Sounds more detailed than Price's 'Last Year ..' (well I suppose it would be as it deals with the ..' last days..' )..appendices, references..?

[edwest]

I'm glad you found my comments useful. The publisher is Frontline Books, London, which is an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd. I do not see any reference to a German language edition.

The author mentions where he obtained his information and acknowledges the help of well known experts in the research community. There are no footnotes or appendices with references to specific documents, but I believe that space, and therefore, expense, was the primary reason.

Finally, aside from some references to late war operations and some mention of unit consolidations, the rest of the book is about what was planned and this, generally, did not take place.

After the 10 July assassination attempt on Hitler, he understandably put more and more of his trust into the SS. The mention of Dr. Ing. SS General Hans Kammler, for me, was an important acknowledgement of a figure who would receive Plenopotentiary powers from Hitler on 27 March 1945, and be given all power to call on any branch of the military and the Party to assist him in advanced weapons development.

I can recommend this book to those who wish to fill in some gaps regarding special missions and a few interesting late-war events, such as Me-262s of the Hogeback battle unit assisting in putting down the Czech insurgency in Prague. Since I do not own a large specialized library, I am unaware of how much of this information may have been covered elsewhere, both in books and magazine articles. And for those interested in the plans that were in place and projected to the end of 1945, then this book goes a long way in answering those questions.

For me, I wanted to know about those last days and those last missions as part of completing a picture of late war air operations and in the hope of answering some questions for my own research regarding Luftwaffe and non-Luftwaffe activity during this time period.



Regards,
Ed

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by edwest

Since I do not own a large specialized library, I am unaware of how much of this information may have been covered elsewhere, both in books and magazine articles…
Ed

Griehl's books sounds as if it may have some elements in common with Alfred Price's "The Last Year of the Luftwaffe" (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1991: ISBN1-85409-113-1)