Australian Spitfires

[Jim Oxley]

JoeB, Spitfires over Darwin only covers the Australian side of the air war over Darwin. The book is not about claims v's actual's (whch is always an area of contention).

The book presents (without fanfare) the true side of the Spitfire effort over Darwin from the Australian point of view; the limitations of the aircraft in that environment, it's losses and the reasons why, and the life that the flyers led in such a remote part of Australia. It doesn't in any way try to portray the Spitfire as a 'great' fighter, in fact it understates it to a degree.

But it does dubunk factually many of the myths of the Spitfires poor performance.

I agree that it would be nice to see a book that deals with both the Japanese and the Australian sides in the battle over Darwin - and indeed one that also does the same for 1942 when the USAAF were based there. But nothing has been put into print yet - although there is something in the throes I gather.

[Nicholas]

JoeB

With respect I think you need to read the book before drawing conclusions about it. In fact I did not claim it as "definitive". I stated that it is a very balanced Australian perspective and I recommended it to Graham.

For the record I am not particularly "a Spit fan" but I am very interested in the RAAF's air war and this was a part of it very ably described, from the Australian perspective, by Jim Grant. As such it certainly deserves consideration as a scholarly study and definitely adds more to our factual knowledge about the RAAF operational use of Spitfires than the simplifications you have repeated here. To dismiss it as merely "adding color" or to ignore it because it does not include Japanese claims/losses does a great disservice to Mr Grant. There are so few books on the Darwin Spitfires that it would be "rather surprising" for anyone with a serious interest in the subject to ignore Mr Grant's study.

I agree that it would be nice to have the accurate claim/loss records from both sides and to hear the answers to the questions posed by Mr Dunn. Would they be "definitive" in assessing the Australian use of the Spitfire? Well, no, because air warfare is never just about the machines used in it and, however much factual information is included, any historical study is always subject to bias, interpretation and debate. This is true still of the Battle of Britain where a wealth of factual material from both sides is available. The bias is as inherent if one sets out predetermined to demonstrate an inferiority in the Spitfire as if one sets out to demonstrate its superiority.

In the words of Ivan N Kozhedub: "No matter how good the violin may be, much depends on the violinist" and, I might humbly add, the rest of the orchestra, the conductor and even the concert organisers.

[rldunn]

Joe et al

1. JAAF Type 100 (DINAH) recce a/c did not begin to fly recon missions over Australia until Nov 42. USAAF P-40s (49th FG) thus had no opportubity to intercept them. During the period when RAAF Kittyhawks defended Darwin recce mission were flown but weather was generally bad no doubt interfering with intercptions. The Japanese navy recce unit was not then (late 42/early 43) equipped with the Type 100 but did fly successful recons with its Type 2 land recce (J1N1) a/c during the early Spitfire period. In the New Guinea-area both P-38s and P-40s succeeded in shooting down Type 100 recce a/c during 1943. Recce missions over Australia continued even after losses were suffered in early to mid-43 and in fact continued until the summer of 44.

2. The Japanese did not change tactics during the course of the campaign but flew a mix of "air annihilation" operations and escorted bomber missions throughout. Despite Caldwell's claims for "light bombers" (sometimes called larger aircraft, fighter-bombers or KATES) on the 2 March 43 mission, there were only Zero fighters involved. Fifteen provided cover to 6 others that strafed Coomalie Creek afld. No Japanese a/c were lost. Guide planes were used in this mission to aid the fighters in navigation. Other fighter sweeps took place on May 10th (Millingimbi); 22nd June (JAAF); and, Sept 7th.

3. The Japanese conducted night bombing operations prior to the arrival of the Spitfires, most notably from Nov 42 to Jan 43. During these ops Kittyhawks successfully intercepted and destroyed one bomber. The change to night ops in Aug 43 by navy bombers was associated with the dispersion of their escorting force (Air Group 202) in small flights throughout the region in an air defense posture. As of July 43 both Air Group 202 and Air Group 753 (bombers) were far stronger than they had been in March. In terms of numbers they were more capable of offensive ops in Sept than they had been in March. Air Group 202 did assemble forces for ops over Australia twice during Sept 43 but under a joint army-navy agreement they were generally required to provide defensive cover to a large number of disperesed locations.

4. Darwin was a "backwater" of the larger Pacific conflict. One example of this is that as of early 1943 Air Group 202 was not authorized to receive the latest model Zero. Its T/O authorized only the model 21 and model 32 not the latest model 22. The only type a/c it received from new production in early 43 was the Nakajima-built Zero model 21. This was essentially the same a/c the Japanese had introduced in China in July 1940. Although a "backwater", Darwin was on Allied territory and the Japanese press made much of raids there. From March to Sept 43 Darwin was actually raided in daylight much more frequently than the more important targets of Port Moresby and Guadalcanal. Whenever the Japanese raided Port Moresby or Guadalcanal they suffered heavy losses. In the middle of 43 the Allies went over to the offensive. This included offensive action in the Aleutians (beginning May 43), the first raid in northern Japan from Alaska (July 43), and particularly the South Pacific offensive beginning 30 June 43. These strategic events plus the arrival of a group of B-24s (380th BG) capable of hitting wide-ranging targets "north of Australia" forced the Japanese into a permanent defensive posture.

The above is just an outline but essentially factual and not opinion or conjecture. Hope it is helpful.

RLD

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Nicholas

JoeB

With respect I think you need to read the book before drawing conclusions about it. In fact I did not claim it as "definitive". I stated that it is a very balanced Australian perspective and I recommended it to Graham.

Also with respect I repeat, that in the 21st century, books that attempt to cover any period of WWII air combat history without accounting the actual losses of the other side, as well as the actual enemy units, their organization, strategy, tactics, operational conditions and handicaps etc., are severly limited. I didn't say not to read them, but several posts implied, "here's the real story". Without the J information, that's simply impossible.

Also let's start realistically with where Western perception of the Pacific Air War has generally been most flawed (and this includes Allied efforts in many cases, not solely the Spitfires defending Darwin by any means). The severe defiict has generally been on the side of Japanese information, the common problem is definitely not "oversimplifying" based on too heavy reliance on Japanese info.

On the guy who plays the fiddle, it's fine, but first get the total real story of what happened. Again much conventional wisdom about the Pac war IMO proceeds to the fiddle v player part without the right foundation of total facts. To go off topic a bit with your quote by Kozhedub, it could be applied to the air units he flew with or his own claims in GPW. What's was the claim accuracy ratio there? I don't know. I've closely studied Soviet claim accuracy in the Korean War (which included Kozhedub as a senior leader though not combat pilot) and found it to be quite low. "Balanced" accounts from their side bear relatively little resemblance to what actually happened, does it mean don't read them? no but it's important to realize. Others may not accept my statement about that war, again a debate for somewhere else if they don't, but the point is if those facts can't be found and agreed to begin with, the 'guy who plays' v 'fiddle' part tends toward angels dancing on the head of a pin, IMHO.

I doubt plane and other factors can ever be fully separated, but stuff like the losses on each side really happened, likewise the units on each side (when were Type 100's used, etc), likewise why per their accounts and logically based on their *real* losses did the Japanese use day and night tactics v. N Aus in 1942-43?: pretty obviously, availability of fighters for escorted raids v. other needs at different times, not losses in escorted daylight raids. The Allied fighter force at Darwin in '43 (and '42 to a lesser degree, though the real J fighter losses were a bit higher in that case) was enough to prevent *unescorted* daylight raids, and present a risk to recon planes no doubt, but whether it accomplished greatly more is open to debate.

Joe

[Nicholas]

Er . . . . OK. I agree that factual losses (and linking actual losses to claims) for both sides is fundamental. But the starting point has to be available and accurate records. For the RAAF we have these - for the IJN/JAAF less so. Also let's not forget the implication of each force's practice in categorisation of damage/loss and eventual fate - an area where much may be concealed.

Grant's book is not a defence/promotion of Spitfire superiority, but an analysis (amongst other things) of why they were not more effective in air combat. This transcends the simplistic judgement of whether Zeros were better than Spitfires because it makes clear that the Spitfires were operated at a technical and tactical disadvantage on several counts. Hence the holistic element I stressed. The study is therefore still important to a full understanding of the situation, even without the accurate Japanese records. The discussion was not about generalisations on the limitations of 21st century books but about this specific book, which, not having even read, you appeared to dismiss by those generalisations!

The violin (not fiddle) analogy is merely about why one on one assessments of aircraft (technical) superiority are fruitless. Much will depend on the pilot and the tactical situation. That is all. A classic example of this is Schilling's AVG P-40 thrashing Brandt's RAF Buffalo, an incident much touted by the anti-Buffalo/British faction but about which 'Kitchie' Bargh's recent biography throws new and surprising light.

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Nicholas

Er . . . . OK. I agree that factual losses (and linking actual losses to claims) for both sides is fundamental. But the starting point has to be available and accurate records.
...The study is therefore still important to a full understanding of the situation, even without the accurate Japanese records.

A classic example of this is Schilling's AVG P-40 thrashing Brandt's RAF Buffalo, an incident much touted by the anti-Buffalo/British faction but about which 'Kitchie' Bargh's recent biography throws new and surprising light.

But, who says accurate (from their viewpoint) Japanese accounts don't exist for many episodes of the Pac War? That's also a common conjecture it seems. Available, OK, it's sometimes surprising how in the "hi tech modern" world basic language and culture barriers are still an obstacle. OTOH most of the best two sided books on the Pac War I've read were written by non-Japanese speakers (AFAIK) who nonetheless perservered to get that info. Another aspect from what I've read is that Japanese info accessed in English is usually not literally original records but often from Japanese official histories written well into the post war period, such as the Senshi Sosho (~"war history collection" 102 volume series) including info from original records. Maybe Rdunn could comment on the details of the historiography, but I know of no contention from scholars on the topic that those histories are seriously inaccurate for the periods and campaigns for which they give detailed operational info, which is quite alot of the war though not all.

I'm not familiar with the particular aspect of AVG you are referring to, whether Schiller himself outflew a Buffalo in some practice fight, or said the AVG did much better than Commonwealth units in SEA in the same period against the JAAF. The latter is a fact. However, ironically the book best documenting that fact, "Flying Tigers" by Ford was (and its author was) very unpopular with Schilling, a prolific internet poster in his last years. Because though the AVG had by mid '42 very much the measure of the Japanese fighters they faced (~3:1 real ratio v strictly JAAF fighters all in Dec '41-June '42, far better than other Allied units of the time), they shot down a lot fewer than they claimed (though not especially worse on average than other Allied fighter units of the period in that regard). Schilling insisted the Japanese records Ford used were "inaccurate" and "incomplete" but that was fairly obviously his conjecture based on his subjective recollections, and personal feelings about having AVG claims questioned. That's seems to be the case when records are challenged in most cases, especially by veterans of the actual combats. We want to and should respect them, and understand why they feel that way, but there are still too many lines in too many books saying "the enemy records don't admit these losses" when there's no evidence the supposed losses happened except claims. Wrecks are sometimes mentioned as evidence, almost uniformly without actual documentation of specific cases that prove the enemy loss records incomplete. That's a common factor in four of the cases we've touched on: the main topic, Commonwealth in SEA, AVG in China, Soviets in Korea. I've seen general statements in published works on each of those that wreck finding proved the enemy understated losses, but nothing that shows such statements to really pan out in any of the cases.

Once again, far back up in this thread sources are cited (chapters or articles, not whole books) detailing the OOB, claims and losses of the Japanese in fair detail for the Darwin campaign; no real evidence they are seriously incomplete AFAIK.

Joe

[Nicholas]

Originally Posted by JoeB

the AVG did much better than Commonwealth units in SEA in the same period against the JAAF. The latter is a fact.
Joe

Are you sure about that? That is certainly what we have been conditioned to believe by many writers. Dan Ford does not analyse RAF claims or combat reports in any detail and there are some major inconsistencies in the accounts of several of the RAF/AVG encounters with Japanese formations. Many of the RAF records for the period are missing and then there are those persistent rumours of RAF personnel "giving" claims away to AVG members. Is there any actual proof to confirm that downed Japanese aircraft were the result of AVG rather than RAF attacks?

Schilling was very anti-British. Some AVG books do not even mention RAF aircraft taking part in well known AVG/JAAF encounters, even when they most definitely did. Bargh's biography throws some light on this but I'm afraid the Flying Tigers deserved fame and attendant mythology has long over-shadowed the situation even for British writers.

Some Japanese Darwin loss records have been mentioned. But are they accurate? Are they complete? I remain sceptical about that.

[rldunn]

Nicholas

Capt. Terauki Kawano (Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, ret.), working for the Military History Department, Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, wrote a monograph (The Japanese Navy's air-raid against Australia during the World War Two) based on access to Japanese unit records available at the NIDS archives giving details of losses by JNAF units involved in attacks on Australia. In particular his sources included the unit combat records (kodochoshos) for Air Groups 202 and 753 for the Spitfire period. Historians generally recognize these as the best available evidence of Japanese losses. They are the unit commander's record of the action prepared immediately after the mission was completed. I would say anyone with access to this monograph or the source records on which it was based has a complete and accurate record of Japanese losses for these units over Australia.

The losses mentioned in certain published sources such as Hata & Izawa's book on Japanese fighter units seem to track closely with the data in the monograph mentioned above.

Scepticism is often good but it makes no sense to reject the best available data on a subject. In the case of the Zero versus Spitfire confrontation, we have the basic data on claims and losses. It makes no sense to ignore it or draw conclusions without considering it.

RLD

[Nicholas]

Thanks. Perhaps then you might post them here as JoeB has already requested? Scanning the posts above I can see only references to fighter losses and these do not seem to be directly from the source you mention. It would be helpful to confirm these but also to introduce bomber and recce losses, including damaged aircraft if known.

Notwithstanding the pedigree of the source you mention my scepticism is rooted in the extreme nature of Japanese wartime propaganda and the prevailing command psyche of the Japanese forces which was to deny reverses. In addition the quality of unit records is dependant on local factors and mistakes or ommissions are not unknown. I agree that these records should represent the best available but their 100% accuracy and completeness is not to be assumed.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by Nicholas

Er . . . . OK. I agree that factual losses (and linking actual losses to claims) for both sides is fundamental. But the starting point has to be available and accurate records.

For the RAAF we have these - for the IJN/JAAF less so.

How do you know that?

Originally Posted by Nicholas

Also let's not forget the implication of each force's practice in categorisation of damage/loss and eventual fate - an area where much may be concealed.

Might be? Could be? I know how that kind of argument would stand up in a court of law so let's not go there. Honest historians operate much the same way as honest police detectives. They build a case on what information is available, not on what they would like to believe.

Originally Posted by Nicholas

Grant's book is not a defence/promotion of Spitfire superiority, but an analysis (amongst other things) of why they were not more effective in air combat. This transcends the simplistic judgement of whether Zeros were better than Spitfires because it makes clear that the Spitfires were operated at a technical and tactical disadvantage on several counts.

I doubt if both sides agreed about overall disadvantages. They rarely do.

Originally Posted by Nicholas

The violin (not fiddle) analogy is merely about why one on one assessments of aircraft (technical) superiority are fruitless. Much will depend on the pilot and the tactical situation. That is all. A classic example of this is Schilling's AVG P-40 thrashing Brandt's RAF Buffalo, an incident much touted by the anti-Buffalo/British faction but about which 'Kitchie' Bargh's recent biography throws new and surprising light.

Someone has now written a differing opinion. Well so what, everybody has one.