[Juha]

Hello Tony
in fact I was referring cases where British infantry under German attacks declined air support and decided rely purely on artillery barrages directed by ordinary FOOs.

Quote:” The Transportation and the Oil Plans were given to Harris as direct orders in writing, and his views on them as panaceas were well-known.”

My point was exactly that while AOC BC had certain latitude in operations and Harris, being stronger willed than Portal got even more latitude, Churchill’s attitude had also significance in that, in the end his opinions were not decisive, the opinions of those who decided the target priorities and overall strategy were decisive. If those who thought that attacks on Germany’s power grid were the key to speedy victory could have convinced key scientific advisers like Lindeman and Zuckerman or people in Ministry of Economical Warfare or whatever, that they had got the right tool for victory they would have had good chances to have their idea implemented in spite of what Harris thought. But for some reason they didn’t got their idea accepted and in 44, when Allies knew much on Germany’s economy, the decision was to implement Transport and Oil Plans not the Power Grid Plan. Why that happened is much more important question than that what Harris thought about it or bombing strategy in general.

Juha