Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[tcolvin]

Kutscha, two comments.

1. The point about using A-36s is that it would preclude the need to build and operate Lancasters. These were suitable only for laying waste cities at night, which of course would not be needed once Germany's war-making capacity had forced it to capitulate.

2. Obviously there was a reason why BC did not even try to take out the German electricity system. The reason you give is their rationalisation for refusing to bomb 'panacea' targets, unless given a direct order in writing.

3. Your statement that the radius of action in miles for the FW-190A and Me-109G can apply to Allied dive bombers is incorrect and a misunderstanding (apples and oranges). The FW-190A and Me-109G were glide-bombers, while the A-36 was a dive-bomber. Its radius of action was more than twice that quoted for German glide-bombers.

Tactical Bulletin No.23, 'The A-36 (Mustang Fighter/Bomber) in North Africa', issued by the Northwest African Air Force, dated July 1, 1943, gives the following among other figures as a conservative loading and range characteristic;
Load: 1x500lb bomb and 1x75 fuel tank; Mission type: to target, bomb, return to base; Combat radius: 300 miles.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Juha,

I can accept that the P-51 was more cost-effective than the Mosquito.

Unfortunately there were many/most situations in the infantry attack when artillery directed by aerial spotters could not substitute for aircraft, even though, as you say, the army had plenty of artillery. The Germans were masters of camouflage, and nearly every attack was into a German ambush. For the attack to succeed the German heavy weapons had to be taken out as soon as they revealed themselves by firing, but 2TAF failed nine times out of ten to achieve this, even when they were present doing cab-rank, which was not always, and probably not even half the time.

It was a tragedy. Brooke believed he had got Churchill's agreement to the establishment of an army airforce after Alamein, but Montgomery went public, and without reference to Brooke, saying he and Tedder could do it together and a separate army airforce was not needed. Tedder and Montgomery then fixed the communication level at Group to Army instead of Group to Corps, which was the minimum acceptable. An independent army airforce, of course, would have cooperated at the Squadron-Battalion level, but that was too WWI for the RAF who categorically refused to consider any tie-up below army level.
The RAF therefore were permitted to continue to believe and to say that aircraft were not army weapons, and the army should learn to use its own weapons and stop calling on airforce weapons, whose strategic mission was to destroy German cities.
The RAF was ordered to set up a tactical airforce (or the army would have been allowed to do so), and the rest is known, but not always fully understood.

I would say your characterisation of the RAF as seriously studying all options won't wash. The Transportation and the Oil Plans were given to Harris as direct orders in writing, and his views on them as panaceas were well-known.

I don't think the spectacular raids on the Dams and the Dortmund-Ems Canal can be cited as evidence of an open mind by BC. Harris believed and said that he would crack morale in Germany by bombing cities and so end the war. Unbelievably BC did not interfere with German rebuilding of the dams, because that would have been a diversion from the main mission. The RAF was always interested in PR. Even in the dark days they had time to assist with that hilarious misrepresentation, "Target For Tonight".

Tony

[tcolvin]

Yes, Nick, the Typhoon was consistent with the FW-190F.
What we are discussing is the lack of a 2TAF a/c consistent with the Ju-87.

Tony

[Kutscha]

1. Despite your bias against the heavies, a squadron of Lancs would do a better job of destroying the power plant than the several squadrons of A-36s that would be required.

2. The quote is from the Strategic Bombing Survey.

3. Of coarse the P-51 had a greater combat radius than the 109 and 190 as it carried much more fuel. It doesn't matter whether the a/c were dive or glide bombers. In fact, climbing to altitude with a heavy bomb load would reduce the combat radius.

It was posted to show the reduction in combat radius of fighter based a/c carrying bombs.

[Juha]

Hello Tony
in fact I was referring cases where British infantry under German attacks declined air support and decided rely purely on artillery barrages directed by ordinary FOOs.

Quote:” The Transportation and the Oil Plans were given to Harris as direct orders in writing, and his views on them as panaceas were well-known.”

My point was exactly that while AOC BC had certain latitude in operations and Harris, being stronger willed than Portal got even more latitude, Churchill’s attitude had also significance in that, in the end his opinions were not decisive, the opinions of those who decided the target priorities and overall strategy were decisive. If those who thought that attacks on Germany’s power grid were the key to speedy victory could have convinced key scientific advisers like Lindeman and Zuckerman or people in Ministry of Economical Warfare or whatever, that they had got the right tool for victory they would have had good chances to have their idea implemented in spite of what Harris thought. But for some reason they didn’t got their idea accepted and in 44, when Allies knew much on Germany’s economy, the decision was to implement Transport and Oil Plans not the Power Grid Plan. Why that happened is much more important question than that what Harris thought about it or bombing strategy in general.

Juha

[tcolvin]

OK, Juha, then can you explain why the priority target in 1941 was ignored in 1943?

Kutscha's quote makes no sense to me other than as a rationalisation of a decision made on other grounds; (An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another.)

Perhaps there was fear of retaliation, or US shareholders in RWE objected to their asset being destroyed? I have heard both of these suggested.

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
now I have my own main intrests and now the targeting policy of RAF isn’t among them, but
one explanation might have been, that after B????’s report revealed how inaccurate RAF night bombing was, BC switched to area bombing.

To me Kutscha’s quote make sense, to valid or invalid it one should IMHO look at the papers on decisions on target priorities and on British valuations on the effects of LW attacks on British power stations and on British power grid. As you probably know, British power stations were sometimes hit by the LW and their power grid suffered damage often in 1940-41, so they had empirical info on the effects of those kinds of attacks. If you are really interesting on the truth on this matter, the NA is the place to dig out it or at least try to find a book/books on this subject.

As I wrote, LW did made attacks on British power stations and why would US shareholders in RWE have had more influence than US shareholders in Automotive or oil industry?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Hi Juha.

I'm afraid this well-researched subject will yield no further revelations from the National Archives, and AFAIK there are no books on the subject, and never will be since irrefutable evidence exists that electricity generation was rejected as a target by BC from first principles, aka prejudice.
I asked you about it because it appeared you had a source, but you don't.

The subject is well-known and crystal clear, and not worth pursuing further because of Occam's razor (entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity" - entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem). There is no necessity to look further than the following facts, which IMHO preclude any doubt on this subject, in spite of Kutscha's quote which gives no detail. When told they had missed the one target that could have ended the war, and therefore had egg all over their collective face, the RAF would have claimed that they "extensively debated" it, wouldn't they? But they never produced any evidence, and none has surfaced AFAIK.

The facts:
Butt led to Gee, which by February 1942 had been fitted to 200 bombers.
On February 14, 1942 BC was directed to strike at full force (no more conservation of strength) for 6 months (time estimated before the Germans jammed Gee) against German cities to destroy 'the morale of the enemy civil population, and in particular of the industrial workers' through area bombing.
This remained the gospel for the following two years. Why?
Because on February 22, 1942 Harris took command of BC.
Harris immediately ruled out all 'panacea' targets - oil plants, aircraft works, ball-bearing factories, molybdenum mines, submarine works, etc, etc, including electricity generating stations.
Harris argued that even if his bombers could find and hit these 'panacea' targets, as he contemptuously dismissed them, "their destruction would probably have nothing like the effect prophesied by our economic experts. And as, for the most part, such targets could not be found and hit by night, and as our bombers could certainly not survive over Germany by day, it followed that our offensive must be directed against something much larger. The only really large objectives of indisputable value, it was alike clear to Harris and the Air Staff, were Germany's great industrial towns......... In this frame of mind, and with a calculated determination to resist all unnecessary diversions to other ends, Harris embraced his new task". Richards & Saunders, Vol 2.

Note the glaring fallacies, and why it is instructive even now to point them out:
1. Every target, other than cities, was dismissed as a 'panacea'. So bye-bye any discussion of electricity generation - 'Don't waste my time with another panacea', Harris would have said. Do you believe, Juha, that in this environment Harris would listen to reasoned argument? Or that anybody would have been fool enough to bring an argument to him? Harris is an open book; you can hear him on film explaining himself. This man was on a mission to kill Germans until those who remained alive lost the will to resist and capitulated. This was called 'destruction of morale' by the RAF spin-doctors.
2. The only strategic weapon that existed for Harris and the Air Staff was the inaccurate heavy bomber operated at night. So bye-bye the accurate A-36 dive-bomber and Mosquito skip-bomber operated by day. Portal (see earlier in this discussion) dismissed as a technical impossibility the very idea of a long-range fighter, let alone a long-range fighter-bomber. Harris would not have been interested in them because of their pathetic bomb-load which could not set alight city centres and kill masses of Germans.
3. A 'panacea' is a 'cure-all; a remedy for all diseases, evils, or difficulties'. So why was area bombing not itself dismissed as a panacea? The answer is because the boss said so, and the boss was Harris, and Harris was on a mission to kill Germans until those alive cried uncle.

Tony

[Kutscha]

The contract for 500 A-36A aircraft fitted with bomb racks and dive brakes was signed by Kelsey on 16 April 1942. The first A-36A (42-83663) was rolled out of the NAA Inglewood plant in September 1942.

The A-36A-1-NA joined the 27th Fighter Bomber Group composed of four squadrons based at Rasel Ma in French Morocco in April 1943 during the campaign in North Africa.

So what is Harris suppose to do for a whole year until some A-36s show up?

What a/c were going to escort these heavy bomb laden A-36s deep into enemy territory with a potent LW?

[tcolvin]

The first RAF Mustang 1 came off the production line on May 1st, 1941.
So the RAF knew its capabilities.
If they had wanted the A-36, they could have ordered and received it by February 14, 1942.

If escort were needed - a big 'if' given it could operate below the German radar - then it could have been provided by A-36s without bombs with a max speed of 356 mph in clean condition at 5,000ft.

Tony