[Steve Smith]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Graham.

Why the word 'slur'?

Did you read the following in the website I quoted? Note especially the comment about tactical freedom, which was obviously missing when 617 Squadron tried to bomb the Urft Dam but could not find enough clear sky to establish the required length of SABS bomb run, and so failed the mission.
The RAF were obviously concerned about the best (SABS) being the enemy of the good (MkXIV/T1.

"Two other precision bombing squadrons were formed based upon the Mk XlV bombsight, and in the period of February to March 1945 their average error was 195 yards. It is not surprising that when the Norden was offered to the RAF later in the war it was rejected.

Less than 1,000 SABS bombsights were manufactured and after the war great difficulty was experienced in finding sufficient sights to equip two Lincoln squadrons for precision bombing against Japan. Compare this with the 23,000 T1 sights manufactured in America.

There was in Bomber Command at the time much discussion on the comparative merits of the two bombsights. The SABS, although potentially more accurate, lacked the degree of tactical freedom afforded by the Mk XlV/T1. As a result the Mk XlV/T1 was known to Bomber Command as the ‘area’ bombsight of the RAF and the SABS as the ‘precision sight.’

It was a much more complex sight to use and to maintain than the Mk XlV/T1 and required more man-hours in manufacture. For the majority of the squadrons in Bomber Command the Mk XlV/T1 was still the preferred sight."
source: http://www.geocities.com/skidaddy20000/Air-Bomber.html

And I did mean Holland, where 2TAF were experimenting with MRCP and radar controlled bombing at Erp. 2TAF and BC were in the same organization fighting on the same side, but that didn't mean they necessarily spoke to each other.

As for your question about Oboe, I do not know the answer. The RAF had another, and similar system, called GEE-H, which became standard post-war, AFAIK.
The RAF was at the cutting-edge of navigation and bombsight technology. Hence my continued surprise that the cutting-edge 617 Squadron should have been stymied by 10/10th cloud in December 1944. But that's no more than a statement about my ignorance, which has been considerably lessened by this discussion, for which many thanks.

Tony

Tony,

With regards of G-H, the decision to equip No.3 Group with GH the sole Bomber Command exponent was taken in late 1943, the first GH operation was carried out on November 3rd / 4th 1943 against the Mannesmannrohrenwerkes situated on the outskirts of Dusseldorf. The attack carried out by Avro Lancaster-equipped No.115 and 514 Squadrons was a complete success. The success was however short lived, as GH was hastily withdrawn on the orders of Air Marshall Sir Arthur Harris on the grounds that there were insufficient sets available and that until such a time as there was, no further operations over occupied Europe with the equipment would be undertaken. The other and perhaps more far reaching reason was the ever-present danger that such a valuable piece of equipment could fall into the hands of the Germans, allowing them to create a counter-measure and thus thwarting it’s true potential from the outset. It was re-introduced to the Group’s aircraft from early 1944, but predominantly to assist Mine laying operations. It would be much later in 1944 before the Group would re-equip on a large scale with "G-H" and use it against large German targets. No.218 (Gold Coast) Squadron was the leading exponent of the device and did much to iron-out the initial problems.
　
On October 18th 1944, 128 Avro Lancaster’s drawn from nine squadrons carried out No.3 Group’s first independent "G-H" bombing raid. The attack carried out in daylight was directed against the German town of Bonn and was a complete success. The reason for the choice of Bonn was simple, it had until then received relatively little damage from bombing, and as a result of this raid the very heart of Bonn was burnt out and destroyed. For the next seven months almost daily raids were made against Germany’s railway networks, marshalling yards, synthetic oil and benzol installations and communication networks. All of these targets received extensive damage due to the accuracy of GH.
Not only did the "G-H" equipped Lancasters of the Group mark and attack their own targets independently of both No.5 & No.8 Groups, but they would often lead other bomber Groups. Unlike other Groups who were restricted by bad visibility, 10/10th cloud cover over the target area did not cause any unnecessary problems, as a visual identification was not required with GH. Especially trained "G-H" Leader crews would bomb on their equipment and the following gaggle would release instantly the G-H crew bombed, and the results were often impressively accurate. There are a number of occasion when accuracy was less that 50 yards.

Regards

Steve