Bomber Command failure at Urft Dam.

[tcolvin]

Graham.

Why the word 'slur'?

Did you read the following in the website I quoted? Note especially the comment about tactical freedom, which was obviously missing when 617 Squadron tried to bomb the Urft Dam but could not find enough clear sky to establish the required length of SABS bomb run, and so failed the mission.
The RAF were obviously concerned about the best (SABS) being the enemy of the good (MkXIV/T1.

"Two other precision bombing squadrons were formed based upon the Mk XlV bombsight, and in the period of February to March 1945 their average error was 195 yards. It is not surprising that when the Norden was offered to the RAF later in the war it was rejected.

Less than 1,000 SABS bombsights were manufactured and after the war great difficulty was experienced in finding sufficient sights to equip two Lincoln squadrons for precision bombing against Japan. Compare this with the 23,000 T1 sights manufactured in America.

There was in Bomber Command at the time much discussion on the comparative merits of the two bombsights. The SABS, although potentially more accurate, lacked the degree of tactical freedom afforded by the Mk XlV/T1. As a result the Mk XlV/T1 was known to Bomber Command as the ‘area’ bombsight of the RAF and the SABS as the ‘precision sight.’

It was a much more complex sight to use and to maintain than the Mk XlV/T1 and required more man-hours in manufacture. For the majority of the squadrons in Bomber Command the Mk XlV/T1 was still the preferred sight."
source: http://www.geocities.com/skidaddy20000/Air-Bomber.html

And I did mean Holland, where 2TAF were experimenting with MRCP and radar controlled bombing at Erp. 2TAF and BC were in the same organization fighting on the same side, but that didn't mean they necessarily spoke to each other.

As for your question about Oboe, I do not know the answer. The RAF had another, and similar system, called GEE-H, which became standard post-war, AFAIK.
The RAF was at the cutting-edge of navigation and bombsight technology. Hence my continued surprise that the cutting-edge 617 Squadron should have been stymied by 10/10th cloud in December 1944. But that's no more than a statement about my ignorance, which has been considerably lessened by this discussion, for which many thanks.

Tony