Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)

[Laurent Rizzotti]

Rather than deception, I think the ambiguity in US losses from Bodenplate is coming from US documentation attitude. We have two rather exhaustive databases, the MACR covering the aircrew missing in action (and by way of consequence most of the times their aircraft) and the accident reports. The first help to find the fate of the missing crew, and the second helps to establish how and why the accident occurs.

Any operational loss without a missing crew (for example a pilot bailing out over friendly territory and surviving) or a ground loss in an emeny raid like Bodenplatte will not be listed in the above reports, and should be searched elsewhere.

Another issue is the aircraft not totally destroyed but just damaged. They will often not be counted as losses, but could very well never been repaired, especially so late in the war. In this case they will probably be struck of charges months later, and not be counted for war losses. I have read for example that the US losses for the raid on Rabaul on 2 November 1943 include only aircraft failing from return and that many other were actually never repaired, but I have never seen figures for the latter.

As for Bodenplatte being a success or a failure, my own opinion is that it was the second. Germany was running out of experienced pilots and lost many of them in this operation, while the Allied air forces losses were essentially material and were quickly replaced. Also at this stage the German offensive was stopped and there was no more use to disable the Allied tactical air forces for some days. If this operation could have been launched in the first days of the offensive, it may have more impact, even if the German offensive will still have failed IMHO.

On the other hand the Jagdwaffe has been heavily engaged since the start of the offensive and its losses before Bodenplatte were heavier than during the ooeration itself (but on a longer period, I agree). And even when German pilots shot down tens of B-26s in one day, that was not sufficient to protect the German troops. So the option to fight the Allied tactical forces in the air rather than on the ground was no more efficient than Bodenplatte.

Bodenplatte is IMHO related to the German concept of a decisive battle often used by the Wermacht, while the Allied forces were actually fighting an attrition warfare that they knew they will win. Even if ideas of decisive battles were also used on the Allied side (like Market Garden or the BC campain against Berlin).