Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Graham Boak]

The thinner Tempest wing produced less profile drag than the Typhoon, but having a larger area it had more skin-friction drag. Plus, of course, less wave drag, but this was not relevant in level flight. Induced drag was possibly worse, because thick wings are better at producing lift, although there would be a trade-off with wing area. Any value of the elliptical planform is dubious. The overall Tempest superiority varies with the flight condition, being greater at low altitude and speed, but less at high altitude.

The large Hawker factories at Brooklands and Langley spent most of the war producing Hurricanes, only changing over to the Tempest in 1944. Typhoons were entirely built at Gloster. The Tornado was intended to be built at Avro, but the Lancaster took over with the cancellation of the Vulture.

Discussion of the fighter equipment programme very much depends upon just when you consider. The delays and cost of the early Spitfire programme certainly led to considerations of cancellation in 1937/38, when the Tornado/Typhoon programme looked most promising. In the 1939/40 period programmes were in a constant state of flux, with many changes, but closure of the Spitfire line was not among the considerations. Despite Quill’s apparent later fears on the subject there seems to have been no real suggestions of closing the line before A&AEE’s harsh comments on the early 20-series, and it is unclear how far that went beyond the initial flight reports. Over six years of war, with fluctuating fortunes in service and on trials, continual reassessment and redesign of competing projects, and not least the rotation of strong-willed individuals through the various staff posts, it would be astonishing if there had been a single policy held steadfastly throughout. It wasn’t that way and could not have been. Quill worries about bias in favour of the Typhoon, but Beamont speaks of a Spitfire mafia that continually belittled the Typhoon and its potential. Behind the scenes, great hopes are placed on Folland’s project. Conspiracy theorists may suggest that this was a deliberate policy for spurring on each manufacturer.

It is one thing, undeniably true, to say that the Typhoon did not meet the RAF’s perceived need for high-altitude performance in 1942/43, though it did meet the specification as written before the war. Like the Defiant, should we blame the specification for failing to foresee the future? Perhaps. It is quite another thing to write the Typhoon off as a failure overall. High-altitude air-superiority over Western Europe was not the only role or theatre for a fighter, and it was not a failure in the low-level fighter and fighter-bomber roles. As were other fighters excluded from high-altitude roles. There is an attitude that only the fighter-fighter combats count, and that mud-moving isn’t a proper role for an aviation hero. I disagree.