I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

[Dan History]

Gentlemen, for I see that no ladies have participated in the discussion until the present time, thank you for a spirited reaction to my work. However, it is disappointing that serious researchers like you are not making an attempt to engage more deeply with my work and are in some cases giving reactions based only on reading the introduction or a small part of the work itself. I am loath to engage in self-aggrandizement, but the research for this work took substantially more than a year and the evidence within it was extracted with great effort from a variety of sources, several if not most of which have not been seen before by the members here. I would be glad if members deployed the information that they had accumulated during their own research in order to provide informed support or criticism of my conclusions. The private opinions of members are of interest in and of themselves, of course, but so far there has been an excess of heat and a deficit of light in the discussion, as happens often on online forums.

Since the working week has begun, I have less time to respond for the time being, so I will seek to respond to the latest postings first, to keep up with the discussion. I would encourage members to respond to each other’s points too, as FalkeEins did with Rémi’s post above. I am very happy to be at the centre of attention, but it would be equally interesting to see what members think of each other’s contributions.

Ed, as you have made the latest contribution for the time being, below is my response:

Originally Posted by edwest2

Thank you very much for bringing more information

First of all, thank you for your words of encouragement in the first of three posts that you wrote. To address the points that you made, I am surprised that you think I took a narrow view. I have very rarely seen anyone in the field attempt to combine an analysis of the Luftwaffe’s flying units with its air defence forces, let alone bring in issues like fuel and ammunition. It would be helpful if you clarified this particular comment here.

I did not ignore the issue of radar, instead I wrote, on page 20: “It is regrettable that information about the distribution of gun-laying radar is unavailable, but sound detectors area good proxy indicator, for these were used as a partial substitute for radar (Westermann: 203).” If you have information on the distribution of Luftwaffe radar between different operational theatres, I would be glad if you shared it. A substantial motivation for my involvement in this discussion is to obtain new information. I trust you will agree that any information about the distribution of radar will support my overall argument, since there is overwhelming indirect evidence that the majority of Germany’s radar network was sited in the West and Mediterranean, for example on http://gyges.dk/ , the excellent website put together by SES. Does the Radarkrieg book by Bukowski contain data about the production of radar and the distribution of radar installations between fronts? I am concerned, based on the title, that it only discusses radar units in the Berlin area.

I have the Neulen book about Luftwaffe allies, which is superficial in places. The issue of Axis allies can be put to one side in a work such as this, because the scale of the operations and losses of these air forces was so much smaller than that of the Luftwaffe. Dénes Bérnad, György Punka, HGabor and so many others have written many interesting pieces about the actions of these air forces, and I will include some of this work in an expanded version of my study. However, these air forces were too small to materially change the balance of forces in the air war. Furthermore, any review of the activities of Axis allies must of necessity devote much attention to the Regia Aeronautica, which fought almost exclusively in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the inclusion of Axis allies will shift the balance of attention further away from events on the Eastern front.

Since you wrote “based on my research”, may I ask for more details of what research you performed, what evidence you presented and the conclusions that you reached? Allied resource superiority did provide the foundation for ultimate Allied victory, but the analysis in my work is deeper than this one observation. I emphasise that Western air power was decisive in the air war, for reasons of its technological superiority as much if not more than its numerical strength. Furthermore, since air power consumed resources far in excess of those allocated to other forms of military power, it is not possible to place air power on the same level as the ground forces. Even well-equipped and well-trained ground forces fared very badly in the face of enemy air superiority, which was the key change from the First World War, although signs of this could already be observed in the campaigns of 1918.

Do you have the Kahn book? I am not sure that it contains information worth a price in excess of $100 . The other two books that you mentioned, Overy’s War and Economy and Uziel’s Arming the Luftwaffe, are useful and interesting, but they focus on issues of resource mobilisation, rather than the distribution of resources and the destruction of these resources at the front. I will add here that I find your various links to book purchase websites slightly frustrating, in the sense that they obscure the point that you are attempting to make. I am grateful for the work that you do in publicising various new books, but what is your view of the matter at hand?

Kind regards,

Dan

[Dan History]

Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis

I will be brief.

Bruce, brevity is a virtue, but I suggest you have been too brief in your response. I note that you disagree with my conclusions, but may I ask why that is the case and what conclusions of alternative sources do you find more convincing?

I must emphasise that you are in error when you seek to describe the USSR as an Allied power. The USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 and then invaded Poland following Germany’s own invasion. Up until the German attack on the USSR, the Soviet Union was a de facto ally of Nazi Germany and provided a large volume of raw materials necessary for the German war economy. Once Germany invaded, the USSR did join the Allies out of necessity, but it pursued fundamentally different objectives during the war. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe led to a very rapid breakdown in relations after the end of the war in Europe, with Churchill being invited by Truman to make the observation that “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent” less than a year after Germany’s surrender.

I am surprised that you write of the “confusion within [my] conclusions”, since you criticised my conclusions on the basis that you understood them clearly, even if you had not had the time to follow my reasoning. I hope that labelling my paper “readable” was not intended as a back-handed compliment. I am most interested to know which of my sources you would like to consult in the future. As I indicated to Ed above, I consulted many other sources which I did not have space to use in the study, so I would be glad to comment futher.

Your use of the word “validate” is not entirely clear. The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the most common modern usage of validate is “To examine for incorrectness or bias; to confirm or check the correctness of.” Do you mean that you will not spend time examining the correctness of my conclusions, or rather that you will not confirm the validity of my conclusions? The two are not the same, of course. Since you would like to use the fruits of my research, I would suggest it would be most appropriate if you spent some time considering my reasoning.

Kind regards,

Dan

[Alfred.MONZAT]

I've read Dan's study and found it very interesting, comprehensive and worth reading. It look like to be a very hard work and the people who accepted to publish it on their website would not have accepted if it was wrong or twisted, so I encourage people to read it. As far as I know nobody worked on that subject since Murray. I still disagree with his statement on this forum but in the study there's not such exagerated claims but true things based on facts and datas, such as that the extent of the air war in the Westfront and Südfront in 1941-1942 is too often downplayed and Dan's study give justice to this fact.

I urge people with better knowledge than me to read it to confirm or infirm I am right in my feeling about this what looks to me to be a milestone in that area.

Regards

Alfred

[edwest2]

Dan,


In order to avoid any confusion or further frustration, I will bow out of this thread.



Best,

Ed

[Bruce Dennis]

Dan,
I'm with Ed.

Bruce

[Dan History]

Originally Posted by edwest2

I will bow out of this thread.

Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis

I'm with Ed.

Ed and Bruce, I have sent each of you a private message, with a simple message - I would be glad if you stayed!

I shall take a moment to respond to kalender1973, because he asked a short question which drives to the heart of the matter:

Originally Posted by kalender1973

How you come to the conlusion: "Western air power defeated the Luftwaffe and therefore enabled the USSR to survive"?

Kalender, thank you for your praise and let me outline my reasoning:

1. The Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses of aircraft and personnel before the German invasion of the USSR. See Table 10 on Page 23 for details. This materially eased the burden on Soviet defenders in 1941.

2. Even when the Luftwaffe had concentrated most of its resources in the East, in the second half of 1941, the RAF and Commonwealth air forces inflicted substantial losses on the Luftwaffe. In consequence, the Eastern front accounted for just 25% of total German aircraft losses from the outbreak of the war in Europe until the end of 1941. See Table 11 for the details. Thank you for drawing attention to the fact that the Commonwealth air forces were involved.

3. You made the observation that I wanted people to make, that German losses were quite evenly divided between East and West from mid-1941 to the end of 1943. This is not the whole story, of course. Table 13 shows that three-fifths of the single-engine fighters were destroyed in the West, and almost all night fighters. The German war effort was very precariously balanced and its central component was air superiority, which was maintained by the fighter force. Therefore, the defeat of the German fighter force in the West was of critical importance to the survival of the USSR, relieving the pressure of German air power on the Soviet armed forces. Take a look at Table C-2 on page 51 as well, when the non-operational losses are included, the importance of the fighting in the West is drawn into even sharper focus. I believe that this measure of losses, including non-operational ones, is the most useful, because non-operational losses were a consequence of combat. Without the pressure of combat operations, non-operational losses would have been much lower, so it is eminently reasonable to add non-operational losses to operational ones.

Kind regards,

Dan

[Delmenhorst]

I would be glad to receive questions and comments from members, whether supportive or critical!

Dear Mr Zamansky

I have with great interest read our report and there are some interesting points.

I have a few questions and comments.

Page 4:
Access to ‘Personelle and materielle Einsatzbereitschaft’ is not a rare privilege. A few thousand people have had access to these files.

Page 6:
You use the term Western front. Do you mean Luftwaffenkommando West or the whole of western Europe including Luftflotte Reich etc ? I guess that it is the latter.

Page 7:
You are writing about allocation of German aircraft, but it is more interesting to investigate allocation of air crews, aircraft and fuel. One without the other is useless.

You are using the term ‘reserve’ on page 7. What do you mean by that term ?

Page 8:
You are stating that allocation of aircraft to the East fell in December 1941. Have you investigated why ?
The Luftwaffe strength fell on the eastern front at that time, but it could be due to weather, lack of suitable airfields, problems with fuel supplies and the Russian air force.

Page 11:
You states that the need to react to the allied landings in North Africa was one of the fundamental causes of the failure of the Stalingrad airlift. I disagree with you. The Stalingrad air lift failed because the Luftwaffe did not have suitable aircraft for maintaining the air lift, not enough airfields and because bad weather caused a lot of problems. The Russian AA defence around Stalingrad was so strong, that the air lift never could have worked.

You are writing about Scandinavia. Do you with this term mean Scandinavia or Luftflotte 5 ?

Page 15:
You are writing that Rolf Pringel was shot down by a small formation of Stirling bombers. Well, that is twisting it a bit. Bomber Command sent three Stirings against Chocques power station in France. One Stirling, R6017 from No. 7 Squadron, was shot down. Pringels Bf 109 was damaged by return fire from the two last Stirlings and he was then shot down by a Spitfire flown Sergeant J Smigielski from No. 306 Squadron. Pringel would have shot down the Stirling if the Spitfire did not come to the rescue. No four engine bombers could survive without fighter escort.

You are writing that the 210 mm rocket mortar was the most powerful weapon used by German fighters during the war. I disagree. The 210 mm was the largest caliber, but it was short range, difficult to aim (+ hit with) and there were a lot of malfunctions. The R4M was the most powerful rocket that the German fighter arm had. The 210 mm was only used in the West because it could only be used (in air combat) against big slow moving aircraft. It would have been even more useless on the Eastern front where the situation was different.

Page 19:
You are again writing about Scandinavia. Due to your extensive research, you are familiar with the fact, that the German Navy was responsible for AA defence quite a few places in Norway and Denmark. Are you only talking about Luftwaffe guns or the whole Flak arm ? Some cities in Germany was also protected by the Navy and not the Luftwaffe (for instance Wilhelmshaven and Kiel).

You are using the term ‘German air defence’ a few times. Are you talking about the AA defence. In my world the Air Defence consist of radar, fighters and AA.

Page 20:
You are writing that it is regrettable that information about the distribution of gun-laying radar is unavailable. Well, you have to go back to Freiburg. There is a lot of information about that subject. You are right – there were many more gun laying radars in the West than in the East.

[Dan History]

Originally Posted by Delmenhorst

I have with great interest read our report and there are some interesting points.

Delmenhorst, thank you for your words of praise! It is very pleasing that my work is of interest to people like you. I have responded to your points below and have also sent you a private message regarding a couple of specific points in your message.

Personelle and materielle Einsatzbereitschaft

I should hope that a few people have had access to this source, since it is so important. The privilege that I was referring to involved seeing the colour originals, rather than the microfiche copies of the files. The originals are in a tender state, though by no means as tender as a few of the documents from past centuries that I had a chance to view at the British National Archives. The benefit of seeing the originals is that the textual notes regarding the state of various Luftwaffe units can be read easily. I should clarify that I only saw a small selection of the volumes in the series and access to the rest is dependent on their physical state. I did not have the time to find out how many files in the series are accessible.

Western Front

This was one of several generalisations that I had to make to save space in my work and to avoid excessive detail for what was a non-specialist audience. You are correct, the Western front is shorthand for operations in Western Europe and over Germany.

Aircraft, crews and fuel

You are right that it is best to analyse these three in combination, but I found absolutely no data concerning the allocation of fuel between operational theatres and very little data concerning aircrew. If you know where to look for this, I would be very glad to find out!

Aircraft in reserve

I mean all aircraft not subordinated to an active command, so units resting, re-equipping or transferring from one theatre to another. I relied on the written comments in the Einsatzbereitschaft series to make this determination.

Fall in aircraft strength in the East in November-December 1941

This was caused by the withdrawal of some units for rest, due to German over-confidence, and by the transfer of other units to the Mediterranean. Losses were not as significant an influence, because German losses had declined precipitously from the peak in June-July 1941, as the Soviet air force had been largely destroyed, for the time being. Logistical and weather issues played a part too, but the core point is that the Wehrmacht was making a maximum effort to capture Moscow and defeat the USSR, so there was no operational pause during which the Luftwaffe could make the choice of reducing its activity, as there was in late spring 1943 before the battle of Kursk.

The Stalingrad airlift

It is likely that the airlift would have failed in any case, because the Germans had put themselves in an untenable position. However, it is not possible to argue that a doubling of Luftwaffe transport strength would not have changed the situation. Even if the Stalingrad pocket could not be maintained by an air lift, which is probable, the improvement in German logistics could have facilitated a successful relief of the pocket and the withdrawal of at least part of the 6 Army. Even if this were not to be the case, the general crisis along the entire southern sector of the German front would have been reduced, as units moving up to the front could have been supplied more easily. On the subsidiary point regarding the effectiveness of Soviet AA fire, I think it is clear that Allied fighters and long-range bombing attacks on airfields, the dominant dangers in the Mediterranean, posed a much more serious threat. Flights into the Stalingrad pocket were vulnerable to AA fire, but the Soviet forces could only rarely attack transport aircraft bases or formations of aircraft in the air.

Scandinavia

This is shorthand, and you have again understood it correctly. I used Scandinavia to avoid having to discuss the precise nature of the deployment of Luftflotte 5, for which I did not have space.

Stirlings and four-engine bombers in general

I was not aware of the full details of the shoot down of Pingel, but the point still stands. It was far more difficult to attack heavy bombers, even weaker-armed RAF types, than other aircraft types. RAF Blenheims and Soviet Il-4s could not survive without fighter escort in the very literal sense, that is entire formations were shot down. In the case of four-engine bombers, the destruction of entire formations was rare and required great exertions from the Luftwaffe.

Rockets

Rockets represent a resource cost, this is the main point. If rocket fighters had not been needed, the time and effort spent on this activity could have been redirected to address the requirements of the Eastern front. I am aware of the deficiencies of the 210 mm rocket, but it had an explosive charge far larger than any other cannon or rocket system used in air combat during the war. Thus, it is an excellent illustration of the lengths to which the Luftwaffe had to go to attack USAAF bomber formations. Indeed, the 210 mm rocket did make a significant contribution to the heavy losses suffered by the USAAF in autumn 1943, in spite of all the problems with this weapon. The case of the R4M only reinforces the point that the Luftwaffe had to develop a weapon of extraordinary complexity, the Me 262 jet fighter with rocket armament, to finally solve the problem of attacking bomber formations, and it took until the final weeks of the war to do this. The resources expended on this effort could have been allocated to producing more machine-guns and cannon to equip the standard types on the Eastern front.

Marine flak and IADS (Integrated Air Defence System)

I am aware of the existence of naval flak units of course. I could not locate data on the distribution of these units. Are you in a position to help? To use modern USAF terminology, an IADS consists of a multitude of components, from the surface and aerial defences to the variety of communications and command units that coordinate the air defence system. I would be very interested in writing about all this, but again the difficulty is finding data.

Gun-laying radar

This is excellent news! I am looking forward to going back to Freiburg to look at this information. I am not surprised that most gun laying radar were in the West, but it is good to have independent confirmation from you.

Kind regards,

Dan

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Dan,

thank you for the article. Some of statistic tables are interesting. I have some comments and questions.

As for your main thesis I can only repeat the question of Ruy Horta: “Did the results of your study lead you to your conclusions, or did you want to proof your point by using statistics?”
The problems of your article begin from the first sentence of the abstract: "German air force, a key component in the initial German victories during the Second World War".
Not a key component, but one of the components, not more.

But comments and questions:

1. Table 1. Allocation of Luftwaffe operational aircraft …, and following tables.

How you divide the units between “At the front” and “In reserve”? Maybe if you will list the units with allocation for the specific date (for example 10.Feb.43) your methodology will become clearer. Also distribution between Ostfront, Germany, West, Southeast, Mediterranean etc. more useful than the faceless “West”.
How and where you are counting Lfl.5?

For the estimation of comparable efforts the number of sorties is more important than allocation. Do you saw that data in BAMA? If not, for some large timeframes these data survived the war in the reports to Heeresgruppen, to armies etc.

2. Table 6. Allocation of German anti-aircraft guns and supporting equipment, December 1942.

About zero in the row “Heaviest guns (105-128 mm)”: I don’t have entire picture but in Kerch area in Jan.43 (and evidently in Dec.42) were two “heaviest” batteries: 105 mm 4./321 and 128 mm 1./Lehr u.Versuchsabt. If the data in other rows are likewise “correct” …

Also, Heeres-Flak and Flak units integrated in ground forces divisions etc are beyond this analysis. And the lion’s share of ground forces was in the East.

3. Table 9. Anti-aircraft batteries lost with all equipment, 1939 to July 1944

As you write correctly “Of course, losses of entire batteries exclude the many losses of individual guns during routine operations”. So the losses of “batteries lost with all equipment” have a questionable value for the analysis. But it is more important that the data seems doubtful, both for East and West.

In 1941-43 in the “West” (in Tunisia) were lost 19. and 20.Flakdivision. Some batteries probably were lost in Libya, maybe on Sicily and in 1940 in Narvik. But more than 150 batteries?
How many batteries were in Tunisia in May 1943 for example?

For the East: it seems that only Stalingrad is counted. But German army had retreated (partly in disarray) many times in 1941-43: from the outskirts of Moscow, from Caucasus, from Upper Don, from Orel-Kursk-Kharkov-Mius etc etc etc with heavy losses of all kinds of weapon. Some AA batteries were lost in the Kerch peninsula in Dec.1941 certainly during Soviet landing operation.

4. Table 11. Luftwaffe losses before and after 22 June 1941 …

For such inhuman phenomenon as the war the losses and their replacement is a normal process - as far as the replacement remain on the same or the higher level (quality and quantity) as the lost means of war and personnel. You probably know when the reduction of quality of the Luftwaffe crews began. It was certainly not before 22.Jun.41. In 1939-41 some crews were lost, but all other became more hardened. Green crews had a time to training due to great pauses between significant operations in 1939 - 1st half of 1941.

5. Table 12. Luftwaffe losses January to August 1942, by theatre of operations

Do you saw the following thread?
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...highlight=Chir
From the 98 planes captured after Stalingrad on the Chir station at least 68 planes are the total losses unknown from the German documents or known as repairable before the discussion about Chir finding. It isn’t singular known example. And how many such examples are not known yet …
So the statistics based on GQM returns is certainly incomplete, unrepresentative. At least the losses of planes transferred to the repair units are not counted. It was in Tunisia also, as Andrew Arthy wrote, but the scale of such Ostfront losses is certainly far more high for obvious reasons.

6. These mines were particularly effective in the initial period of the Soviet-German war, because the Soviet navy was “practically unready” to defend against their advanced firing mechanisms, which included combined acoustic and magnetic detonators (Kuznetsov and Morozov 2015: 42, 50)

As co-author of the book you cited I can say that though Soviet navy indeed was practically unready to sweep these mines 22.Jun.1941, German mining campaign had failed. Partly because the solution was founded quickly (among others the further «father» of Soviet A-Bomb and of nuclear energetics Kurchatov and further President of Academy of Science Aleksandrov had worked with that problem in Sevastopol). Partly it was due to German unwise tactical solutions and even due to bad knowledge of the operational characteristics the own mines by German headquarters. The sole palpable result for German airdropped mines was later, during April-May 1942 in the Kerch Strait, partly due to difficulty of minesweeping due to local German air superiority.
And I'm surprising that Germans had used 41% of aerial mines in 1942 in the East, during the almost pure overland campaign.

7. Table 16. Expenditure of selected classes of Luftwaffe munitions, second half of 1941

It is amazing technique to not count the most used bombs (50 kg and lower) with explanation that more heavy bombs were «reserved for especially important tasks». No comments.

Too long post, I’m stopping.

Best regards,
Andrey

[Dan History]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

Hello Dan

Hello Andrey,

Thank you for your response. I have been busy with work, but I will reply to you here and hope to also reply to the others who are waiting for a response within the next few days.

Let me begin by saying that attacking my integrity is not the best way to start a discussion. I did not see Ruy's comment as an attack in the way that you have implied, and I will leave it to Ruy to speak for himself. Your attack is unwarranted, since I have set out a substantial body of evidence, some of it never before presented. Only after presenting the evidence did I reach my conclusions, which the evidence supports.

I am very surprised that you, as a historian of the Second World War, suggest that the Luftwaffe was "one of the components, not more" of the initial German victories. It is abundantly clear that the campaigns in Scandinavia and in the West in 1940 were critically dependent on the German air force. It was the Luftwaffe that broke Allied resistance and allowed other German forces to succeed. Much the same phenomenon was in evidence during the summer of 1941 on the Eastern front. Suggesting otherwise betrays a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the course of the war, so I am quite surprised that you have made such a comment.

To reply to your specific comments:

1. Aircraft distribution

To start with your main point, the distribution between East and West is the crux of my study. This allows an understanding of German resource allocation between the very different wars against the Western Allies and the Soviet Union respectively. Greater detail of aircraft distribution by theatre would be useful to discuss the interplay between Luftwaffe operations on the Western front and in the Mediterranean. I may include this data in a future study.

Data on total numbers of sorties flown is certainly interesting, but I would strongly dispute it is more useful than the the data on aircraft strength. Data on aircraft strength gives an overall sense of capability in a given theatre of operations, while sortie numbers are dependent on a large number of factors, for example range to target, availability of specific equipment needed for particular missions etc. Nevertheless, overall data on the number of sorties by front and aircraft class (single-engine fighters, bombers etc.) would be extremely interesting, but I have never seen it. There are fragments about the Battle of Sevastopol in 1942 and other selected operations, but nothing which allows a comparison between fronts. I am aware of the reports to army groups and other army units submitted by various air headquarters, but again these are merely fragments in the history of the war as a whole. If someone could collate such reports, it would be of substantial utility for our field of research, but this is a vast task on its own and would probably not provide much data which can be compared across different fronts.

As for Luftflotte 5, I have divided its units between East and West, based on some comments in the original documents themselves and on secondary sources. I may have made some errors in this division, but because of the small size of Luftflotte 5 and of the specific units involved, this does not materially affect the overall argument. As sircraft in reserve I counted those with units resting, refitting or in transit, as well as newly delivered aircraft which had not yet been absorbed by frontline units. I will give a breakdown for a specific day of the war when I will have had time to set it out formally unit by unit, since clarity of public presentation is important.

2. Allocation of guns

Thank you for the note concerning heavy flak units in the Kerch area. It is clear that the summary report is in error here, but you are wrong to imply that this somehow casts the entire body of data presented in the report into doubt. The overwhelming majority of every single category of flak equipment was deployed against the Western allies. It would, of course, be very interesting to present similar information on army and naval anti-aircraft units. The majority of army flak was in the East and of naval flak in the West, but there is no reason to suggest that adding these units would change the overall picture. The majority of German flak guns was concentrated under Luftwaffe control.

If you can provide data, or reference to sources at Freiburg, which give a more specific breakdown of anti-aircraft guns by front, I would gladly make use of this and would gratefully acknowledge your assistance.

3. Losses of anti-aircraft batteries

I think this data is very useful, since the majority of flak batteries were not deployed on the battlefield, but some distance behind the frontline. Therefore, losses of entire flak units were relatively rare events and it is interesting to see where such events occurred. The phenomenon that you are surprised by, that so many more batteries were lost in the Mediterranean than in the East in the years 1941 to 1943, is quite easy to explain. The Allied forces were far more efficient at sinking Axis ships than Soviet forces were, so some flak units would have been sunk in transit. Furthermore, the retreats in Africa and the final surrender in Tunisia happened at a speed and intensity which was rare on the Eastern front. The German army suffered many defeats in the East, but rarely would it flee at a speed and for such a long distance as after the Battle of El-Alamein, for example.

There is data at Freiburg summarising the losses of flak guns by Luftflotte for most months of 1942 and 1943, so this can be calculated and adduced as additional evidence. If you want to help with this endeavour, I would be glad! The key observation to make is that since the Soviet war effort was less technologically advanced than that of the Western Allies, the Soviet armed forces had difficulty inflicting substantial losses on German forces away from the immediate frontline. Therefore, even with the greater scale of ground fighting in the East, Luftwaffe flak losses were not particularly large.

4. The replacement of losses

It is extraordinary to read the statement that there was no reduction in the quality of Luftwaffe aircrew before Operation Barbarossa. This would mean that the very high losses of experienced aircrew in the Battle of Britain, in particular, had no effect on the quality of Luftwaffe personnel as a whole. Furthermore, the suggestion that all new crews became battle-hardened is clearly at variance with the facts. Experienced and successful aircrew were extremely difficult to replace for all air forces, something which is frequently commented on in a variety of secondary sources.

5. Completeness or otherwise of German loss records

While a few questions have been raised about the completeness and accuracy of the Gen.Qu. loss lists of individual aircraft, it has not been demonstrated that the same issue affects summary loss reports. You assume that these were simply summaries of individual loss returns, while they could have been formed based on a much wider and more complete set of sources. Looking at the issue as a whole, it is very difficult to sustain the position that the Luftwaffe simply did not know or consciously under-reported its losses in its internal accounting. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that in the case of individual aircraft losses, the problem of Gen.Qu. reporting was more pronounced in the East than on other fronts. Vast numbers of airframes were abandoned not just in Tunisia, but in Sicily and southern Italy and later in France. There are a few researchers on this forum who will have much to say about this, including Andrew, of course.

6. Aerial mines

It is excellent to read your response here, thank you! Kurchatov was not in any substantive sense the ‘father’ of the Soviet nuclear programme, but to get back to the subject at hand, you are right that the Germans misused aerial mines. However, I think you are changing the emphasis subtly in your response. During spring 1942 in the Kerch straight, there was a palpable immediate operational effect of the use of aerial mines. This in itself is highly unusual for a single weapons system, since usually only a combination of different weapons has an effect at an operational level. The main effect of aerial mines was to put a general stress on Soviet naval operations, which was significant, as can be seen from your own writing. It was certainly not in any sense decisive, as you emphasise, but it is very reasonable to suggest that if much more than 9% of German aerial mines were used in the East in 1941, the Soviet navy would have had very substantial problems. You know the context very well, that even less sophisticated naval mines caused catastrophic problems in selected operations, especially the evacuation of Tallinn. If you look at the raw numbers, you will see that the greater proportion of mine expenditure in the East in 1942 was a function of the overall decrease in the scale of mining operations on all fronts.

7. Counting bombs

As a naval historian, you will be well aware that small bombs were of very limited utility in attacking any protected target, be it warships or coastal fortifications. Therefore, it is very reasonable to treat heavier bombs separately, since certain types of operations were entirely impossible when such bombs were unavailable. Given what you know of German problems of reducing the fortifications of Sevastopol and sinking warships in the Baltic and Black Seas, it is surprising that you have “no comment”.


Kind regards,

Dan