I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

[edwest2]

Dan,


Thank you very much for bringing more information to researchers. It is a welcome sight to see new blood entering the field. I know when I first started I was met with so much detail and abbreviations that it took a while to get up to speed. Now, regarding your study, I understand why you took such a narrow view. Keep in mind that the British and Russians were flying American aircraft through Lend-Lease. And flak units did not just rely on spotters, or listening devices or searchlights, but radar as well. They also improvised, providing upgrade kits so that other weapons could be attached to Luftwaffe aircraft in the field.

Finally, the Luftwaffe had its own Allies flying air missions for them. See:

https://www.amazon.com/Skies-Europe-.../dp/1861267991

As far as radar, see Radarkrieg und Nachtluftverteidigung über Berlin 1939-1945 by Helmut Bukowski. ISBN 978-3-86619-012-2


I think you should consider a side by side comparison with the Luftwaffe and their opposition. For example, German aircraft had fuel injection while British aircraft did not, at least early in the time period in question. The effectiveness of Allied bombing was bad, especially in the early period. The Germans had built false walls around their factories. This meant that if a bomb exploded nearby, the outer wall would take the brunt of the damage. Prior to the start of the war, the Germans designed the interiors of their factories so that any bomb damage could be quickly repaired.

They also put debris on the roof to fool Allied reconnaissance.




Best regards,
Ed