Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)

[leonventer]

Originally Posted by Chris Goss

John & Ron’s book written in 2004 on Bodenplatte will answer all such questions

As Chris suggested, "Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope" by John Manrho & Ron Pütz is the definitive account of the attack.

For a German perspective, check out "Six Months to Oblivion" by Werner Girbig (Schiffer, 1991).

FWIW, here are some other secondary resources:

• "Destruction at Dawn" by Arthur Bishop (McGraw-Hill, 1998)
  (Canadian perspective. Less detailed, with many personal accounts and coverage of the lead-up to the attack)
• "Battle of the Airfields" by Norman Franks (Grub Street, 1994)
  (A bit dated and contains errors, but maybe worth your time)
• "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny Parker (Combined Books, 1994)
  (Decent coverage in a 77-page chapter, with Order-of-Battle tables and several personal accounts)
• "Ardennes 1944: De Nuages et de Feu" by Philippe Guillemot (Heimdal, 2018)
  (Very well illustrated, with nice maps, aircraft profiles and photos -- some in color)
• "Batailles Aeriennes magazine #066: Bodenplatte - L'offensive de la derniere chance" (Lela Presse, 2013)
  (Also very well illustrated, with many aircraft profiles and photos -- some in color)
• "Operation Bodenplatte" by Lawrence Cortesi (Zebra, 1980)
  (If you prefer a gripping, action-packed narrative with much dialog... )

Hope that helps,
Leon Venter

[Broncazonk]

I have, Six Months to Oblivion by Werner Girbig (Schiffer, 1991) which from the German perspective paints a rather catastrophic picture of the mission.

Question: Six Months to Oblivion describes the incredible secrecy and compartmentalized planning that the Bodenplatte operation received. Was this because Hitler and the Luftwaffe/German high command finally began to suspect that the Allies were reading their mail (on a minute by minute basis?)

Are there any opinions on the fundamental question: In theory, was Operation Bodenplatte a bad idea? That is, with an attacking force of skilled and experienced pilots would it have been a bad idea, or was it a bad idea only because the attacking force was comprised of mostly unskilled and inexperience pilots?

I cannot find any relevant discussion of this matter in the "Books and Magazines" section. Help?

Bronc

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Broncazonk

Six Months to Oblivion describes the incredible secrecy and compartmentalized planning that the Bodenplatte operation received. Was this because Hitler and the Luftwaffe/German high command finally began to suspect that the Allies were reading their mail (on a minute by minute basis?) Bronc

No, because deciphered German signals had been giving clear indications since November that fighter units were being massed on Western airfields in preparation for some major operation. For example: SG 4 was brought in; III./JG 26 carried out four flights to practice low-level attacks; courses for National Socialist Leadership Officers were cancelled because of an "impending special operation"; all Kommodores and Gruppenkommandeurs (except JG 300 and 301) were called to a special conference at Jagdkorps II HQ on 5 December; nightfighters were assigned to fighter units "to assure assembly of strong day fighter forces in bad weather; and so on.


Source: National Archives HW 13/45 "Report on indications of German December 1944 counter-offensive in Ardennes, derived from ULTRA material, submitted to DMI by C".