Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)

[Franek Grabowski]

Nick
Yes, that is the point. Another myth is numbers of Allied fighters over Germany. A total of fighter escort for a raid is impressive, but escorts were staged, so at one moment there were much fewer of them, actually. Still, in German accounts you have hundreds of Allied fighters attacking a single Gruppe.
Of course, there was a problem of poor training of German pilots back in 1944/45, but this was a problem arising from earlier period. Pilots send as replacement in 1944 joined Luftwaffe around 1942, so well before problems with fuel appeared. In fact, first problems appeared in 1943 over Tunisia. So the root of the problem appeared much earlier.
Franek

[Broncazonk]

Professor Dr. Williamson Murray's, Strategy For Defeat ~ The Luftwaffe 1933 - 1945 has a lot to say about these matters. It is, of course, required reading for most of us. Any discussion of the 'culture' of the Luftwaffe (and its combat philosophy) has to include Goring. The Reichsmarschall (of-course) rose to fame and fortune as a superstar fighter pilot, not an air combat strategist.

In all honesty, I also believe that everyone's relentless pursuit of their very own Knights Cross hurt the over all combat capability of the entire Luftwaffe, 1940-1945. I truly believe this.

Bronc

[edwest2]

Opinions don't matter. Actual document research needs to be done. I have seen unpublished photos of scale Allied aircraft models on thick wires on the ground. Trainees were shown how to best approach these aircraft. From different angles and directions. Training manuals had drawings of Allied bombers showing gun positions and angles of fire. Regardless of rank, the goal was to survive. I have also seen photos of excited fighter pilots returning after a sortie, using their hands to show their comrades how they approached and brought down a bomber.

How escort fighters were deployed and used requires Allied mission reports and after-action reports. On their approach to their targets, the Allied bomber stream would be spotted headed for one target and then change direction. This to throw off German fighters that had been scrambled to defend the apparent target. The Germans had ground observers and radar.

[Franek Grabowski]

Why do you assume the research has not been done?
You present your opinion regalrdless of actual research. In fact, a lot has been researched but needs to be collatted to be put into a global picutre.
Not all has been done, there are still major challenges for Luftwaffe historians, but it seems there is simply no interest in issues related to the chain of command.

[edwest2]

Books have been independently published, as well as published by publishers who have been in business for a long time. Perhaps you should consider doing the work yourself to resolve and document those things that interest you.

I can tell you from personal experience from over 40 years in publishing that people are not capable or do not want to do the work. That's fine. No one can force them.

I don't assume anything. The output of books in the military history category in English, and covering all time periods, has been quite substantial, year after year.

[Franek Grabowski]

It is funny you create unfounded opinion, discussing with a person who did a research on primary documents concerning air combat over Europe 1940-45.
Concerning publications, it is very simple. If publisher says that a book is commercially not viable, it is essentially dead. Addittionally, no publisher offer royalties allowing to cover the research alone, not to mention all the work put into writing. It is as simple as that.
By my personal assessment, based on what I need in my own research, the published coverage of those issues is very poor. Worse, due to passing of time and veterans, this would remain a gap, because there is no content to fill it up.

[Broncazonk]

The question that remains unanswered (and there are numerous (over a dozen) expert opinions that are available here to answer the question if they are willing) is what could have been done, if Bodenplatte was a bad idea?

What alternatives did the Luftwaffe have on that day?

Bronc

[edwest2]

History in the "what if" category is not history. It should be avoided.

[Franek Grabowski]

There was no good or bad choice in the condition, Luftwaffe was in the late 1944. This was an effect of decisions taken in the previous years, and actually could not have been remedied.

[Broncazonk]

Originally Posted by edwest2

History in the "what if" category is not history. It should be avoided.

I COMPLETELY disagree. A smart historian is ALWAYS interested in examining alternatives, (why decisions were made and not made and why strategies were chosen and not chosen) to determine WHY history was made.

The study of history becomes sterile to the point of bean counting if a historian is uninterested in the latent, underlying conditions and thought processes of the participants.

Even worse, it is impossible to learn from history--to learn strategy and tactics from history--if all you are doing is counting beans.

Bronc