Me 262 should have been used as a bomber?

[Graham Boak]

Although lacking in range for other than Baltic waters, the Il 2 would have been perfectly effective against ships using rockets. The RAF strike wings were converting to rockets rather than torpedos because rockets were at least as effective when they hit, had a greater probability of hitting, and placed the aircraft under less risk from flak. No aircraft can be effective without an appropriate weapon. The Russians had air-to-ground rockets, so it was just a matter of applying their capabilities.

How much flak renders fighter-bombers nugatory is a difficult measure to use. The intense German light flak did not stop the Allied fighterbombers, though may well have biased the weapon of choice to the less accurate (but stand-off) rocket rather than the more effective bomb. Intense light flak also drives to the use of the medium bomber, bombing in the safer environment of medium altitudes.

The Germans no longer had the luxury of choice. The high speed of the 262 would give greater survivability than the 190 jabo, and linked to air-to-ground rockets was probably the only option available with any realistic capability.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello tcolvin
"the Polish army in 1939 which lacked Flak" is not entirely correct, Polish army had a decent number of 40mm Bofors AA guns and some heavy AA guns.

This is new. Can you tell me how this Polish Flak performed during the heavy LW attacks on September 16, 1939 against the Bzura counteroffensive?
Is it not true that the LW considered the Polish army had no Flak?
It is my understanding that the LW responded to the Wehrmacht's clamour for help against the Polish counterattacks that began on the Bzura on Sptember 9, by sending everything available to destroy the Polish army.
On September 16, 820 German aircraft dropped 328,000 kg of bombs on the hapless Poles. Sending everything to destroy Poles included fitting bomb racks to air superiority fighter aircraft for the first time ever, because a bomb was seen to be more destructive than bullets against troops that could not fire back and had no fighter defense. The German fighters had nothing to do so why not use them as make-shift bombers?
The fighter-bomber was thus born over the Bzura.
Later, during the Battle of Britain, Galland was told to fit a bomb rack to his Bf109 when bomber losses became unacceptable. Galland went apeshit. The British saw a bomb rack on a downed Bf109 and promptly followed this LW innovation that was controversial even on the German side. The British had never thought of a fighter-bomber before, but seized on it as a way of using up failed air superiority fighters like the Typhoon and at the same time heading off army demands for an army-air corps because the army had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk.
The Russians started from a different and base which was the development at the end of WWI by Britain and Germany of armoured tactical ground-attack aircraft, which like the IL-2 were bombers which could survive over the battlefield and not fighter-bombers which could not survive - except against troops like the Poles who lacked Flak.

[Juha]

Hello Graham
Il-2s could make life miserable for minesweepers and smaller warships and for transports but usually could not sink them. On the other hand destroyers and bigger warships were able to give artillery support to Heer at Baltic right to end of war. Swordfish, which could use rockets, torpedos, bombs or mines and had room and carrying capacity for ASW radar and operator, could attack day or night or at least mine the harbour entrances or usually used searoutes would IMHO have been more effective countermeasure against Kriegsmarine. Il-2 with its, was that 700 kg, armour simply didn't have enough carrying capacity for an effective anti-shipping operation, at least against real warships.

[RT]

But a big ship, Arcona ?full of Kz-lager inmates was sunk by brit. aircrafts using rockets no ?? during the war between Iran nd Irak tankers were sunk using blind-rockets, not maybe adapted for armoured big-units..

rémi

[Juha]

RT
Yes Arcona was sunk by rockets, but Brtish used solid head rockets in their anti-shipping strikes. Aimed little low to hit hull below waterline to punch holes. IIRC Soviet rockets were short stubby sort ones and I'm not sure were they enough accurate and did they have suitable underwater traectory for such a tactic and anyway IIRC they usually had HE warhead.

[Juha]

Tcolvin
"The fighter-bomber was thus born over the Bzura."
Now they used fighter bombers in WWII and LW used them in Spanish Civil War, He 51s.

On Poland's AA defences, IIRC they had some 380 40mm Bofors AA guns etc.

"army had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk."
Now I'd say that that is a one-sided statement when one thinks the air combats over Dunkerque.

"IL-2 were bombers which could survive over the battlefield and not fighter-bombers which could not survive..."

Now Il-2 losses were very heavy and without better fighter escorts would have been even disasterous because Bf109 with gun gondolas or Fw190 could shoot them down, I'll not say easily but without too much difficulties. And Il-2s were vulnerable to AAA fire from 20mm upwards. Of course they were "harder" targets than fighter bombers and were practically invulnerable to rifle and 7 - 8mm mg fire which could be deadly to fighter-bombers. But on other hand fighter-bombers were less vulnerable to enemy fighters.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Now they used fighter bombers in WWII and LW used them in Spanish Civil War, He 51s.

On Poland's AA defences, IIRC they had some 380 40mm Bofors AA guns etc.

"army had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk."
Now I'd say that that is a one-sided statement when one thinks the air combats over Dunkerque.

"IL-2 were bombers which could survive over the battlefield and not fighter-bombers which could not survive..."

Now Il-2 losses were very heavy and without better fighter escorts would have been even disasterous because Bf109 with gun gondolas or Fw190 could shoot them down, I'll not say easily but without too much difficulties. And Il-2s were vulnerable to AAA fire from 20mm upwards. Of course they were "harder" targets than fighter bombers and were practically invulnerable to rifle and 7 - 8mm mg fire which could be deadly to fighter-bombers. But on other hand fighter-bombers were less vulnerable to enemy fighters.

1. He51s were used to drop bombs, IIRC, in the Spanish Civil War after they were retired as frontline fighters. Instead of being scrapped they were turned into bombers. By that time bombers like the Battle and Blenheim, Do17 and He111 outperformed the He51. The He51 was no longer a fighter. That was how the Typhoon became a so-called fighter-bomber. It had inadequate performance at altitude for a fighter so should have been scrapped.
2. But do you know how the Polish Bofors performed? Were they a factor on the Bzura? I believe they were not. On the other hand it is possible that the destruction of the Polish army on the Bzura was not due to the LW but to Wehrmacht artillery. That was the conclusion of Operational Research when 2-TAF's claims in the Falaise Pocket in 1944 were checked. This would probably not have been done on the Bzura so we'll never know. But the LW believed its intervention on the Bzura had been significant.
3. The army from Alanbrooke down to the squaddie believed they had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk. Whether it was true or not, I leave it to the experts to determine. But the army believed it and campaigned strongly for an army air corps equipped with dive-bombers. They might even have succeeded if Montgomery had not pulled the rug from under Alanbrooke by agreeing with Tedder that the RAF was delivering good tactical support in North Africa, which remains debateable. The compromise was 2-TAF.
4. Agreed the IL-2 needed fighter protection. All bombers did. But so did the Typhoon on the rare occasions when it encountered Bf109 and Fw190. The RP rails reduced the Typhoon's performance and it could not defend itself from the air, while its lack of armour made it vulnerable to ground fire. It was grossly inaccurate in ground attack with rockets according to contemporary Operational Research. It was therefore good for nothing.

[Kutscha]

tcolvin, the Tiffie made some 247 claims including 3 Me262s, 55 Me109s and 94 Fw190s. Not bad for a ground pounder.

How would you rate the P-47 which also had no extra armour?

The LW made 90-100 claims against RAF a/c (May 27-30) so how did this happen if there was no RAF in the area of Dunkerque?

See Tony Wood's claim list at the bottom of the link, http://jg26.vze.com/

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The RP rails reduced the Typhoon's performance and it could not defend itself from the air, while its lack of armour made it vulnerable to ground fire. It was grossly inaccurate in ground attack with rockets according to contemporary Operational Research. It was therefore good for nothing.

Except of course for all the damage it inflicted on the Germans. When I've located it, I'll post a deciphered German message about the effects of Typhoon attacks on Panther tanks.

If you care to read the deciphered traffic you will find a rich strand of evidence from the German side about the disruption caused by these and other "good for nothing" Allied fighter bombers. I posted four pages of this material elsewhere on TOC a few months ago, for example.

[Graham Boak]

The Typhoon’s lack of performance at altitude was only equalled by the Fw.190, Yak1, 3, 7 and 9, Zero, Oscar, Bf.109, and all other types with a single stage supercharger. On entering service, it was the fastest fighter in service in the world, with the greatest firepower fitted to a single-engined fighter (apart from its earlier stable-mate the Hurricane IIc). Although largely unarmoured initially, in common with all other contemporary fighter-bombers, armour was fitted to dedicated fighter-bombers in 1944 production. Please do not confuse half-truths seized on by its competitors for orders, and mindlessly repeated by armchair strategists, with absolutes. Compare the Typhoon with its true contemporaries, allied and Axis, and bear in mind both advantages and disadvantages of all, and not least consider the disadvantages coming from disrupted production in the event of any cancellation.

The lack of accuracy of the unguided rp was no surprise, being well known to ballistic experts and the decision-makers before its adoption. It was still chosen for wide-spread service, and perhaps a little thought will show why. A squadron or wing of Typhoons attacking a large military formation is not the same thing as a sniper picking out a solitary target at long range. Comparison should be made to the kill probability of a bomb, a shell or a rifle bullet. None are outstanding. In addition, the rp had a significant psychological effect greater than that of the bomb. Regardless, not all Typhoon units carried rockets anyway, perhaps half.

The operational analysis quoted was carried out some weeks after the battle, and covered only a limited part of the battlefield. Only wrecks indisputably caused by the rocket alone were counted. No allowance was made for examples with multiple weapon hits, none for allocation of a share of unidentifiable wrecks, none for removal of wrecks from the battlefield for any reason. No allowance was made for the effect of disruption on enemy movement. This survey has been used not only to attack the rp as a weapon, for which it presents some case, but also the fighter-bomber in general, for which it does not.

The Allied advance through France and Germany was inextricably tied to, and dependent on, the successful use of fighter-bombers to disrupt German movement and clear strongpoints. No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.