Me 262 should have been used as a bomber?

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Now they used fighter bombers in WWII and LW used them in Spanish Civil War, He 51s.

On Poland's AA defences, IIRC they had some 380 40mm Bofors AA guns etc.

"army had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk."
Now I'd say that that is a one-sided statement when one thinks the air combats over Dunkerque.

"IL-2 were bombers which could survive over the battlefield and not fighter-bombers which could not survive..."

Now Il-2 losses were very heavy and without better fighter escorts would have been even disasterous because Bf109 with gun gondolas or Fw190 could shoot them down, I'll not say easily but without too much difficulties. And Il-2s were vulnerable to AAA fire from 20mm upwards. Of course they were "harder" targets than fighter bombers and were practically invulnerable to rifle and 7 - 8mm mg fire which could be deadly to fighter-bombers. But on other hand fighter-bombers were less vulnerable to enemy fighters.

1. He51s were used to drop bombs, IIRC, in the Spanish Civil War after they were retired as frontline fighters. Instead of being scrapped they were turned into bombers. By that time bombers like the Battle and Blenheim, Do17 and He111 outperformed the He51. The He51 was no longer a fighter. That was how the Typhoon became a so-called fighter-bomber. It had inadequate performance at altitude for a fighter so should have been scrapped.
2. But do you know how the Polish Bofors performed? Were they a factor on the Bzura? I believe they were not. On the other hand it is possible that the destruction of the Polish army on the Bzura was not due to the LW but to Wehrmacht artillery. That was the conclusion of Operational Research when 2-TAF's claims in the Falaise Pocket in 1944 were checked. This would probably not have been done on the Bzura so we'll never know. But the LW believed its intervention on the Bzura had been significant.
3. The army from Alanbrooke down to the squaddie believed they had been abandoned by the RAF at Dunkirk. Whether it was true or not, I leave it to the experts to determine. But the army believed it and campaigned strongly for an army air corps equipped with dive-bombers. They might even have succeeded if Montgomery had not pulled the rug from under Alanbrooke by agreeing with Tedder that the RAF was delivering good tactical support in North Africa, which remains debateable. The compromise was 2-TAF.
4. Agreed the IL-2 needed fighter protection. All bombers did. But so did the Typhoon on the rare occasions when it encountered Bf109 and Fw190. The RP rails reduced the Typhoon's performance and it could not defend itself from the air, while its lack of armour made it vulnerable to ground fire. It was grossly inaccurate in ground attack with rockets according to contemporary Operational Research. It was therefore good for nothing.

[Kutscha]

tcolvin, the Tiffie made some 247 claims including 3 Me262s, 55 Me109s and 94 Fw190s. Not bad for a ground pounder.

How would you rate the P-47 which also had no extra armour?

The LW made 90-100 claims against RAF a/c (May 27-30) so how did this happen if there was no RAF in the area of Dunkerque?

See Tony Wood's claim list at the bottom of the link, http://jg26.vze.com/

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The RP rails reduced the Typhoon's performance and it could not defend itself from the air, while its lack of armour made it vulnerable to ground fire. It was grossly inaccurate in ground attack with rockets according to contemporary Operational Research. It was therefore good for nothing.

Except of course for all the damage it inflicted on the Germans. When I've located it, I'll post a deciphered German message about the effects of Typhoon attacks on Panther tanks.

If you care to read the deciphered traffic you will find a rich strand of evidence from the German side about the disruption caused by these and other "good for nothing" Allied fighter bombers. I posted four pages of this material elsewhere on TOC a few months ago, for example.

[Graham Boak]

The Typhoon’s lack of performance at altitude was only equalled by the Fw.190, Yak1, 3, 7 and 9, Zero, Oscar, Bf.109, and all other types with a single stage supercharger. On entering service, it was the fastest fighter in service in the world, with the greatest firepower fitted to a single-engined fighter (apart from its earlier stable-mate the Hurricane IIc). Although largely unarmoured initially, in common with all other contemporary fighter-bombers, armour was fitted to dedicated fighter-bombers in 1944 production. Please do not confuse half-truths seized on by its competitors for orders, and mindlessly repeated by armchair strategists, with absolutes. Compare the Typhoon with its true contemporaries, allied and Axis, and bear in mind both advantages and disadvantages of all, and not least consider the disadvantages coming from disrupted production in the event of any cancellation.

The lack of accuracy of the unguided rp was no surprise, being well known to ballistic experts and the decision-makers before its adoption. It was still chosen for wide-spread service, and perhaps a little thought will show why. A squadron or wing of Typhoons attacking a large military formation is not the same thing as a sniper picking out a solitary target at long range. Comparison should be made to the kill probability of a bomb, a shell or a rifle bullet. None are outstanding. In addition, the rp had a significant psychological effect greater than that of the bomb. Regardless, not all Typhoon units carried rockets anyway, perhaps half.

The operational analysis quoted was carried out some weeks after the battle, and covered only a limited part of the battlefield. Only wrecks indisputably caused by the rocket alone were counted. No allowance was made for examples with multiple weapon hits, none for allocation of a share of unidentifiable wrecks, none for removal of wrecks from the battlefield for any reason. No allowance was made for the effect of disruption on enemy movement. This survey has been used not only to attack the rp as a weapon, for which it presents some case, but also the fighter-bomber in general, for which it does not.

The Allied advance through France and Germany was inextricably tied to, and dependent on, the successful use of fighter-bombers to disrupt German movement and clear strongpoints. No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.

Graham.

1. It is true the ground units cheered the Typhoons and Spitfires giving the semblance of close air support. No one on either side could believe then , and some still cannot believe today, that all that sound and fury signifieth nothing - or not very much. Time and again I have checked 2 TAF claims that their sorties were "very successful" only to find they had missed completely.
2. The Hillman strongpoint, which had no Flak, held up 3 British Infantry Division on D-Day for hours and was one of the major reasons why Caen was not taken on the first day. 2 TAF provided no help. The aircraft that could have given the crucial assistance, the Vultee Vengeance, were being used to tow target tugs in Devon on that day. The Vengeance proved its worth in the Far East - it's all on the record.
3. Hindsight is 50/50. The Army should have had its own air corps. The Army Air Corps should have had Vengeance dive bombers and Hurricane IIC tank-busters. The RAF's role would have been to gain and keep aerial superiority and ensure the LW was kept away from the battlefield.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Except of course for all the damage it inflicted on the Germans. When I've located it, I'll post a deciphered German message about the effects of Typhoon attacks on Panther tanks.

If you care to read the deciphered traffic you will find a rich strand of evidence from the German side about the disruption caused by these and other "good for nothing" Allied fighter bombers. I posted four pages of this material elsewhere on TOC a few months ago, for example.

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

My position derives from the conclusion of No.2 ORS Report No. 15, Enemy Casualties in Vehicles and Equipment During The Retreat From Normandy to the Seine;
"Effectiveness of weapons.
The principal weapons used for the direct destruction of enemy vehicles and equipment were cannon, machine guns, RP and bombs.
We have not been able to differentiate at all clearly between the relative effectiveness of the first two; both appear to have been very deadly to all except heavily armoured vehicles and the figures given in the preceding parts of the report speak for themselves. As indicated in 2(b) above, RP have not produced the results against armour which might have been hoped for, whilst against soft-skin vehicles they are clearly less suitable than cannon and machine gun fire. It is suggested that RP in its present form suffers the grave disadvantage of being virtually a 'one shot' weapon which even in the hands of the most skilful pilot has poor accuracy, whereas the protracted burst of fire from cannon or machine guns gives a far greater chance of scoring hits."

2 TAF commented:
"The circumstances of the examination did not make it possible to take account of the moral effects of RP. A lack of effectiveness in causing material damage cannot be accepted as a reason for abandoning RP as a weapon against armour until it can be replaced with something better."

The conclusion surely is that:
1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air.
2. Resources taken by Air resulted in fewer resources available to Ground.
3. There was something better, and 2 TAF knew it.
4. The Hurricane IIC was scrapped in North Africa because it required armour which had been ordered from the manufacturer. Armour was against RAF political correctness. RAF PC also killed the dive bomber.
5. Rudel had a famous postwar argument with 2 TAF pilots telling them he had tried RP and knew the gun was better. The 2 TAF pilots even then refused to believe him.
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done. And they caused more losses to the wretched pilots KIA than more suitable aircraft would have done. That's all I think I am trying to say.

Tony

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Nick.

I'll look forward to that with interest. I'm sure in the end we will agree.

1. 2 TAF, like Bomber Command, was not interested in the material damage being caused but argued the effect on morale was sufficient justification for the enormous resources being devoted to Air...
6. Surely this debate can now be put to rest. Of course Typhoons caused damage. But they caused less damage to the Wehrmacht than more suitable aircraft would have done.

Tony

Morale effect was maybe a consideration but what you seem to ignore is disruption. Allied air power severely restricted the mobility of German ground forces throughout the NW Europe campaign and the movement of supplies to the front. A tank is just as dead without fuel and shells as it would be from a direct hit.

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

[RT]

Question 1: did this "more suitable aircraft" exist and if so what was it?

If you hv full air-control difficult to hv better than stuka type, one question why they do not use earlier a 20 mm cannon on this bird, could be useful....

Question 2: do you think the German Schlachtgeschwader in the East were a waste of time too?

In fact no-one achieve successes like those of the germans in the first years of the war, but they use almost more the 2.mot. bomber than the stuka

The fighter-bomber came at the moment where the armies learned how to protect against air-artillery, were more entrenched nd when the skies became dangerous for low flying aircraft

Remi

[Kutscha]

Vultee Vengence

In the European theater the Vengeance was considered too vulnerable to enemy fighters for front line use and was soon withdrawn for use in secondary roles such as training of attack squadron pilots and towing targets for gunnery training.

Is it true that the Germans made troop/supply movements during the night because it was too dangerous to move during the day?

[Graham Boak]

There are times when I hate this board – this is the second time today I have typed a long response only to have see it rejected and the text lost.

The Hurricane comments do not hold water. The Mk.IId was used in combat in the Middle East, where the weapon was shown to be effective but the loss rate high. This is because the weapon requires a low slow approach in full view of the enemy, followed by an overflight. The enemy is given time to direct his fire efficiently, and did so. In addition, the penetration was found to be inadequate against the latest German tanks, which were correctly expected to be present in greater numbers and proportions in the future. The gun also required extended training for the pilot. Despite this the gun-capable Mk.IV, which was armoured, saw service in Western Europe until just before D-Day, in Italy to the end of the European war, and in the Far East until the end of the Japanese war. One squadron in the Far East was trained and equipped as a specialised unit with the 40mm.

There has never been any serious argument that the gun is the most accurate choice, despite what any front-line officer without direct experience may have felt. The problem has always been the vulnerability that goes with its use. It should be remembered that only 10% of even an armoured division were tanks: if 2 TAF were more concerned with their overall effect on the enemy than on bean-counting holes in tanks, it is difficult to fault their judgement. Always assuming that the 40mm was capable of making those holes in the first place.

The Vengeance’s limited operational activities, experiences once tried not to be repeated, were only in areas without enemy fighter activity and with limited flak defences. This was not the case in Western Europe, on either side. Even Rudel was forced to leave his beloved Stuka and fly an Fw.190 in later missions. The Luftwaffe was never foolish enough to attempt to use the Stuka over Western Europe from 1944 onwards. The Vengeance was more expensive to build and to operate, with a notoriously unreliable engine. It called for a two-man crew, at a time when Britain was suffering badly from manpower shortages. The role required greater time in training, the aircraft had limited air-to-air defensive capability and its offensive capability air-to-air was nil. The value of a fighter-bomber is not just the capability of self-defence that the dive-bomber lacked. It was also in the escort fighters that weren’t required, and could be put to more productive use.

The only alternative role it could carry out was target towing, but this was a vital activity which should not be sneered at. If the Vengeance spent its time improving the gunnery of allied aircrews, this was more valuable than burying said aircrew in futile holes in Normandy.