Graf or Steinhoff?

[nick de carteret]

Different meeting referred to here John. Galland had already been replaced at the time of the mutiny of the Geschwaderkommodoren, who were proposing to go to Hitler with their demands for Goering's dismissal towards the end of January 1945. The 'Fat One' got word of this before it could be enacted and agreed to meet them first. One of their ultimatums was that Galland should be reinstated immediately and all resources be redirected towards the fighter arm (Me 262 etc.) The controversy is whether Graf or Steinhoff were part of the delegation that was led by Lutzow who was the main protagonist in confronting Goering. Both claimed at different times to have participated and that the other was not present.

[Raimo Malkamäki]

Hello,

personally I think that Hermann Graf is one of the most interesting personalities of the German fighter aces, not least because there are so many controversies regaring him, pow-years etc.

Anyway, here is one view to the mutiny of the aces. This is a translation of pages 244-247 from a book in Finnish language by Karl Bartz: "Taivas on liekeissä". Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, Helsinki. KK:n kirjapaino, 1956.

The original title in German language is "Als Der Himmel Brannte". This book is old but quite good and different than most WW II books. It has a nice "touch", it is well written and it covers many sides of the war, both personal experiences and strategy. It is not a Luftwaffe history in < scientific sense, but more like a collection of stories from interesting incidents.

I made this fast translation for my good friend Christer Bergström when he was writing his Graf-book. I´m not a translator by profession, but the basic idea of the text is surely correct.

********************************************

Pages 244-247: Aces in mutiny

The blame of Bodenplatte´s great and irreplaceable losses was put on bomber general Peltz and also general Schmidt. Why would one send so concentrated formation to fly low over the enemy territory, when they thus were easy targets for the most concentrated aaa-fire?
How was it possible that the formation leaders were told to fly the fixed routes and not let them freely choose the best way to target? Why weren´t the pilots informed of the V-weapon areas?

Among the front commanders Göring had long ago lost his authority. Everybody knew, that he could not support the Luftwaffe. When Göring demanded during one conference (when all high ranking officers were present) that everything must change and he told these men who had so many times risked their lives, that they should have fanatics of the Soviet army as an example, everything was at the end. Bitterly and scornfully the officers took this mocking. For them, Göring´s fairy tale was finished.

All this and bad leadership, the ignorance of the stab about the front situation and finally the wrong commands regarding the Bodenplatte had started the idea of demonstration against Göring. The last drop was the fact that Galland was sacked from the GdJ-post.

So several Luftwaffe obersts got together (Galland had made the iniative, but he stayed behind the scenes) in order to write a memo and to told Göring directly what are the problems, and to insist the problems to be fixed. These men had the highest medals and they all had faced death many times... They were obersts Graf, Lützow, Neumann, Rödel and Trautloft.

Trautloft and Lützow wrote the memo, which the other obersts supplemented.
Honest, honourable and slim oberst Lützow was chosen to present the memo.
It started with a fact that jagdwaffe was going thru a crisis because of the allready made and planned personnel changes. The following reasons had led to this crisis:
The units can´t understand the "leave" of general Galland, because he is the leading brain of the jagdwaffe, he is known as a good leader and despite his toughness, is popular among the fighter pilots. One reason for crisis was accusation "many times repeated by Göring that the fighter pilots are cowards, allthough jagdwaffe had perhaps greater proportional losses than any other part of the whole Wehrmacht".

Next came the demand that the bomber general who had led the jagdwaffe since the beginning of the western attack (17.12.1944) must be relieved from his duty. Since that day 2 kommodore, 14 kommandeur and 63 staffelkapitan had died.

According to opinion inside jagdwaffe, these losses are mainly due to leader´s mistakes. Never could the bomber general achieve the trust of the fighter pilots, (although he had great personal achievements) because he had kept the IX Fliegerkorps out of the battle during these difficult times. At the same time he had ruthlessly sent the badly trained day fighters to the battle. (IX Fliegerkorps had been trained to use Me 262 as a bomber, with no results). Also, bomber general is no fighter pilot. He had supported the idea that Me 262 should be used as a bomber. He had close co-operation with a person, who was known as an enemy of the fighter pilots and who called them pigs.

In the memo Gordon Gollob, Galland´s succesor was also mentioned.

Gollob has shot down many planes, but he never was a good superior. He considers personal matters more important than the main facts. The proof is that when he was not satisfied, he didn´t try to live with it, but instead he wanted to change to another arm (SS).

Oberst Herrmann would also never be popular among fighter pilots. As a commander of the dispanded 30. Jagddivision he had had great losses and minimum results, and he had not told his superiors the faults of the system, but instead had kept them secret for personal reasons.

The jagdwaffe is convinced that the "close ring" of Reichmarschall gives him wrong info. So jagdwaffe demands, that all officers must be changed, specially those without no combat experience. According to new situation, the new officers must be chosen among the experienced fighter pilots.


The meeting begins. Göring arrives with Koller and some other officers. Obersts salute. Göring doesn´t respond. He says only: Sit down. With red face he reads the memo.

So brave Lützow begins to speak with calm and friendly voice, without permission and against all military tradition.

Herr Reichmarschall: In the name of the soldiers at present, I must ask you to give me 50 minutes time to speak without interruptions. Otherwise our aim to give you information is useless.

Göring´s face gets even more red: This is outrageous, he shouts. Something like this has never happened. Are you going to say that I have not established a strong air force?

Lützow stands without a move and looks Göring straight in the eyes: Yes, Reichmarschall, he says, and stresses every word by knocking his finger on the board. You have started strong Luftwaffe and had success in Poland and in France. But since then you have been sleeping.

Göring´s eyes seem to blow. His face is blue-red and he hits his fist on the table. What do you say? he shouts. I´ve had it. This is mutiny. I´ll have you shot.
Then he leaves the room.
Lützow and Trautloft were sacked. Gollob was made the last GdJ.

Then Hitler interfered. Galland didn´t get his job back. But he got the opportunity to start a new Me 262-unit and prove his point about Me 262 being so good as a fighter plane. And Galland said yes. He could pick his pilots. He took the "Aces in mutiny" with him and started JV 44 at Branderburg-Briest in January 1945. There were many aces among the pilots, Steinhoff, Lützow, several majors, kapitans, leutnants, unteroffiziers. They wanted to fly as an ordinary pilots...
At the end of March the unit flew to München. During the last days of war Steinhoff got burned badly. Lützow died. At the beginning of May the unit flew to Salzburg.
When the americans got closer, the jets were burned.
**************************************************

Further evidence, or should I say counter-evidence, is presented by Alfred Price in his book "The Last Year of the Luftwaffe. May 1944 to May 1945."

Page 131: A few days later a deputation of senior leaders, led by oberst Lützow and including Oberst Graf (JG 52), Oberst Rödel (Commander of the 2nd Fighter Division), Oberst Steinhoff (JG 7) and Oberst Trautloft asked for and received an audience with Göring.

So, this question still waits the final answer. I wonder if we are ever going to get one.


Best regards from Helsinki,
Raimo Malkamäki

[ju55dk]

If Koller was present it shold be possible to find out who was there. Parts of his diary has survived the war! Does anyone know if the part from january to march 1945 still exists?

Junker

[nick de carteret]

Thanks Raimo, so now we have a possible third scenario in which, as proposed by Alfred Price, both Graf and Steinhoff together were present at the showdown with Goering. Very interesting but strange that with such deep research having been performed for so many years on important Luftwaffe history such as this, that no complete answer has been found to this question.

[Christer Bergström]

Thank you (again) for your input, Raimo!

It is interesting to note that Karl Bartz mentions Graf but not Steinhoff. But I agree that we don't know exactly who was present and who was not. That is why I published both sources in my book "Graf & Grislawski".

The version that Steinhoff was removed from his command of JG 7 as a consequence of the "rebellion meeting" is a myth. Steinhoff was removed from his post as JG 7's commander in December 1944 due to Manfred Boehme on the grounds of accusations of failures in his duties as unit commander ("mangelnder Aktivität, (. . .) weil er versäumt hatte, in den rund sechs Wochen seiner Kommodoretätigkeit die Aufstellung des Geschwaders genügend voranzutreiben." Boehme, "JG 7", p. 102.)

The "rebellion meeting" took place in January 1945.

I agree with Raimo that Graf is one of the most interesting personalities of the German fighter aces. I also think that Steinhoff's qualities as a fighter pilot deserve to be better emphasised than in most books on the topic. While I was working on "Black Cross/Red Star", volumes 3 & 4, it struck me that Steinhoff really was one of the "giants" among the German fighter aces as far as fighter pilot qualities is concerned.

Funny that Gollob also was mentioned in this context. Apart from Graf, I can't think of any Luftwaffe fighter ace and unit commander who has been more unfairly treated by history writing than Gordon Gollob. I admit that I too fell into that trap until I some years ago had reason to study Gollob's career as a figyter pilot more closely. This will show in "Black Cross/Red Star", Volume 3.

[ju55dk]

According to diary from Koller under 17. january 1945:

After I came back from the advanced headquarter in the west i met with Oberst Lützow, Steinhoff and Rödel 17.30!

So I,m pretty sure that Steinhoff was present at the meeting on the 19. with Göring!

Junker

[Ruy Horta]

It is interesting to note that Karl Bartz mentions Graf but not Steinhoff. But I agree that we don't know exactly who was present and who was not. That is why I published both sources in my book "Graf & Grislawski".

Small correction here:

Als der Himmel brannte
Der Weg der deutschen Luftwaffe
Karl Batz
Adolf Sponholz Verlag Hannover, 1955

p.252

Meuternde "Asse"

So trafen sich - auf Veranlassung Gallands, der im Hintergrund blieb - mehrere Obersten der Jagdwaffe, um eine Denkschrift zu forumulieren und Göring ins Gesicht zu sagen, wo die Fehler lagen und Abhilfe zu verlangen. - Es trafen sich Männer mit den höchsten Auszeignungen, Männer, die oft genug das Totenhemd getragen hatten... Es waren die Obersten Graf, Lüztow, Neumann, Rödel, Steinhoff und Trautlof.

So the original German copy of Bartz does include Steinhoff!

Lets not forget that also Steinhoff quotes from Koller's diary, on p. 112 & 116 as one of the prime instigators running up to the confrontation with Göring.

The Final Hours
A German jet pilot plots against Goering
Johannes Steinhoff
Nautical & Aviation Publ., 1985

Another list can be found in

Fighter General
The Life of Adolf Galland
Raymond Toliver & Trevor Constable
Schiffer, 1999

p.167

Goering immediately saw Steinhoff and Neumann at Karinhall. Their visit and views convinced Goering that he had a major crisis on his hands. The Reich Marshal thereupon called a meeting of all available Kommodores at the House of Pilots (Haus der Flieger) in Berlin. Colonels Luetzow, Steinhoff, Roedel, Trautloft and Neumann; Lt. Colonels Graf, Bennemann and Priller; and Majors Michalski and Aufhammer were available to attend. Galland was not invited. Trautloft and Luetzow nevertheless kept him informed of events.

Now here is what I think might be closer to the thruth.

The Obersten Lutzow, Neumann, Rödel, Steinhoff and Trautloft were prime movers in the case against Goering. They had been part of the planning phase or had contact with either Köller or Von Greim in the days previous to the January meeting.

Steinhoff p. 118

We gathered outside the building. At our suggestion all the conspirators had been summoned to Berlin who a month before had decided to take action: Lützow, Trautloft, Neumann, Rödel and Steinhoff.

Now Graf was there judging by what apears to be a more thorough list in Toliver & Constable, but likely only as an attendee: a meeting of all the available Kommodores.

So Steinhoff was in his right in excluding him as part of the conspiracy, however Graf was also correct as a participant of the infamous meeting.

What remains is an error in a Finnish translation of Karl Bartz, or an error in its re-translation to English, thus there remains no doubt that Steinhoff was there, and little doubt that Graf was as well...

Of course this is part assumption on my part.

(there is also a good account of the January meeting in Six Months to Oblivion, by Girbig p. 182, which together with The Last year of the Luftwaffe, by Price p. 131, also includes Graf in the list).

[SES]

Hi,

I.a.w. Steinhoff's The Last Chance there is no doubt that he was there. After the meeting he accounts how he attempts to contact Lützow in Italy, but is detained at the border and returned to Berlin.

It is noteworthy that Lützow, Trautloft, Neumann, Rödel and Steinhoff all are "relieved" of their present positions, but Graff continues as Kdore JG 52 ??????????????????
bregds
SES

[Christer Bergström]

If you read between the lines in my book "Graf & Grislawski", you will see that although I mention the two different versions, my own conclusion is that probably both Graf and Steinhoff took part in the confrontation with Göring in January 1945. At the end, I write: "Göring's most sinister threats never were realized. The most severe repercussions were brought down on Lützow, who was banned from German soil and sent to Italy to assume command of the German fighter units in the area. Oberst Rödel remained in command of 2. Jagddivision, and Oberst Steinhoff had been removed from his command of JG 7 previously in December 1944. The fact that Hermann Graf was allowed to return to JG 52. . ."

I don't see any objective circumstance which supports the conclusion that Graf was only a passive attendee. At least Graf himself describes the list of demands which was presented to Göring as "our proposals".

This is how Gollob commented on Steinhoff's description of the famous meeting with Göring:

"One finds that accurate statements are missing, detailed information is sometimes not correct. Anyone expecting objectivity/impartiality will be disappointed," Gollob writes on Steinhoff's description.

Continuing his review of Steinhoff's book ("Verschwörung der Jagdflieger"), Gollob wrote:

"One notices that many of the 'players' are referred to by their initials and not their full names. Why such secrecy? Often it is unclear who said what . . . We find for instance, Major Br. (page 82) and the Hptm. from the General der Jagdflieger's staff who 'arranged' Steinhoff's trip to northern Italy to see Lützow where he was held up by military police on orders of General Ritter von 'P'. Shall we insert the proper names? Brustellin, Kath and Ritter von Pohl. Or does Oblt 'B' (p. 52/54) and Obstlt B. have a similar personality to that of Bühlingen? Corrections would be welcome as much as any additions. The method of spreading allegations without providing any proof is inexcuseable."

Jochen Prien is another one who questions the accuracy of some statements in Steinhoff's book "Verschwörung der Jagdflieger". See p. 138 in Prien's et al excellent "Jagdfliegerverbände" 9/I. Although Prien touches another subject in the same book by Steinhoff, it forms a questioning of the reliability of Steinhoff's book as a source.

As for myself, I rest my case. I was in personal contact with Steinhoff for many years and received much valuable information from him - information which I later have been able to find confirmation for in original documents etc. However, Steinhoff diplomatically avoided to identify the people mentioned by single characters (letters) in "Verschwörung der Jagdflieger".

For different reasons, these three men - Graf, Steinhoff and Gollob - are quite controversial persons in the society of WW II Luftwaffe fighter pilots.

To SES:

It is noteworthy that Lützow, Trautloft, Neumann, Rödel and Steinhoff all are "relieved" of their present positions, but Graff continues as Kdore JG 52

The assertion that Steinhoff and Rödel were removed from their posts because of their participation in the so-called "mutiny" in January 1945 is wrong, as you can see above and in my previous post. Steinhoff was removed from his post as JG 7's commander in December 1944, and due to other reasons. Rödel remained in command of 2. Jagddivision, just as Graf remained in command of JG 52. The reason why precisely Graf remained in command of JG 52 is discussed in my book "Graf & Grislawski"; I find it quite understandable in view of circumstances. By the time the meeting with Göring was held, the Soviet winter offensive caused the German lines to collapse, and the Red Army was streaming into Germany. To remove such a popular commander and hero as Graf from his command of a key Eastern Front unit like JG 52 - and precisely in that moment - probably would have been psychologically unwise ( to say the least). You have to understand that by that time, Graf was a "super hero" to the German airmen and soldiers, way above Steinhoff, Neumann, Trautloft and Lützow. Such a cult figure can't just be dismissed - particularly not exactly in the very days when the Third Reich is flung into its deepest crisis ever.