Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

[Kutscha]

You should look at the Davis link Juha.

from page 16

"On 4 October 1940 Sir Charles Portal became chief of the air
staff, a post he would hold until the end of the war; Sir Richard
Peirse became AOC, Bomber Command. On 30 October Portal
made his previous views official policy—lowering German
morale would no longer be the by-product of strategic air attack
but the end product. The air staff ordered Bomber Command
to concentrate on oil and morale—oil when visibility allowed,
morale when it did not. The command would devote
limited efforts to U-boats, communications, and airfields. The
initial draft of instructions suggested 20 to 30 cities."

So, long before Harris took command of BC, area bombing was policy.

[Juha]

Hello Kutscha
I have read the same years ago fromNoble Frankland's Bomber Offensive (Purnell 1969) and from semi-official Richards' Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol I (1953). I don't know if it is in Davis' book but already by July 41 Air Staff knew that oil plants were too small to be found with the equipment and training level at the time, so Peirse was informed that targets were morale and marshalling yards.

But Tony's point was that COS could not control Harris, that's a different thing than Air Staff. IMHO power grid targets were not feasible for night bombers before late 43 when there was enough H2Ss and some ecperiences on their use and Oboe was established itself. IIRC Germans jammed GEE much earlier than British had anticiped but still had its function because it was working over North Sea and navigators could check their calculations against GEE positions for first couple hundred kilometers, so they saw for ex how exact was the forecast for winds etc and it also helped them during last couple hundred kilometers on way back.

And one should go through the British reports on effects on LW bombing to see how British power grid coped, that surely had its effects on how vulnerable target British saw the Germany's grid. I'm rather sure that there are books on the target selection and at least memorandums and service's own internal studies, for ex that on Photo recon was opened to general readers at PRO in 1978.
Juha

[Juha]

To a bit clarifying
Opinions in the Air Staff varied during the war, but it was naturally committed to strategic bombing campaign against Germany, just like Admiralty would have liked more a/c to support naval operations and Army would have liked more air support to land campaigns.

IMHO the Air Staff went for area bombing because,a) Politicians wanted to make Germans to pay their bombing attacks on British cities, b) they found out, well before the Butt Report revealed the truth to the other branches and to politicians, that real effects of bombing were much less than what was hoped for because of the difficulties crews had to find out ordered targets. The first area attack was against Mannheim on 16/17 Dec 40. It was a revenge attack to LW attacks on British cities, especially to those on Coventry and on Southampton.

When new navigational aids and better tactics came into use, inside Air Staff began again discussion on target priorities but Harris, with WC’s backing, opposed diversion from area bombing. What was behind Harris reasoning I don’t know, but he had participated the Air Policing in Iraq in 20s and might well be frustrated during 40-41 frequently changing priorities and decisive new techniques which should have bought the war rapidly to end but failed miserably. Also British knew from LW bombing on British targets that many targets were more resilient against bombing than had been thought and that nervously changing bombing priorities wasn’t the right way to go because knocking out targets was difficult, repairs were many times faster than anticipated, substitutes could be found, less necessary consumption curtained, use of reserves could delay impact of production shortages etc. IMHO when technical progress allowed it, BC should have returned to attacks on certain sectors of Germany’s economy. But what would have been the priority targets in addition of oil would not have been so easy to decide during the war. And Harris stubbornness at least prevented the dissipation of efforts to unsuccessful “war winning targets” even if I personally think that from late 43 onwards BC efforts could have been directed better.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Tony
IMHO your RAF A-36 timetable in your message #30 is highly optimistic when we think that the first oper. sorties by Mustang Mk Is were flown in May 42 and the handling trials report for Mustang Mk I was completed at A&AEE in Aug 42. Because I don't remember that RAF asked other manufactures at that time to design a dive bomber version of their fighters, why should they asked that from NA. So IMHO earliest possible time for interest in A-36 was when NA got its prelimenary design of A-36 ready.

Juha

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The first RAF Mustang 1 came off the production line on May 1st, 1941.
So the RAF knew its capabilities.

Tony

The RAF sort of knew of the capabilities of the Mustang. They also knew the capabilities of the P-39 but found problems with them later when they had arrived in GB.

The 1st arrived in Oct '41 but there was still 8 or so months of testing and training of pilots before the 1st mission took place in July '42. Delivery date is of no consequence.The date of the first operation is more important.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

If they had wanted the A-36, they could have ordered and received it by February 14, 1942.

Tony

What crystal ball were the Brits looking at? It was only by accident that the Mustang was converted into a dive bomber. It then took 13 months from the date ordered before the A-36 went on a mission.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

If escort were needed - a big 'if' given it could operate below the German radar - then it could have been provided by A-36s without bombs with a max speed of 356 mph in clean condition at 5,000ft.

Tony

Early Mosquito missions were flown below German radar and they suffered high losses. Once the coast was crossed the Germans didn't really need radar. You expect missions deep into enemy air space not to be intercepted. No big 'if', escorts certainly would be required. What a waste having A-36s carrying no bombs. But, then if there were Mustang Is.......

As for the 300 mile combat radius, that is a straight line. Missions were not flown straight from base to the target. Zigs and zags would reduce the combat radius possibly up to a 100 miles. Low level navigation is not that easy especially when the pilot had to fly the a/c and also do the navigation.

[tcolvin]

Juha and Kutscha.

If BC/RAF had understood and appreciated the possibilities of dive-bombing accuracy, and the vulnerability of German electrical generation in 1938 to small tonnages accurately placed, then they could probably have had the A-36 operational before February 1942.

But they could certainly have had a DH98/Mosquito dive-bomber with internal bomb-load like the Vengeance, operational by end 1940.
Britain could therefore have knocked Germany out of the war before February 1942 and saved itself from the recurring consequences of Russia and the USA winning WW2.

De Havilland presented his proposal in September 1938 at the time of Munich, but the RAF rejected it in October 1938, and did not even order a prototype until March 1940. They then faffed about until the middle of 1941 before ordering mass production.

The RAF was not alone. Arnold and Quesada were shown the Mosquito in April 1941, but the USAAF did not order it, having their own prejudices and blindness.

Tony

[CJE]

May I add my two cents?
Having butchered the Ju 87s over the Kent, I guess this very bad experience may have made the RAF overly cautious about the value of dive-bombers with no escort.
Apart from pin-pricks in airfield tarmacs, what success could the dive-bombers be boasting about during BoB?

[Juha]

Hello Tony
can you be more specific how the A-36 could have been operational before Mustang Mk I, from which it was developed? As I wrote Mustang Mk I flew its first oper sorties in May 42 and first bigger long-range missions around mid-summer 42.

And as Chris wrote, what happened during the BoB had profound influence to British thinking, also on dive-bombers.

Juha

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Juha and Kutscha.
De Havilland presented his proposal in September 1938 at the time of Munich, but the RAF rejected it in October 1938, and did not even order a prototype until March 1940. They then faffed about until the middle of 1941 before ordering mass production.

Tony

De Havilland only began working on B.18/38 (company designation DH98 Reconnaissance-Bomber) in Oct '38. Kind of hard to reject something before it has been put forward.

Then there is the availability of Merlin engines. There would have been less Merlin engines available for Hurricanes and Spitfires if they had gone to Mossies. So much for winning the BoB.

Be sure the RAF had air superiority in 1940 allowing dive bombers to operate without much fear of interception.

Crystal balls, 20/20 hindsight and a fairy godmother who waves her magic wand and poof, 100s of fully tested a/c with fully trained crew suddenly appear is so wonderful.

[Juha]

Hello Tony
to test the theory of vulnerability of Germany’s electrical generation to 500lb bombs I suggest that you try to find out what effects the 12 Aug 41 attack on the power stations Knapsack, output 600,000 kilowatts, it had the largest steam generators in Europe, and Quadrath, 200,000 Kw, had. After all of the attacking force of 54 Blenheims 50 bombed, each dropping two 500lb GP bombs during this low level attack. The crews claimed accurate bombing, 2/3 bombed Knapsack and 1/3 Quadrath. One lost before bombing had flown to high-tension cables, so it also had damaged Germany’s electricity grid. So 100 500lb bombs onto two very important powerstations producing power for Ruhr area.

Juha