The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[pstrany]

I had the privilege of doing an interview with John Kenneth Galbraith many years ago (he was one of the authors of the USSBS.)

As regards Hamburg, Mr. Galbraith pointed out that the Germans were very slow to mobilize their war production. Hamburg was a thriving city, with a great deal of civilian economic activity. Once Hamburg was bombed, all that civilian infrastructure was destroyed, so that all the shopkeepers, hairdressers and other non-military activity ceased. As Mr. Galbraith put it, the British created an idle workforce. The Germans, realizing this, put them to work in military industries.

Keep in mind that peak German military industrial output came not in 1941, but in 1944, after several years of BC attention. That is not to say that they accomplished nothing, but just that they did not single-handedly bring down the German war machine.

One other note, both Mr. Galbraith and several other sources pointed out that German war production could have been brought to its knees fairly quickly if Bomber Command had focused on the power grid in Germany. Aside from the raids on the Ruhr dams, very little effort was made to destroy German ability to generate and distribute power to factories throughout the Reich.

Any weapon can be effective, but only if it is used properly.......

Paul

[Jan Gazda]

Tony,

To answer your original question first no critical review of Fahey’s book is known to me. As for the conclusions you’ve made:

1. I totally agree with you that given the vast resources at its disposal BC’s contribution to the ultimate victory inadequate although by no means negligible. Had the only goal been to defeat Germany as quickly as possible then BC would be a horribly inefficient tool. However, there was broader strategic planning at work there. In terms of casualties BC’s campaign was a cheap way of showing good will to Russians. It enabled Churchill to stand by and watch Russians and Germans to slaughter themselves which he undoubtedly enjoyed. From this point of view bombing Germany for four years from 15 000 feet above was a very smart thing to do.

2. I can not agree with you that BC’s campaign or even WWII bankrupted Britain. Surely there was some loss of wealth as in most wars and yes, Britain was in huge debt after the war, but so were most other countries and this situation had been there before. War debt did not make UK the sick man of Europe as there were many other and more important factors at play that caused steady decline of Britain’s economy. The only country that really got bankrupted by the WWII was Soviet Russia. For many reasons combined it was unable to ever fully recover from the damage war brought about. The GDP per capita gap between USSR and the West kept widening after WWII which finally led to collapse of the Soviet block.


Jan

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Jan Gazda

It enabled Churchill to stand by and watch Russians and Germans to slaughter themselves which he undoubtedly enjoyed.

Are you seriously suggesting that Britain alone could have raised and equipped an army sufficient to take on the Germans in Western Europe and win? Britain's entry to the war was predicated on an alliance with France and its (on paper) very powerful armed forces. When the greater part of those forces were taken off the board, Germany and the USSR were still in a non-aggression pact. Other than surrender, what were the viable options for Britain at that time?

I think you might also find that, at considerable cost, Britain and the USA poured material support of all kinds into the USSR to sustain it against Germany.

[RodM]

After having a read of the thesis, my own opinion is that it is an important addition to the debate of the strategic air offensive.

Having said that, I feel that the author has missed the point in several areas and not delved into several complex issues.

I actually find it offensive that the author should emphasize a calculation of the cost for each German civilian killed, as if this is the marker upon which the success of the SBC should be judged. In fact, the calculation is completely irrelevant. Of more importance would be comparing the cost to Germany of defending against and repairing the damage caused by the SBC, not to mention the simple expedient that Bomber Command was an offensive weapon that, along with the USAAF, diverted a fair portion of German output to defence - output that otherwise been used for offensive over the British Isles. I would maintain that Germany's failure to mount a proper and sustained strategic campaign against the UK as a base of war operations was a grave mistake. Whether Germany could have mounted such a sustained campaign, considering that it had ultimately 'bitten off more than it could chew' once America had joined the European war, is another matter.

In terms of the construction and maintenance of airfields and infrastructure, I don't believe that one can separate the needs of Bomber Command from that of the USAAF. To that end, if the investment had not been made in Bomber Command, how would the USAAF strategic bomber force have fared in establishing itself in the UK? The USAAF in the UK relied heavily on RAF support in a number of areas, including the infrastructure set up to aid Bomber Command. To suggest that the investment in Bomber Command infrastructure was a cost that Britain could not afford, would automatically call into question the parallel USAAF SBC. I don't believe these two issues can be separated.

Nor do I see detailed analysis of the offsetting of costs against reverse lend-lease. A question I would be asking is did Britain get full economic value from technological advances and research shared with America? While the military value of this sharing undoubtedly bore fruit in American manufacturing of and improvements to British technology in the fields of both the aeronautics and electronics, to what extent did America economically profit to the detriment of Britain in the post-war years because of technology provided to the Americans for no real direct economic recompense?

The author also places emphasis on the wastage due to the dissolution of a substantial portion of Bomber Command in the immediate post-war years, without exploring the late-war requirements of fighting Japan, and the planned deployment of 'Tiger Force'; plans only made redundant by the Japanese surrender after the Atomic bombings. That Britain could reduce this war material to scrap only came about because the Allies defeated the Axis powers and the Soviet Union did not 'liberate' western Europe.

Tony, most of your theories are based on the notion/belief that Bomber Command operations had no political or material effect against Germany and its ability to wage war, and were thus a complete waste of effort. Many people flatly disagree with this notion, including Webster/Frankland in the Official History (which, in my view, is one of the most forthright and courageous Official Histories ever published by any country. If you haven't done so, I suggest that you read all four volumes from end-to-end, and not selectively take what suits your own hypothesises).

What most people now agree on is that with hindsight the British SBC could and should have been more effective than what it was. This is obviously different from suggesting that Britain should not have embarked upon a SBC at all. Should Britain not have done so then I would suggest that the economic cost to Britain could have been much more dire because the war might have been lost.

Cheers

Rod

[Jan Gazda]

Nick,

I do not want to add any more heat to the thread. This has always been a very friendly board and discussion on a topic like this can easily get out of hand which is unnecessary. We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations. Russians will always feel that the Western Allies could have done more and the Western Allies will always argue that they did what they could. I think that this is one of the matters on which there will always be split opinions. One of the reasons is that people in the West never came to fully understand the extent of the carnage on the Eastern front. The Russians really fought a completely different war out there.

Jan

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Jan Gazda

I do not want to add any more heat to the thread. This has always been a very friendly board and discussion on a topic like this can easily get out of hand which is unnecessary.

Jan, I admire your wish to keep the mood of this board amicable. I am less impressed by your throwing out an intemperate accusation which you then completely fail to justify, preferring instead to withdraw from further discussion. I can only hope that this is because you now regret what you wrote although it is difficult to see how "We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations" could suffice either as an explanation or an apology.

[Jan Gazda]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Jan, I admire your wish to keep the mood of this board amicable. I am less impressed by your throwing out an intemperate accusation which you then completely fail to justify, preferring instead to withdraw from further discussion. I can only hope that this is because you now regret what you wrote although it is difficult to see how "We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations" could suffice either as an explanation or an apology.

Nick,

It was not meant to be apology of any sort but merely an acknowledgement of the fact that we will probably never reach an agreement on this topic. I am comfortable with that. History is not algebra which has a unique and correct answer for each problem. There is no “true story” hidden and waiting to be found in historical events. All we can do is take the data we have and proven or assumed relations between the agents in play and put them together in more or less coherent hypothesis or interpretation.

Your premise here, I suppose, is that Britain stood under-manned and ill-equipped against a stronger opponent and that more than three long years were needed to overcome this. For my part, I can not endorse with this picture. As in 1940, the population of UK was 48,2 million with total GDP (in 1985 international dollars) of 236,8 bn.$ and per capita GDP 4 910 $. For Germany, respective numbers were 69,8 millions, 273,1 bn.$ and 3 910 $. From 1941 on some two thirds of German war effort was vectored to the East, so corresponding portions of German figures for population and GDP should be subtracted. Thus UK was significantly wealthier, more productive and had an advantage in manpower over its opponent and yet it was unable or unwilling to wage a full scale war against Germany until mid-1944.

Now my interpretation of its low activity is that it was geopolitically-driven strategy behind it. Letting Soviets and Germans bleed to death in intense and bitter fighting in the East meant to improve Britain’s position after the end of hostilities. I’m sure you will have quite a different interpretation of the events and that you have compelling arguments to support it. For reasons stated above I can fully accept that you’ll adhere to your viewpoint and I will hold mine.

As for the Lend-Lease I am fully aware of it but you may have overlooked the reciprocity of the problem summed up candidly by Truman. Lend-Lease dollars were aimed at saving American lives: every Russian, British or Australian soldier who went into battle equipped by means of American aid reduced the danger to young Americans.

As for the efficiency of the bombing, the average GDP growth of UK between 1940 and 1944 was 2,75% per year, while in case of Germany it was 3% per year. Throughout this period Germany´s defense outlays as the percentage of national income increased from less than 50% to around 70%. It wasn’t until 1945 that German GDP decreased in year-to-year comparison. Strategic bombing campaign might have reduced productive capacity of Germany by a slight margin but it seems it was far from what was being expected.


Jan