Response to Glider and Juha.

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

As far as I am concerned, the matter under discussion is how the VVS compared with the Anglo-Canadian-American TAFs in fulfilling CAS and interdiction.

IMHO the thread can go nowhere, and is futile, for two reasons;
1. There is no agreement about the obligations or the effectiveness of the Western Allies' TAFs. The data is available, but the subject is emotionally charged with tribalism. One side of the comparison is therefore in dispute.
2. An understanding of the Russian language is necessary even to know what data is available about the VVS. The other side of the comparison is therefore unknown.

Tony

I certainly agree that the information is available iro the 2 TAF and the subject is charged with bias, tribalism is something different.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

As far as I am concerned, the matter under discussion is how the VVS compared with the Anglo-Canadian-American TAFs in fulfilling CAS and interdiction.

Then I don't see why you tried to make a cost/benefit analysis with so little information.

You did not compare survivability rates of one aircraft against the other when attacking the same type of air and ground defenses. You did not have a handle on losses in Russian and German ground attack aircraft units, nor did you have them categorized by cause. You did not write anything concrete about their state of morale. You did not write much about the perceptions of Russian and German troops on the ground; including those who were attacked and those who profited from it. You did not identify any documents or case studies that might tell us how their experience with Close Air Support might have differed significantly from that of the RAF and British Army.

So your strong opinions were based on what?

Originally Posted by tcolvin

IMHO the thread can go nowhere, and is futile, for two reasons;
1. There is no agreement about the obligations or the effectiveness of the Western Allies' TAFs. The data is available, but the subject is emotionally charged with tribalism. One side of the comparison is therefore in dispute.

It cannot be disputed that the Luftwaffe, once the most staunch proponent of specialized dive bombers, was forced to accept that it was a technical dead end.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

2. An understanding of the Russian language is necessary even to know what data is available about the VVS.

In any language, air attack on surface targets was a very expensive option to other methods and I believe that there were few exceptions. A small group of assault infantry or demolitionists could eliminate certain types of bunkers and fortresses that aircraft units could not destroy at any cost. It was also learned that a well-planned grid of minefields could sink more enemy ships (and for less capital investment and fewer lives spent) compared to attacks on shipping by aircraft.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The other side of the comparison is therefore unknown.

There is a massive amount of data which proves that no type of manned aircraft from the 1940s was cost effective as flying artillery. A lack of precision guided weapons caused a need for repeat attacks on most hard targets. Aircraft cannons up to 50mm were usually not effective against pillboxes, bunkers and most tanks of 1944 vintage. Post-battle field inspections and training exercises showed that the projectiles would deflect off harmlessly unless the firing angle of impact was ideal.

In the context of weight of fire, or accurate placement of unguided rockets and free-falling bombs, you are hairsplitting about the Typhoon, Stuka, and Shturmovik.

[tcolvin]

Nifty,

My strong opinion against the Typhoon and Spitfire is based on accuracy.

Dive bombing was the most accurate method of bombing in WW2.
This was acknowledged by all those who operated dive bombers - GAF, VVS, USN, USMC, IJN, FAA, Regia Aeronautica, Flygvapnet, and probably more.

Only the RAF refused to operate dive bombers.

Perhaps you (or anyone) would care to give the real reason for the RAF's refusal, rather than the rationalisations put forward by the RAF - such as Dowding's argument that inaccuracy is desirable for its own sake, or the argument that dive bombers are liable to be shot down by fighters.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

As I already mentioned the Il-2 operate more over battle field and pass more then one atack(first RS rocket, then bombs, and then MG's, total sometimes up to 6 atacks) on their target. Under these circumstances the AA have more chance to shot down the attackers

Igor,

I agree that your reason is the only one that explains the high Il-2 loss rate compared with that of Typhoon and Spitfire.

If what you say is a fact, and we know for a fact that 2TAF made it policy never to go round again because of the risk from aroused FLAK, then we have an explanation.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Tony
I’d say that the situation isn’t so impossible. If you cannot lay your hand on Soviet operational studies or if you cannot read Russian, read several German memoirs of men who fought on both fronts in 43-45, after all the men in receiving end had the best knowledge on the effects of CAS. There are also a few good books on Il-2 in English and also a must is "Red star against the swastika" by Vasily B. Emelianenko, very good memoirs of an highly decorated Il-2 pilot.

Juha

Juha,

Would you please recommend the best books on the operational use of the Il-2 (is Yefim Gordon's book more than a picture book?), and relevant German memoirs.

I have been told there are US translations of Russian analyses of the VVS on the web which should be consulted.

By the way and off subject, I was lectured at by a Finnish woman and her husband this afternoon on, "Saviours or Intruders? Operation Barbarossa, German troops and Finnish Civilians". She is Una Heiskanen from the University of Helsinki.

Tony

[Kutscha]

Tony, do you know why the Ju-87 had its dive brakes removed?

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Nifty,

My strong opinion against the Typhoon and Spitfire is based on accuracy.

Dive bombing was the most accurate method of bombing in WW2.
This was acknowledged by all those who operated dive bombers - GAF, VVS, USN, USMC, IJN, FAA, Regia Aeronautica, Flygvapnet, and probably more.

Only the RAF refused to operate dive bombers.

Perhaps you (or anyone) would care to give the real reason for the RAF's refusal, rather than the rationalisations put forward by the RAF - such as Dowding's argument that inaccuracy is desirable for its own sake, or the argument that dive bombers are liable to be shot down by fighters.

Tony

A small point but the RAF didn't refuse to fly dive bombers, using the Vultee Vengence against the Japanese where they were replaced by fighter bombers namely the P47. This has been mentioned before see posting 4.

I don't pretend to know why they were replaced by Fighter bombers but presumably they had good reasons. At a guess the FB was more flexible having considerable firepower as well as a heavy payload, one crew member instead of two, faster cruising speed which made it easier for the escort and no doubt others.

Just one clarification which I admit is off topic. You may get the feeling that I am anti dive bombers which I assure you isn't the case. In debates around the start of the war I am the first to say that the Battle of France might have been very different if the RAF had equiped their light bombers squadrons with Skua's instead of Battles.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Nifty, My strong opinion against the Typhoon and Spitfire is based on accuracy. Dive bombing was the most accurate method of bombing in WW2.

And precisely what do you mean?

The war has just ended and three airplanes in mint condition arrive over a target practice range for tests and evaluation. A Typhoon, Spitfire, and Stuka of the variants most commonly seen in 1945. The three test pilots (the Stuka man is ex-Luftwaffe) were properly trained for this kind of mission, with average ability, and a similar number of combat dive-bombing sorties. All the planes carry the same type of bomb, so what will be the % difference in probability of hitting a target the size of medium tank?

Originally Posted by tcolvin

This was acknowledged by all those who operated dive bombers - GAF, VVS, USN, USMC, IJN, FAA, Regia Aeronautica, Flygvapnet, and probably more.

The path of your logic is not unlike suggesting that because a Gladiator biplane could easily outmanuever a Spitfire in a dogfight, the Gladiator must be the better fighter. And therefore the RAF would have been better off keeping biplanes in front line service for as long as possible.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Only the RAF refused to operate dive bombers. Perhaps you (or anyone) would care to give the real reason for the RAF's refusal, rather than the rationalisations put forward by the RAF - such as Dowding's argument that inaccuracy is desirable for its own sake, or the argument that dive bombers are liable to be shot down by fighters.

Costs vs. Benefits.

[tcolvin]

You ask, Glider, what I mean by 'accuracy'.

My answer is identical to that given by Squadron Leader Arthur Murland Gill of 84 Squadron RAF (who experienced operating Blenheims and Vengeances) when interviewed by Peter C Smith;
"Dive-bombing with the Vengeance in Burma taught us what it meant to be accurate. For example, to take out vital bridges, I could usually send a couple of Vengeances in with the almost guaranteed certainty that the bridge would be demolished, whereas with the Blenheim I could take the squadron against the same target day after day and rarely, if ever, score a hit."

Tony

[tcolvin]

Kutscha asks if I know why the Ju-87 lost its air brakes. I don't know they did, so please explain, Kutscha.

Nifty says it's indisputable the Luftwaffe accepted that dive-bombing was a technical dead-end. Really?

Then how could Hermann Neumann in an escorted Stuka destroy the permanent and defended Oder bridge at Aurith on April 16, 1945 with an 1,800 lb bomb when pilots of Me-109s and Fw-190s with 1,200 lb bombs had to fly their aircraft into the bridges?

Naumann said in an interview;
"So, I flew to my target, which was the bridge at Aurith, just south of Frankfurt on the Oder. When I got there, it was almost sundown. I did not have that long a flight. I think it took me about 20 minutes. Before I got there I waved away my escort. When I got to the bridge, I went up to 6,000 meters, went into a dive and dropped my bomb. They did not know what hit them. That was the only time I blacked out from the G forces. When I came to, I saw the bridge breaking up. If you look at a map of Germany today you will notice that the bridge has not been rebuilt, even though the road still goes to the river. "
source: http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/interview...nn_neumann.htm

Tony