Response to Glider and Juha.

[MW Giles]

Please do not shout at me for going off at a tangent, but we are debating the merits of the Spitfire and Typhoon and their ability or inability to hit precise targets when compared with the dive bombers of either the VVS or the Luftwaffe.

There is one very large airforce operating in Europe alongside the RAF that also lacked dedicated dive bombers, i.e. the 9th USAAF. In 1944-5 they had lots of P-47s and some P-38s and P-51s. No Vengences or Dauntlesses. I wonder why?

12th USAAF was also largely dive bomberless (except for a few A-36s, which were replaced by more conventional fighter bombers in 1944- for production reasons)

Please do not tell me they were brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves. I would argue that the USAAF (interestingly an Army Air Force) looked at the Western European environment which was likely to develop following an invasion. An environment that was likely to densly fill up with ground units and their associated flak defenses (high densities of Army Divisions/mile, in comparison with the wide open spaces of the Eastern Front where there were more men but much more space too) and an environment where fighter defences were likely to be well trained and capable. Given that scenario the USAAF chose fighter bomber types for their ground support, which were more flexible and capable in a range of roles than a dedicated dive bomber.

Could they have equipped a number of Dive Bomber Groups? Certainly they could have. Did they? No

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by glider1

Another small point, but I didn't question accuracy of dive bombers, they were very accurate.

However regards this posting we are not questioning the accuracy of a dive bomber vs a Blenhiem, what would be interesting is a comparison of a dive bomber vs a Typhoon or a P47. Vengeances were replaced by the P47 in RAF service presumably for good reasons and one of those would be that the Fighter Bomber had a good enough accuracy, maybe not as good as a Dive Bomber but good enough.

The single-seat Typhoon and P47 would bomb with far less accuracy than a slower Blenheim IV bomber which was equipped with bomb sights manned by a trained bomb aimer who would direct the pilot.

There was no good reason for replacing the Vengeance in RAF service. It was done to avoid continuing RAF embarrassment at its success, news of which was filtering back to the UK (see Peter C Smith).

I suppose you know the quantified inaccuracy of Typhoon RPs provided by the Operational Research Sections of 21AG and RAF.
The percentage of shots hitting a; a) small gun position was 0.2%; b) Panther tank 0.5%; c) large gun position 0.8%; d) army hut 2.8%; and e) large building 10.0%. The number of sorties needed for a 50% chance of a hit on; a) was 44; for b) 18; c) 11; d) 3; and e) 1.

Remember what Gill said; 2 sorties would guarantee a hit on a bridge.
On the basis of cost-benefit, the Vengeance always won hands down.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Giles, that's no tangent. It shows you're catching on. There is no mystery why the A36 was dropped. The USAAF did not want it and decided to kill production on March 22, 1943, even before the A-36 had flown its first mission. The decision was made on the recommendation of a Board of Officers convened to study the USAAF's needs and requirements, and to "evaluate current dive-bombers now in production". Their opinion was that, "dive bombers in general, and converted Navy dive-bombers in particular, were not so useful for the tactical conditions encountered by Army Air Forces combat units as were low level attack bombers".
On July 12, 1943, just as the A-36A was proving itself to be an invaluable weapon, the Truman Committee of the Senate issued a press release; "The Army has concluded that it will have little need for additional dive-bombers, for the reason that dive-bombers cannot be operated unless there is a clear air superiority, and then only when the ground forces are not adequately equipped with anti-aircraft equipment".
This press release accurately reflected RAF thinking, so I am afraid your worst fears are true and the USAAF was "brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves" (your words).

A footnote; Col George R Halliwell flew the A-36 from July 1943 to March 1944. He said this; "I've dive-bombed in the P-40 and the A-36 in WWII, in the F-80 and F-86 during the Korean War and in the F-4 Phantom against North Vietnam. Against all these the accuracy of the A-36 stood out head and shoulders above all the others and this was primarily because you could utilise the truly vertical dive with the A-36". (quoted in "Straight Down" by Peter C Smith, which is a must-read if you are interested in dive-bombing).

Tony

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On the basis of cost-benefit, the Vengeance always won hands down.

Tony

Let's see the numbers. Be sure to include the 6,000 foot runway needed by a Vengeance, the high maintenance man-hours per flight hour, and the cost of building, manning and maintaining the escorting Typhoons and Spitfires.

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The single-seat Typhoon and P47 would bomb with far less accuracy than a slower Blenheim IV bomber which was equipped with bomb sights manned by a trained bomb aimer who would direct the pilot.

I suspect not, the slow level bomber which is an easy target for AA fire, carring a bomb with a max size of 250lb flying at altitude would probably be no more accurate than a dive bombing Typhoon with his 2 x 1000lb bombs.

There was no good reason for replacing the Vengeance in RAF service. It was done to avoid continuing RAF embarrassment at its success, news of which was filtering back to the UK (see Peter C Smith).

Can you give a quote for this statement that it was done to avoid embarrassment?

I suppose you know the quantified inaccuracy of Typhoon RPs provided by the Operational Research Sections of 21AG and RAF.
The percentage of shots hitting a; a) small gun position was 0.2%; b) Panther tank 0.5%; c) large gun position 0.8%; d) army hut 2.8%; and e) large building 10.0%. The number of sorties needed for a 50% chance of a hit on; a) was 44; for b) 18; c) 11; d) 3; and e) 1.

Well known and interesting figures but I cannot see the connection with the debate as I can not recall any dive bombers firing rockets. Its interesting that the RAF seemed to have started switching from rockets to bombs towards the end of the war. Tempests for instance were never equipped with rockets and some Typhoon squadrons were changing from rockets to bombs as well.

However while we are on the topic of accuracy, you didn't make any comments about the Finns observations that IL 2 attacks were ineffective against small targets due to their lack of accuracy.

Remember what Gill said; 2 sorties would guarantee a hit on a bridge.
On the basis of cost-benefit, the Vengeance always won hands down.

A fair point however, why then did they replace them with P47's and I don't buy the 'to save embarassment story' without some evidence. If they were worried about embarassment they wouldn't have used Wellingtons and Hurricanes right until the end.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On July 12, 1943, just as the A-36A was proving itself to be an invaluable weapon, the Truman Committee of the Senate issued a press release; "The Army has concluded that it will have little need for additional dive-bombers, for the reason that dive-bombers cannot be operated unless there is a clear air superiority, and then only when the ground forces are not adequately equipped with anti-aircraft equipment".

This press release accurately reflected RAF thinking, so I am afraid your worst fears are true and the USAAF was "brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves" (your words).

Tony

Well that is one spin one could put on the statement. Or, it was a conclusion reached independently.

Those A-36s operated in areas (27FBG, 86FBG in the MTO, 311FBG in the CBI) that did not have large enemy fighter forces.

[tcolvin]

Glider.
I'm afraid you're revealing a sketchy knowledge of this subject.

In terms of accuracy, the Blenheim bomber was always more accurate at the same altitude as a glide-bombing Typhoon. (They rarely dive-bombed; in fact the only case I know was Lallement who fired his RPs vertically into tanks because it was the only way of ensuring a kill). The Blenheim was less vulnerable to FLAK because of its air-cooled engines, and it could fly on one engine if the other was shot up. However being slower over the target it was vulnerable for longer than the Typhoon. But we were discussing accuracy and not vulnerability.

Read 'Vengeance' by Peter C Smith for a full expose of the RAF's despicable behaviour with regard to dive-bombing. Page 104 has the following; "The 8th July 1943 was notable as the first-ever time that a reference to Vengeance aircraft operating in Burma was given by the BBC in London. Hitherto Air Ministry policy had been to pour scorn and ridicule on dive-bombers and dive-bombing at every opportunity and the media had faithfully reflected this policy. The successful use of dive-bombers, with no losses and maximum efficiency, was in such stark contrast to the previous three years' proclamations as to leave the RAF hoist with its own petard. There was considerable embarrassment and it was only with reluctance that they finally admitted a few of the facts". But it also increased their determination to stop operating any dive-bomber and to speed up the transfer of the crews to P-47s and Liberators, in order to eliminate the possibility of further embarrassment.

It is untrue to say the RAF switched from rockets to bombs; they operated Bombphoons and Typhoon RPs together at all times.

It is also untrue to say the Tempest FBII was not equipped with rockets - it was, and although the aircraft never saw action in NW Europe, it was to have used RPs in Japan.
BTW, the Tempest FBII with the Centaurus air-cooled engine would have had higher survivability than the Typhoon with its fitter's-nightmare and glycol-cooled Sabre. So why didn't the Tempest FBII replace the Typhoon 1B? Did the RAF top brass actually care a damn about its pilots? If they did, they had a funny way of showing it.

There is no reason to think the Il-2 was any more accurate than the Typhoon. Where the Il-2 scored was in survivability, because it was immune to all German infantry weapons. These were what killed you when you flew low over infantry.

Tony

[Kryten]

[quote=Bill Walker;127710]Kryten, the term "dive bombing" has had several meanings through the years. In these threads Tcolvin appears to stick to the original narrow sense of the term: releasing the bomb from a vertical or very nearly vertical dive. This tactic was developed in the 1920s and 1930s, and theoretically gave great accuracy. On the other hand, aircraft designed for this specific task were at a disadvantage in terms of payload and maneuverability, and the maneuver, once understood by the enemy, gave lots of opportunities for opposing AA gunners and fighters.

You will find the term used loosely from WW2 up to today to describe any tactic where the bomb is released in a dive, even from fairly shallow angles. Don't get hung up on the words, you need to understand what the aircraft was actually doing in order to follow this discussion. I think most 2 TAF "dive bombing" was at angles of 30 to 45 degrees below the horizon. This gave less accuracy, but afforded the aircraft a wider range of approach options, and was a maneuver possible for fighter aircraft, as opposed to pure dive bombers like a Stuka. This meant the 2 TAF could use true multi-role fighters, that could also do strafing and rocket attacks, and hold their own in air-to-air combat. As the Luftwaffe learned in the Battle of Britain, a true dive bomber is a "one trick pony".

It is interesting to note that allmost all the 2 TAF "dive bombing" was done in aircraft originally designed as interceptors: the Spitfire and the Typhoon. Some here suggest this resulted from ignorance or deliberate hostility to other branches by senior RAF staff. I personally believe that it is more a reflection of the tough decisions made at all levels in the Allied government and military on the allocation of finite resources amongst a large number of competing demands. Like any compromise, somebody always looses, at least relatively. A similar trade off had to be made with large aircraft and their trained crews going to Bomber Command or Coastal Command, generating alot of unresolved questions over the years. Rather than lengthy discussions of "what could have been" (which can never be truly resolved) we should be looking at the overall outcome of the trade offs made on both sides. In most wars it is not "the best side" that wins, but the "least bad side".[/quote

Hi Bill,
Whilst not getting hung up on the "dive bomber" term , my point is simply I doubt the RAF could see any real benefits to developing a dive bomber in the stuka sense when they allready had fighter bombers early on in the shape of the Hurricane and P40 that could deliver bombs with sufficient accuracy relative to the numbers available.

Bearing in mind stukas failed to hit thier targets on a number of occasions (just reading through Fortress Malta) whilst suffering heavy losses to enemy fighters and ground fire, I would suggest the concept became more of a liability as the war progressed and higher performance fighter aircraft and AAA became available to thier opponents!

consider what would have happened if the UK had deployed Luftwaffe 1944 levels of light flak during the BOB when the stukas were attacking chain home installations for instance!

Losses of Typhoon and Spitfires to AAA in Normandy I would argue has a direct relationship to the increase in AAA the Germans had to deploy to counter the weakness of the Luftwaffe at that time, saturate a target with flak and someones going to hit!

so would the performance advantages of a fighter bomber and its time exposed to AAA and enemy interception make a fighter bomber more effective at that time?

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider.
I'm afraid you're revealing a sketchy knowledge of this subject.

I will let the other members of this forum decide who has a balanced and informed understanding of the topic.

In terms of accuracy, the Blenheim bomber was always more accurate at the same altitude as a glide-bombing Typhoon. (They rarely dive-bombed; in fact the only case I know was Lallement who fired his RPs vertically into tanks because it was the only way of ensuring a kill). The Blenheim was less vulnerable to FLAK because of its air-cooled engines, and it could fly on one engine if the other was shot up. However being slower over the target it was vulnerable for longer than the Typhoon. But we were discussing accuracy and not vulnerability.

Dive bombing was the preferred choice for Typhoons when using bombs unless there was no alternative, with the dive starting at 8,000ft for Typhoons and pull out at 4,000ft (6,000 and 3,000 for Spitfires) dive angle was between 60 and 45 degrees with the leader using 60 degrees and the following pilots between 60 and 45 as they would dive together. Attacks normally by section but sometimes individually. Low level bombing was used on large single buildings as the face of the building was used to expload the bombs.
60 degrees isn't 90 degrees but it is steep and a high level of accuracy can be obtained.
I don't pretend to know what height Blenhiems normally bombed at but am confident that apart from special low level raids it wasn't 4,000ft. Besides vulnerability and accuracy do have a link, anyone can do well on a bombing range and no one is shooting at you, its how well you perform in action that counts.

Read 'Vengeance' by Peter C Smith for a full expose of the RAF's despicable behaviour with regard to dive-bombing. Page 104 has the following; "The 8th July 1943 was notable as the first-ever time that a reference to Vengeance aircraft operating in Burma was given by the BBC in London. Hitherto Air Ministry policy had been to pour scorn and ridicule on dive-bombers and dive-bombing at every opportunity and the media had faithfully reflected this policy. The successful use of dive-bombers, with no losses and maximum efficiency, was in such stark contrast to the previous three years' proclamations as to leave the RAF hoist with its own petard. There was considerable embarrassment and it was only with reluctance that they finally admitted a few of the facts". But it also increased their determination to stop operating any dive-bomber and to speed up the transfer of the crews to P-47s and Liberators, in order to eliminate the possibility of further embarrassment.

I hope to read the book next week if the British Museum have a copy. However I do note that the first Vengence Missions were in March with the second squadron starting in June, so it wasn't too tardy in reporting them. Secondly the AA fire and fighter oposition in Burma was almost negligable compared to the opposition in Europe, to compare the two is chalk and cheese.

It is untrue to say the RAF switched from rockets to bombs; they operated Bombphoons and Typhoon RPs together at all times.

Sorry but it is true to say that the emphasis in 2 TAF was switching. We know that the Tempest wasn't equipped with rockets, we know that the 2TAF FB Mosquito's didn't use rockets on the wings and we do know that some Typhoon squadrons were retraining to use bombs instead of rockets. This was mentioned in an earlier posting of mine. Rockets were always the weapon of choice against shipping which in view of the accuracy figures you gave is understandable. Its also true to say that some Typhoon squadrons kept rockets until the end of the war.
Sorry but you are also wrong to say that bombphoons and Typhoon RP were used together at all times. It was a rare occaision when this happened. Squadrons were trained in either bombing or rocket firing and if the Rockets were to be used, then the bomber squadrons often acted as fighter escort and in reverse.

It is also untrue to say the Tempest FBII was not equipped with rockets - it was, and although the aircraft never saw action in NW Europe, it was to have used RPs in Japan.

I don't know why you raised this. I thought we were talking about the war and the Tempest FBII wasn't operational during the war.

BTW, the Tempest FBII with the Centaurus air-cooled engine would have had higher survivability than the Typhoon with its fitter's-nightmare and glycol-cooled Sabre. So why didn't the Tempest FBII replace the Typhoon 1B? Did the RAF top brass actually care a damn about its pilots? If they did, they had a funny way of showing it.

As I said earlier the Tempest II wasn't operational during the war with the first production aircraft being built in Oct 1944.

There is no reason to think the Il-2 was any more accurate than the Typhoon. Where the Il-2 scored was in survivability, because it was immune to all German infantry weapons. These were what killed you when you flew low over infantry.

This we have covered a number of times the IL 2 could take more damage, but was a hell of a lot easier to hit. It was invulnerable to mg fire whereas the Typhoon had the radiator issue but was otherwise well protected against mg fire. My position is and always has been that these factors probably balanced out. I do agree with you over the accuracy.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

It is also untrue to say the Tempest FBII was not equipped with rockets - it was, and although the aircraft never saw action in NW Europe, it was to have used RPs in Japan.

BTW, the Tempest FBII with the Centaurus air-cooled engine would have had higher survivability than the Typhoon with its fitter's-nightmare and glycol-cooled Sabre. So why didn't the Tempest FBII replace the Typhoon 1B? Did the RAF top brass actually care a damn about its pilots? If they did, they had a funny way of showing it.

Tony

The first squadron to receive Tempest IIs was No. 183 Sqd. It replaced the Spitfire IX in squadron service. 183 Sqd operated Tempest IIs initially from Chilbolton Hampshire from Aug 17 1945 to Nov 1945, when it was disbanded.

The second squadron to receive the Tempest II was No.247 Sqd. It replaced the Typhoon in squadron service. 247 Sqd operated Tempest IIs from Aug 20 1945 to May 1946 from Chilbolton Hampshire when Vampire Is replaced the Tempest IIs.

These were the only two squadrons to receive Tempest IIs during the war.

No. 33 Sqd received Tempest IIs in Nov 1945. In 1949, while stationed in Malaya, it used RPs.

I don't know how the Tempest IIs could to be used in Japan as it didn't have the range to reach Japan from any Allied base.