Response to Glider and Juha.

[Juha]

Hello VG
As much I’d like to have exact info, I don’t have, maybe nobody have because the high number of those which simply went missing, but losses in operations was 10759 – 109 destroyed by enemy on the ground + probably most of 807 lost by Naval units.

IMHO it is rather useless to compare Il-2 losses to US heavy bomber losses, their attack profiles were so different and heavy bombers spent so much more time in hostile airspace per sortie. More fruitful comparison would be Il-2losses vs fighter-bomber losses

Quote:” But what is 100% sure from Efremov, Romanov, Zinoviev (yes, yes the famous anti-soviet dissident) and other Il-2 crews testimony, it is that was far better to write off planes for "combat reasons" rather for "flying accident". USSR was the kind of contry where pilots were easily prosecuted and sometimes executed for "unjustified plane crashes". It also should be remembered...when just looking at crude statistics. “

I don’t have info on Shturmovik units but in fighter units also too high combat losses might mean hard times to the CO. One might try to alleviate the impact of high losses by inflating victories but if caught doing that, one would have been in deep trouble indeed. Life wasn’t easy under Stalinist system.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Tony
IMHO Hurricane was obsolete for ETO in 44, just too slow and vulnerable. What I would like to have seen was some Typhoon sqns equipped with Typhoons modified to be able to carry either RPs of Vickers S guns. With much more power available Typhoon could carry more armour and was faster.

Juha

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

If Trenchard had never existed, the USAAF would never have adopted Trenchardist beliefs, because only a nut could have come up with them. And only a Churchill would have given Trenchard's beliefs the time of day.

I think you give way too much credit to Trenchard, and too little to Churchill. Here is what Dr. Chris Harmon, a CC academic adviser and professor at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia recently said about Churchill and the RAF: (from http://www.winstonchurchill.org/lear...k-for-coventry)

"Churchill did not think well of area bombing but began to believe it could be a grim necessity after (1) he watched devastating German air attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other places full of noncombatants; and (2) he could see precious few ideas for hitting back. In the ever lengthening build-up to Normandy, the bomber offensive was about the best he had to hurt the Germans and their industrial war effort. Later, when he saw France liberated, Germany's defensive lines being pierced, and the war being won, he quickly lost taste for it.

"Churchill's head of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Harris, seemed to think German morale might still be broken by bombing, but Churchill rebuked him after Dresden, and again, just as strongly for bombing Potsdam shortly thereafter."

If you read Churchill's memoirs, he talks regularly about requests from Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Coastal Command, RN, Army, etc. for more men and equipment. Each voice claimed they would win the war with more resources, or the war would be lost without extra resources. Churchill often complained about the balancing act he had to maintain between all these requests. He didn't write blank cheques for anyone.

And I don't think the US needed Trenchard to lead them down the "strategic bomber" garden path. Read Seversky, Billy Mitchell, or Douhet's "The Command of the Air" - published in 1921. I think it is really not appropriate to call any of them "nuts" when history shows some parts of their theories wrong at some times. The invention of the nuclear bomb proved them all frighteningly correct.

[MW Giles]

Interesting quotes from USAF Historical Studies no 175 "The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders" (p333-4) DW Schwabedissen 1960, summarising the work of the Ground Attack arm of the VVS

"As long as the German fighters could mount fighter missions in adequate strength against Soviet ground attack forces, the latter suffered considerable losses. These losses were increased by German medium and heavy anitaircraft guns, As a consequence the results achieved by the Soviets remained small. The ratio of German defensive fighters to attacking Soviet ground-attack aircraft, however, became less and less favourable to the Germans. Thus approximately from the end of 1944 on, the Russian ground-attack units were able to secure more effective results.

In spite of all German measures, the Soviet ground attack air arm steadily improved in the last two years of warfare, although it lagged behind its Anglo-American counterparts in the scope and effectiveness of its attacks. One reason for this was probably the inadequate training given to newly assigned personnel.

A massed commitment of ground attack air units in action coordinated with the army was always observed at those points where the Soviet Command was seeking to force a decision, while only small forces were committed in areas of secondary importance. Nevertheless, in most cases the effects achieved were of a psychological rather thana material nature.

In all justice to the Soviet ground-attack air arm, and in spite of the indisputable results it achieved, it at no time during the war played a decisive role."

Martin

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi,

I noticed that the discussion has turned to Churchill, Arnold, Trenchard, and the role of strategic bombing in the Second World War. Please find attached an extract from my Ph.D. thesis about this subject.


Cheers,
Andrew A.

Air War Publications - www.airwarpublications.com

[glider1]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Tony
IMHO Hurricane was obsolete for ETO in 44, just too slow and vulnerable. What I would like to have seen was some Typhoon sqns equipped with Typhoons modified to be able to carry either RPs of Vickers S guns. With much more power available Typhoon could carry more armour and was faster.

Juha

Contrary to what we have been told the RAF didn't give up on the idea of an airbourne 40mm. I believe that a Typhoon and know that a Tempest (SN354) was trialed with the twin 40mm S guns but this wasn't taken up for a number of reasons. One of which, was the Tempest would be a one trick pony effective only against tanks which were a tiny fraction of the calls for support.
It is worth noting that the 40mm were trialed with the littlejohn adapter which gave it a penetration of 80mm at 500 meters more than enough for all but the heaviest tanks when attacked from the rear or side.

[Juha]

Hello Glider
as I wrote in my message #78 40mm Vickers S gun was capable to pierce side and rear armour of all German AFVs but that of Tigers , even with the normal late war 3lb AP shot it could penetrate 58mm armour plate at 20deg from 400y if a/c speed was 350fps. So enough even against Panther if attacked from rear (turret) or from side (both turret and superstructure sides).

And thanks for the Tempest info, I was aware only the trial installation of the post-war 47mm P-gun pods under Tempest wings

Juha

Addum: 40mm S gun had also HE ammo, which made it effective also against "soft" targets and dugouts.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Let me re-phrase that, and see if it meets your exacting definitions. 2TAF was based on 1TAF's organisation, methods and commanders (Mary Coningham and then Harry Broadhurst), but decided to replace the 40-mm Hurricane IID with the RP Typhoon 1B, and the Hurricane IIC with the Bombphoon and Spitfire.

In December 1942 No. 6 Squadron was withdrawn from the front after losing 14 aircraft in about 300 sorties. They flew defensive patrols over Egypt until March 1943, when they were back in action with the latest Hurricane IID (uprated power and armor protection for the engine and radiator). These "enhancements" imposed a very unfortunate side effect: the aircraft was too heavy to begin with but now it was overweight towards the front, and this caused control problems in all flying maneuvers.

After 6 Squadron moved to Italy in 1944, the Hurricane pilots preferred to carry 3-inch rockets. The 40mm underwing guns were removed due to the considerable nose-down pitch when firing. Even with heavy cannons discarded, the nose armor moved the center of gravity very close to the forward limit.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The rational approach to the use of air power was that which was taught in the VVS and Luftwaffe. In those organisations it was part of all-arms. Russians and Germans were never tempted by the Trenchardist belief that air power could win wars on its own and uniquely did not need to engage with the enemy's main force.

The decision to rid themselves of the 40mm S gun was requested by front-line RAF pilots, not old men back in England who were supposedly hidebound by the Trenchard doctrines.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Your point about the Il-2 is well taken and I thank you for that. Note the Il-2 did not rely on RPs to destroy tanks, but rather hollow-charge bomblets dropped from low-overflying aircraft that were armoured against infantry weapons. We agree about the British 40mm. The RAF knew about the gun's accuracy compared with RPs, so the decision to scrap it was final proof that effectiveness did not feature among 2TAF's success criteria.

The British 40mm gun (and pretty much all other underwing cannons) did not fire accurately compared to internal guns. The best place to hang the outboard gun was on the centerline, to avoid overloading the wings and convergence of fire problems. Obviously that was not possible with single-engine types.

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

3TAF also opted for the Spitfire but maintained the Hurricane IIC and IID, and also operated the Vengeance dive-bomber.

And the P-47. John Hamlin in Flat Out: The Story of 30 Squadron RAF wrote a general outline of dive-bombing missions in the Far East during 1945. The squadron was based in Burma and equipped with the Thunderbolt Mk II:

" … Dive-bombing techniques used in close support were well rehearsed, and accurate results were usually obtained. Twelve aircraft carrying 500lb bombs took off, joined up in fours, line astern, and as soon as the leader set course re-formed in three sections of four, Red, White and Blue, in finger formation. An easy climb at 170mph (indicated) took them to 10,000 feet. Bombing was carried out from a deep echelon, with Blue and White leaders line astern to Red leader, aircraft being spaced at about 150 yards, each one at the same altitude as the one in front and just outside its slipstream, with the exception of Blue and White leaders. Targets were identified on one-inch or 1:25,000 scale maps, sometimes with the help of photographs, and pilots were also briefed by the squadron's army liaison officer. Forward air controllers equipped with VHF radios had been set up in forward areas, and at times the army was able to provide smoke indicators. An interval of one second between the time each aircraft 'peeled off' to bomb was normal; a 120 degree turn was found to be most satisfactory, eliminating the need to make an aileron turn back onto the target during the dive. The angle of dive was between 60 and 80 degrees, bombs were released at 4000 feet, and at the bottom of the dive indicated air speeds often reached 500 mph! Engine rpm was set at 2500 before the dive began …"

When the Hurricane was replaced by the Thunderbolt, the bomb payload doubled and sometimes the sorties lasted about four hours. From February through March 1945, the squadron dropped 393,000 tons of General Purpose Bombs and 20,895 gallons of napalm. The primitive jungle bases surely lacked the amenities of English airfields, but aircraft serviceability was rated at 93.1%.


Pilot interviews from William Hess Thunderbolt at War:

Pilot Officer A. L. Coombs, No. 146 Squadron:
" … We had our misgivings when we were told that the Thunderbolt would be our replacement aircraft as we all wanted Spitfires. We lost about eight pilots converting on the type as we had no idea how fast it could dive. An American pilot put us at ease by looping it off the deck, and then we put it to work.
We experimented with long-range tanks as well as 500 pound bombs. In fact we used it for low level strafing more than its original intent as a fighter. It was the most stable platform we had ever used, especially in a dive from 23,000 feet.
We had little contact with enemy aircraft, but at first we were escorted by RAF Mosquitos which at the time were rated as the world's fastest fighters. However, when they escorted us, they had trouble keeping up.
I saw one of our aircraft come home with nine cylinder heads shot off by flak and another hit a palm tree on a low level run which only resulted in a dented wing … "


Squadron Leader Neil Cameron, No. 258 Squadron:
" ... In December 1944 we started to receive our first supplies of napalm. It was a simple weapon system of long range tanks being filled with the new mixture and with a detonator applied to the tail. The tactics were to run in low over the targets, such as Japanese foxholes, jettison the tanks, which as a rule blew up in contact with the ground, and the usual napalm throw-forward and fire developed. We used napalm a lot and in hilly jungle country we were quite often asked to burn down a whole side of a hill so that the army could see the foxhole targets which otherwise had been covered by trees ... "



Another summary from Brian Philpott RAF Combat Units / SEAC 1941-45: " … The all-round versatility of the Thunderbolt is summed up by Squadron Leader Hawkins, a former pilot of No. 17 Sqn., who also operated Hurricanes with No. 135 when it was the most forward unit in first Arakan offensive and flew its aircraft off the beaches. Hawkins recounts how the Thunderbolt responded in the air with the most delicate touch, belying its rather cumbersome appearance on the ground -- its fantastic acceleration in the dive; its steadiness as a gun platform; and, perhaps in many ways of most importance to its pilots, the amount of punishment it could absorb and still stay in the air …"

[glider1]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Glider
as I wrote in my message #78 40mm Vickers S gun was capable to pierce side and rear armour of all German AFVs but that of Tigers , even with the normal late war 3lb AP shot it could penetrate 58mm armour plate at 20deg from 400y if a/c speed was 350fps. So enough even against Panther if attacked from rear (turret) or from side (both turret and superstructure sides).

And thanks for the Tempest info, I was aware only the trial installation of the post-war 47mm P-gun pods under Tempest wings

Juha

Addum: 40mm S gun had also HE ammo, which made it effective also against "soft" targets and dugouts.

Juha
The penetration figures you mention are for the normal 40mm firing the 3lb shot but without the Littlejohn adapter. With the adapter the performance increased to 80mm of penetration. The HE shell would have had some results against soft targets but then again the 4 x 20mm would be a lot better.
The point is that the claim was that the RAF were dead set against this but as we can see, it wasn't.