Hooton's Luftwaffe Loss Totals - request for clarification

[Laurent Rizzotti]

From my own experience, I would say that it was usual for an air force to lose more aircraft in accidents than by enemy action, but only if you include rear area units (flight schools, operational training schools and so on).

From the summary of Luftwaffe losses between 22 June 1941 and the first days of 1945, frontline units will suffer 25-40% of their unrepairable losses (> 60%) in accidents and the rest due to enemy action (either in the air or on the ground)

Some examples:
II./JG 27: 140 accident losses, 509 total = 27%
III./JG 53: 177 accident losses, 477 total = 37%
II./JG 53: 121 accident losses, 467 total = 26%
I./JG 53: 129 accident losses, 422 total = 31%

JGr.West (an operational training unit): 399 accident losses, 477 total = 84%

As for the figures in your tables, you can see that the Q4 1942 and Q1 1943 are the ones where the percentage of losses in accidents are the highest, probably for four reasons:
1) lot of flying was done over water (between Tunisia and Sicily/Italy) or terrain where it was difficult to recover aircraft (desert or Tunisian mountains)
2) the Luftwaffe was operating from rude airfield compared to Germany or North Europe
3) there was a great number of transport units involved in MTO operations, and up to April 1943 and operation Flax they suffered more losses in accidents than due to enemy action
4) lack of spare parts and good workshops: an aircraft that could have been repaired in Germany or in France will be dumped in Tunisia.

If you exclude these two periods, from Q2 1943 to Q2 1944, your figures are 2931 losses due to enemy action and 1492 in accidents = 32%.