Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots

[Broncazonk]

Looking back on it, and knowing what we know now, is it fair to say that the cadre of fighter pilots that the IJNAF started the war with were objectively THE BEST in the world, bar none? (I'm not dissing IJAAF fighter pilots, I just know very little about them.) But looking at the Guadalcanal campaign, where IJNAF fighter pilots were flying missions that were approaching 1000-miles round trip, that is very strong evidence for this proposition is it not?

To some extent, this discussion is like nailing jello to a tree, however, it is a historical fact that in pre-war Japan, circa 1937-1940, the IJNAF and IJAAF were engaged in an extraordinary amount of realistic operational training, not to mention operational flying in Manchuria and China.

Bronc

[bearoutwest]

Bronc,

You can nail jello to a tree with relative ease if you put it into the right container first. Just like being able to juggle 24 eggs at one time is quite easy – if you tape them into the cartons first. It also means that you make a bigger mess when you get it wrong!

I think you need to frame the context of the combat in order to look at areas where a truer comparison of the IJA and IJN capabilities can be drawn. Leo & Guerra have made true statements but which may not lead to any comparison. Let me expand on my thinking (and it is only my opinion now).

Early in the Pacific war (i.e. December 1941 to about mid-1942) the war was very fluid, and the Japanese capabilities very poorly known (or perhaps more correct to state – poorly appreciated) by Allied planners. The performance of the Allied fighters (P-40s, Buffalos, Hurricanes, F4Fs) did not differ greatly from the Japanese Zeros, Oscars and Nates. The advantage would have been to the attackers, able to direct greater numbers to a specific area and overwhelm the defenders for local air superiority. You see these tactics used to advantage in Malaya/Singapore, the Philippines and Java. Under the circumstances where the defending force is constantly spread thin and under local pressure, losing airfields and being pushed backwards….it becomes much more difficult to understand how well you are (or not) actually performing. So then it becomes difficult to hold a true appreciation of the quality of the enemy. Hence the Allied opinion expands to favour an enemy who is filling the skies with Zeros (despite the fact that these aircraft can be Army Oscars and Nates…..a kind of Zero snobbery perhaps).

It’s only when the Japanese started attacking fixed targets where air superiority is contested over a period of time – e.g. the AVG and RAF defending Rangoon, the RAAF over New Guinea and the USAAF over Darwin – that you get a better impression of what the Allied pilots thought about their opposition. The air battles over Rangoon were exclusively a IJAAF affair, though there is some thought that the AVG squadron remaining in China may have encountered IJN aircraft occasionally. So for the early battles, I think you need to look at the RAAF over Port Moresby and the USAAF over Darwin to get a defending force encountering both IJA and IJN air units, and able to hold their own long enough to for a subjective opinion.

The USAAF units that moved into New Guinea for the late 1942 and early 1943 campaigns would also be a good source of opinion – as they would also have encountered both Japanese army and navy air units on reasonably even circumstances. I think the US Army and Marines over Guadalcanal may have been facing mainly IJN air units and may not have encountered sufficient IJA opposition to help you answer your question subjectively.

The RAAF defending Darwin in 1943 (initially with P-40s and then substantially with Spitfires) encountered over 50 “significant” raids (i.e. bombers escorted by fighters or fighter sweeps), but only about 5 (from memory) were IJA raids. Their opinions may be useful in that they were defending from a secure position with little chance of a Japanese invasion, so they may be afforded greater subjectivity in their reports of enemy capabilities. The thing to watch out for here is that the Spitfire wing flew with Bader big-wing tactics, and tended – under the circumstances – to overclaim in the same manner as the RAF big-wings during the Battle of Britain. I think it’s more a result of putting large numbers of defending fighters over a relatively small patch of sky. If six fighters fire at a vic of three bombers – each can be aiming at a separate target, but if one bomber starts smoking…..all six fighters are probably going to claim it. Not dishonesty, just over enthusiasm perhaps.

By the time you get to the 1944 Philippines Campaign and the US carrier raids over Japan, the average quality of US aircraft and aircrew is so much better that the IJA/IJN, the Allied pilots are more thinking of finding the enemy in order to shoot them down, not so much concerned about whether the opposition was any good.

My opinion only - hope it’s of some use.

Regards,
…geoff

[twocee]

As far as US Navy carrier pilots are concerned I have not come across any reports that seek to compare IJNAF and IJAAF pilot abilities: what I have seen reported is when enemy pilots of unusual skill or aggressiveness have been encountered, whether Army or Navy. Of course, particularly in combat Japanese aircraft, and hence the operating service, were often misidentified.

As a general point, US Navy carrier pilots considered themselves superior to those of the Army and so would no doubt have had the same expectation of their Japanese adversaries.

[Leo Etgen]

Hi Bronc

I for one am very wary of using terms such as "the best" when discussing virtually any subject as more often than not it reveals one's prejudices more than anything else. Regarding the level of Japanese pilots and aircrew at the beginning of the war by all accounts it was very high indeed. One source that I have seen states that army and land-based navy pilots had an average of 500 to 600 flight hours; carrier-based navy pilots an average of 800 flight hours. Approximately 50% of army pilots had seen action in China and against the Russians and about 10% of land-based navy pilots had seen combat in China as well. As I wrote before these men did very well in the initial stages of the war and were certainly capable of holding their own in the mid-war period. For example, the Oscar units of the IJAAF in Burma performed well against a variety of opponents in 1942 and 1943 until the arrival in number of improved Allied types began to change the situation in 1944. On the other hand, in the great naval battles of 1942 such as Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz the Japanese consistently lost more aircraft than the Americans and it should be noted that the USN and USMC held their own against the IJN in the Guadalcanal campaign even though the Wildcat was and is generally considered to have been inferior to the Zeke.

Horrido!

Leo