Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Thanks for the 332nd operational statistics Paul. The July statistics do reflect the single group (A) policies that existed at that time (with exceptions for occasional A and B with perhaps 28-30 apiece). In the fall of 1944 in both 8th and 15th AF the two force Group had enough pilots and aircraft in the TO&E to fly them frequently. You might look at the 332nd mission numbers for comparison.

You are welcome, Bill. Do I understand that the A and B Groups would have about 36 aircraft each, for a total of 72, and a possible C Group with 12 more? Following a more detailed look at Mahoney, I can report that the 46 Mustangs on 17 July was at the very bottom of the range of sorties for the 332nd. The highest number of aircraft put up by the 332nd FG in 1944 appears to have been 64 Mustangs on 23 October. This number must be slightly higher than the average for a 15th Air Force Fighter Group during that year. On 12 October, the 52nd, 325th, and 332nd sortied 163 aircraft between them. The highest number for the 306th Fighter Wing that I can find is 185 P-51s on 20 November. Note that Mahoney sometimes lists the number of aircraft flown by each Fighter Group separately, in other places he quotes just the total for a mission or a Wing.

The sortie numbers listed by Mahoney for the 332nd FG in 1944 range from 39 to 64, with the average at about 52 aircraft. In short, its strength was very similar to that of the other Mustang groups, notwithstanding the presence of the fourth squadron.

Originally Posted by drgondog

The only documents that might provide insight would be the squadron Engineering daily status logs recasting availability based on inventory, battle damage, engine changes, etc. One other thought is that the 332nd may have flown a non-typical 12 Mustang squadron in three flights rather than four flights of four. Perhaps the policy of maintaining 100% Black American pilots placed a 'supply' problem for replacement pilots.. more likely, and less likely is a maintenance issue in which a lot of a/c were grounded for lack of crews.

Both Mahoney and the 332nd Osprey profile mention the problem of a lack of replacement pilots, so that was most likely the primary problem. I haven’t read either book fully, as yet, so I will be able to say more once I have done so. The losses suffered by the group were fairly low and there is little mention of maintenance problems, so technical issues were less important.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Yes the task of copying USAF 85 line by line was arduous - and done before USAF populated database at USAFHRC at Maxwell AFB. Equally challenging was pinpointing change of equipment (i.e from P-47 to P-51) to perform the distribution analysis of victory credits.

How helpful of the USAF to do the database so many years after the war. I wonder if part of the reason for that is that were no concerns about unit effectiveness, as there were during and after the Vietnam war. On the subject of equipment changes, did any of the Fighter Groups ever fly two different aircraft types in combat at the same time? My impression is that this would have been very rare, but various combinations of sub-types of the same aircraft were flown regularly, depending on supplies of new aircraft.

Originally Posted by drgondog

As to the P-38 being able to perform adequate escort for 8th AF? I agree, given a priority of stripping PTO to replace P-47s in ETO that the escort population would have enabled the 8th AF to continue deep raids after March 1944 when the supply of P-38J-15s arrived with 110 gallons in LE of wing and improved intercooler. The J-25s arrived after D-Day so the dive flaps and boosted ailerons would not be present to extend the P-38 performance envelope.

I certainly agree that the increased range and performance of the J-15 was important, but I was making a broader point, returning to the idea that deep raids were not essential. Even with a hundreds more pilots and aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not seriously challenge Operation Overlord, because the overall standard of German equipment and training was very low compared to the Allies. They would have needed, at a minimum, hundreds of new aircraft with the two-stage supercharged Jumo 213E/F and turbocharged BMW 801J. They barely achieved this in the case of fighters in 1945 and never came close in the case of strike aircraft. Given that this was the case, any D-Day strike would have confronted large numbers of Allied fighters with superior altitude performance, which could engage the Luftwaffe at will. It is possible to imagine higher Allied casualties in the air and on the ground, but I would say no serious disruption to the landings was possible, even in 1943.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

You are welcome, Bill. Do I understand that the A and B Groups would have about 36 aircraft each, for a total of 72, and a possible C Group with 12 more? Following a more detailed look at Mahoney, I can report that the 46 Mustangs on 17 July was at the very bottom of the range of sorties for the 332nd. The highest number of aircraft put up by the 332nd FG in 1944 appears to have been 64 Mustangs on 23 October.

Without having access to 332nd FG squadron histories that cite the order of battle, I would guess that the 46 Mustang effort was three squadrons and the 64 Mustang effort was all four squadrons with any early returns filled by spares. There was method in AAF doctrine in MTO and ETO for 16 a/c squadrons. Typically two flights in a section could cover each other 'a la Thatch Weave' while essing to maintain pace with the bombers.

The sortie numbers listed by Mahoney for the 332nd FG in 1944 range from 39 to 64, with the average at about 52 aircraft. In short, its strength was very similar to that of the other Mustang groups, notwithstanding the presence of the fourth squadron.

For the reason suggested above, I suspect three squadron mission composition for any documented strength in '48' range

Both Mahoney and the 332nd Osprey profile mention the problem of a lack of replacement pilots, so that was most likely the primary problem. I haven’t read either book fully, as yet, so I will be able to say more once I have done so. The losses suffered by the group were fairly low and there is little mention of maintenance problems, so technical issues were less important.

To safely arrive at either conclusion the Group history of Battle Damage, Accidents and MACR's would be needed - a depth that Osprey typically finds onerous with respect to research. Category B damage would typically take an a/c out for several days, and engine change at least a day-often two. Does Osprey mention the Service Group support attachment to 332nd location - or shared with one or more other groups. That would be needed for something as major as a wing change, for example. If 'off-site' add a couple of days for pick up and transport.

How helpful of the USAF to do the database so many years after the war. I wonder if part of the reason for that is that were no concerns about unit effectiveness, as there were during and after the Vietnam war. On the subject of equipment changes, did any of the Fighter Groups ever fly two different aircraft types in combat at the same time? My impression is that this would have been very rare, but various combinations of sub-types of the same aircraft were flown regularly, depending on supplies of new aircraft.

USAFHRC did so as a service improvement to cut down on the labor and time to respond to individual record requests. USAF 85 was by itself a component of an ambitious study to see what, if any, individual characteristics (age, second child or son, athletic record, IQ, academic record, etc) formed a predictable profile for pilot selection.. The first task was to parse the data from all the theatres, scrub duplicates, scrub ground scores, match against Victory Credit Board documents as available and punch into IBM type record cards for processing and sorting by computer.

Yes to flying two types of equipment at the same time operationally. The war continued and new equipment didn't instantaneously appear and pilots had the schedule flight time for training with few new ships available. Specifically the 352nd, 355th, 358th, 359th, 361st, 479th (P-47 to P-51) and 20th, 55th, 364th and 479th (P-38 to P-51) are examples of two type a/c composition battle groups during the transition - usually for aonly a couple of days from time of full compliment available for each squadron.

I certainly agree that the increased range and performance of the J-15 was important, but I was making a broader point, returning to the idea that deep raids were not essential. Even with a hundreds more pilots and aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not seriously challenge Operation Overlord, because the overall standard of German equipment and training was very low compared to the Allies. They would have needed, at a minimum, hundreds of new aircraft with the two-stage supercharged Jumo 213E/F and turbocharged BMW 801J. They barely achieved this in the case of fighters in 1945 and never came close in the case of strike aircraft. Given that this was the case, any D-Day strike would have confronted large numbers of Allied fighters with superior altitude performance, which could engage the Luftwaffe at will. It is possible to imagine higher Allied casualties in the air and on the ground, but I would say no serious disruption to the landings was possible, even in 1943.

Regards,

Paul

We would disagree on the last point Paul. The standard of the German pilot skill top to bottom by June 6 was relatively low to February 1944 because of the attrition caused by escort fighters over central and deep Reich, primarily caused by the Mustang. During Q1 and Q2 four P-38 FG's in the ETO destroyed only 178 LW fighters by the end of June, approximately 130, by D-Day as contrast to 1361 by Mustangs in the same period with fewer sorties

If one surmises that Double the actual P-38 Victory credits in the medium range to long range missions (as contrast to P-47 short to medium range Penetration/Withdrawal escort), one could speculate that at least twice the experienced LW pilots that weren't killed by Mustangs would have been available.. and the tempo of attrition should have given LW training command some relief to develop better replacement pilots.

Second point to tactical advantages, somewhat nullified by Beachy Head and Type 16 Control for direction, is the weather and cloud cover favored the LW with respect to putting scattered but strong penetrations of fighter bombers and fighters at low altitude where the P-38, P-51 and P-47 were less effective in performance advantage over FW 190 and BF 109. The Spit and Tempest and Typhoon would have been just as effective.

I am not offering a victory to Germany but I am suggesting that it was dicey at Omaha, dicey in consolidation of beach head, fronts dicey 'enough' in ability to stop Panzer reinforcements from Calais area via strong airpower - if 2x experienced LW fighter pilots had been available to disrupt logistics at the Beach or destroy Mulberry or give the Panzer more time to travel at night.

I am saying "I just don't know " how to calculate the impact of what the Joint Chiefs and Allied Command feared most - namely a LW that was not reduced successfully as a result of POINTBLANK.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Without having access to 332nd FG squadron histories that cite the order of battle, I would guess that the 46 Mustang effort was three squadrons and the 64 Mustang effort was all four squadrons with any early returns filled by spares. There was method in AAF doctrine in MTO and ETO for 16 a/c squadrons. Typically two flights in a section could cover each other 'a la Thatch Weave' while essing to maintain pace with the bombers.

For the reason suggested above, I suspect three squadron mission composition for any documented strength in '48' range

I’ve extracted some information from the 332nd history below. In summary, you appear to be right as far as the initial period of operations is concerned, but then the pilot shortage set in. The number of sorties did recover as 1945 progressed, but it appears the group’s maximum effort for 1945 was somewhat less than 60 aircraft.
To briefly digress, flying 16 aircraft squadrons in combat was another USAAF advantage over the Luftwaffe. I don’t think any German Staffel had 16 aircraft for more than a few days.

Extracted information
26 July 1944 – “61 Mustangs took off, but 26 returned to base. This high abort rate was due in part to the group’s newness to the P-51, but some of it could be explained by the skill level of the groundcrews… availability rates would gradually rise to equal those of other groups”
31 August – 100th and 301st FS flew 32 P-51s, the 99th and 302nd – 31 more, for a total of 63.
12 September – the whole group flew 71 Mustangs, including 4 spares.
4 October – 37 Mustangs flown by 99th, 101st, 301st FS and 14 more by 302nd.
Quote from Colonel Davis – “the Army Air Force screwed up pilot training production so very much that by the winter of 1944-45, there weren’t any replacements, and our pilots were doing 70 missions while other fighter groups’ pilots were going home after 50 missions”
26 December – 100th and 301st flew 23 P-51s, the 99th and 302nd – 21 more, for a total of 44.
January 1945 – “The group managed to temporarily ease its pilot shortage when 34 new aviators arrived from the USA”.
17 February 1945 – 54 Mustangs flown by all four squadrons

Originally Posted by drgondog

To safely arrive at either conclusion the Group history of Battle Damage, Accidents and MACR's would be needed - a depth that Osprey typically finds onerous with respect to research. Category B damage would typically take an a/c out for several days, and engine change at least a day-often two. Does Osprey mention the Service Group support attachment to 332nd location - or shared with one or more other groups.

The Osprey book does not go into any such detail, as you expected. The book has 108 pages of text and a 2 page appendix, so it is a brief introduction to the subject. The Aviation Elite series was 28 pages longer than the Osprey 100 page standard. It is probably because the book is so short that there is no mention of damage categories or the Service Group.

Originally Posted by drgondog

USAFHRC did so as a service improvement to cut down on the labor and time to respond to individual record requests. USAF 85 was by itself a component of an ambitious study...

Thank you for providing the background for the USAFHRC project. I should have checked the date online, the publication date listed on the USAF website is 1978. It seems that my assumption was the opposite of reality and this venture is connected to analysis of the problems over Vietnam. I have never heard of the larger study, has it been approved for public release?

Originally Posted by drgondog

Yes to flying two types of equipment at the same time operationally. The war continued and new equipment didn't instantaneously appear and pilots had the schedule flight time for training with few new ships available...

This shows how much I have yet to find about the Eighth! Did the formations operate together, or in sub-groups of different types of aircraft?

Originally Posted by drgondog

We would disagree on the last point Paul. The standard of the German pilot skill top to bottom by June 6 was relatively low to February 1944 because of the attrition caused by escort fighters over central and deep Reich, primarily caused by the Mustang. During Q1 and Q2 four P-38 FG's in the ETO destroyed only 178 LW fighters by the end of June, approximately 130, by D-Day as contrast to 1361 by Mustangs in the same period with fewer sorties

Your points have significant weight, but I think that you overstate the magnitude of the Luftwaffe threat in February 1944. The force may have been significantly more powerful than it would become in June 1944, but it was a pale shadow of its former strength, in terms of experience and effectiveness. Many more fighters and even improved pilots would not necessarily have led to any greater success in an offensive role, as opposed to a defensive one. The last time the Luftwaffe had any operationally significant success against shipping was during Operation Agreement off Tobruk in September 1942. In that case, the Royal Navy had very little air cover and a small number of ships. The huge invasion fleet of June 1944 was a very difficult target on its own, with plenty of AA guns and radar to direct them.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Second point to tactical advantages, somewhat nullified by Beachy Head and Type 16 Control for direction, is the weather and cloud cover favored the LW with respect to putting scattered but strong penetrations of fighter bombers and fighters at low altitude where the P-38, P-51 and P-47 were less effective in performance advantage over FW 190 and BF 109. The Spit and Tempest and Typhoon would have been just as effective.

Accepting your point that the USAAF fighters may have been less effective, I think the RAF on its own would have had sufficient resources to contain and defeat the German threat. Even when the Fw 190 fighter-bombers got through fairly often, as they did in Tunisia and Sicily, the results never came close to changing the course of the fighting.

Originally Posted by drgondog

I am saying "I just don't know " how to calculate the impact of what the Joint Chiefs and Allied Command feared most - namely a LW that was not reduced successfully as a result of POINTBLANK.

I entirely agree that any specific calculation is impossible. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the Joint Chiefs were not willing to fight the kind of war that the Germans had conducted until the autumn of 1941, taking risks to win large-scale operational victories. For example, the Wehrmacht could have demanded an air superiority campaign before the invasion of France or that of the USSR, but instead the air and ground campaigns happened simultaneously. Much is made in American and British literature of the deception plan for D-Day, but if Pointblank is considered as a part of the D-Day campaign, it becomes clear that tactical surprise was bought at the price of a long delay at the strategic level.

Regards,

Paul