Soviet aviation fuel: More bang for the buck or the ruble?

[Tango Echo Dog]

Once again I would like to thank members for their contributions on this subject.
I have been pondering upon the logistical and operational implications of the information supplied and, unless someone can provide more information, it wonder whether or not the Russians created a rod for their own backs?
Air operations require huge amounts of fuel and Soviet figures indicate that more than 694,500 tonnes of fuel were used by their air forces during the Second World War in Europe which, presumably, includes US imports of high octane fuel. Most historians agree that the Soviet Union fought the war with industrial and communications resources which, compared with friend and foe, were extremely limited and that they out-produced the Germans by severely restricting their military product ranges.
The oil industries of Germany, Great Britain and the United States met their air force requirements by producing a range of fuels with the necessary additives which could then be issued for use by for trainers, multi-engined and some single-engined combat aircraft as well as high performance fighters. Information produced by members indicate the Russians produced four basic octane fuels; B-59, B-70, B-74 and B-78 which needed additives to provide.higher octane ratings. But this implies that the VVS supply service faced a nightmare situation of up to 16 different variants ranging from 73 to 95 octane, some apparently for specific engines, and even this does not include the B-89 which several fighter pilots stated was used by their aircraft.
How then did the system work and what were the operational implications? The Soviet Union’s communications were stretched to the limit and yet it appears that instead of moving ready-mixed fuel it was having to move petrol, plus additives, despite the fact that every tonne of additive would mean one tonne less of petrol. It is surprising this was allowed.
Then where did they go?. Were they moved to the VVS’ regional or battalion support depots and mixed there or was final mixing performed at regimental level? Either way mixing additives with hundreds of tonnes of fuel would take a significant amount of time and surely delay deliveries and, in turn, restrict operations especially in the later stages of an advance when Red Army units were at the end of very strained supply lines.
This would suggest that either pre-mixed fuel was delivered to regiments and that the Soviet air commanders accepted the problems or, like their enemies and friends, they received pre-mixed fuel otherwise they would have complained directly to Stalin. Yet I know of no such action, although before Kursk there were complaints about the general lack of fuel.
It is worth noting that, if there were fuel supply problems , this might explain while German aces in fighters, bombers and ground attack seemed to fly significantly more sorties than their Russian counterparts.
Perhaps I am missing something but I would welcome any comment by members, especially those with an intimate knowledge of the wartime Soviet air forces to resolve this mundane, yet vital, issue.