I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

[Dan History]

Bruce, I did indeed ask for comments, thank you very much for yours You are correct that the question of German resource distribution arose from the German decision to fight on two fronts, or even three fronts, if the Mediterranean is to be considered a distinct front. What I did not have the space to discuss in my study, limited as it was by maximum word count, is that Germany did not have an effective option for continuing the war other than attacking the USSR. The objective of Operation Barbarossa was German domination of the European hinterland and use of the associated natural resource base for the German war economy. The Nazi regime was aware that the attempt to crush British resistance had failed and that the United States could enter the war in the future, so Germany needed resources to continue the war with reasonable chances of victory. Otherwise, the German war effort would simply wither on the vine, suffocated by the Royal Navy blockade. Given the experience of the First World War, Germany's entire strategy was geared to avoid such a turn of events.

It was Britain, and ultimately the United States as well, who exercised the choice to either not become involved in the Soviet-German war, and then to fight a long war against a strengthened Germany, or to aid the USSR with the aim of preventing German domination of all of Europe. Churchill took the responsibility of making the decision to aid the USSR, aware of the consequences: "If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House". This aid effort eventually proved overzealous, as German domination of all of Europe was replaced with Soviet domination of half of the continent. One of the objectives of my study is to demonstrate by implication that, since Western air power was quite effective in defeating the Luftwaffe, better strategic choices could have been made during the war.

Kind regards,

Dan

[Laurent Rizzotti]

Hello,

I have finally finished reading your thesis tonight, I did not want to reply before. Even if your initial comment seemed wrong to me.

I admit that I am surprised by your losses figures for the West for the second half of 1941 and 1942. I have searched WWII air war losses for more than ten years, and would have excepted lower figures. I also found the ammunition figures very interesting.

But in my humble opinion I see two main problems in your thesis:

1) the importance of the Luftwaffe is overestimated. You pointed a true and surprising fact that the Luftwaffe suffered roughly equal losses between West and East from June 1941 to end 1943. But the figures for the whole German war machine are far more unbalanced between West and East. And the main reason for victory or defeat on the East front was on the ground, not in the air (the Luftwaffe decimated repeatedly the Soviet air units in Stalingrad area for example, but the town still held for months).

2) a part of your comparisons seem to imply that the air war in the West and in the East was similar. So the absence of heavy AA guns, guided bombs, nightfighters, searchlights, etc... in the East is often cited by you as a proof of the Allied pressure. My opinion is that they were not in the East because they were not needed. Guided bombs were useful against ships and the only places in the whole eastern front there were some was Leningrad. You talk of them twice as important, but I check the number of guns available in the area for the Soviet and I disagree. Most of the battles in the are were fought east of the city, out of range of the guns and the ships never left port once the battle has begun. As for heavy guns, heavy searchlights and nightfighters, they are useful against aircraft flying at high altitude, not tactical aircraft flying as low as possible. I will say the same for gunpods and rocket launchers for fighters: both are useful against well-defended heavy bombers, something that was not present on the Eastern front. And the Il-2 was tough but not invulnerable, as is proven by the losses of Soviet units using it. Well-used small guns were enough to shot them down, and from 1941 to 1943 there were plenty of German experienced pilots in the East to do it (the Luftwaffe fighter units then were composed of between 25 and 50% of aces. As they will fight in pair, the pair leader (the one who did the shooting) will almost always be an ace... as shown by Prien books). I don't remember reading about German fighters in the East asking for Fw 190s, while it is easy to find stories of British pilots in Africa, Malta and Burma asking for Spitfires.