French fighter scores, mainly 1939-1940

[edwest2]

As I wrote before, you should write a book, or several.


Best,
Ed

[rof120]

Originally Posted by edwest2

As I wrote before, you should write a book, or several.

Best,
Ed

- Oh, I didn't understand your preceding post correctly so my reply was not smack on target to say the least, sorry.

I consider your last statement very nice and a great compliment, especially coming from Ed West. Many thanks.

You're right and… I am working on at least one book on this subject indeed, which explains that I am relatively well-informed. I specialised heavily on this because, as I mentioned already, it has been mostly (not always) very poorly researched and treated up till now - with a few exceptions. If not the French but the German or British air force, or both, were the victim(s) of this bad treatment and incredible libelling I would concentrate on them instead.

There were two topflight (a good word here) historians who worked and published books together: French "ingénieurs" (scientists) - ingénieur with the design dept. of "aérospatiale" (now part of Airbus) / flight-test ingénieur with Dassault, Raymond Danel and Jean Cuny (not "Daniel" with an i), in particular Danel, who was a real, excellent historian too. I feel very modest as compared with him. Both died much too early about 30 years ago but they had managed to publish some remarkable books on the 1940 French air force including excellent monographs with the titles "Curtiss Hawk 75", "Le Dewoitine 520" (this book contains amazing detail on performance, production (over 400 before the end of the Fr. Campaign), improvements (by August, 1940, the Luftwaffe would have been in serious trouble facing D.523s and D.524s, then from about December on even better D.551s with ever-increasing, incredible performance - remember Spad and Nieuport in WW I...), engines becoming more and more powerful etc., the book "LeO 45, Amiot 350 et autres B4" (book on modern French medium bombers, all armed with machine-guns and one dorsal cannon; B4 means "Bombardement, 4 men on board), and the superlative "l'aviation de chasse française 1918-1940". Raymond Danel published numerous, excellent historical articles in early issues of "Le Fana" (actually, originally "L'album du fanatique de l'aviation", a magazine created by Robert Roux, an author himself) and also in the beautiful review "Icare" (specially recommended in spite of some flaws) published by SNPL, the main trade-union of French airline pilots. Starting 1970 "Icare" published about 17-20 special issues on the Armée de l'Air and French naval aviation as well as the Dutch and Belgian air forces at war 1939-1940 and two issues on the Luftwaffe. These issues often contain excellent fundamental historical articles by Raymond Danel, and mainly veterans' stories - most interesting. They are lavishly illustrated by original photographs, most of which were contributed by French veterans. "Icare" is still publishing several issues a year on all possible aviation subjects. Easy to find on the Internet. Back issues are easy to find on the Internet and cheap. The most important and useful issues are N° 53 "1939-40 / La drôle de guerre" (Phoney War) with general information too, and N° 54 "1939-40 / La bataille de France - Volume I : La Chasse" (The fighters). One of the mentioned flaws is the permanent use of the wrong phrase "La bataille (The Battle) de France" instead of "La Campagne de France" for "La Campagne" covers all hostilities from May 10 through June 24, 1940, whereas "La bataille" covers the 2nd part of the Campaign: 5-24 June. One or several issues were devoted to the Belgian and Dutch air forces, the French naval aviation, the French light bombers (Breguet 693-695), the French recce units, the bombers. There is a special issue on Czech fighter pilots with the Armée de l'Air and anoher one on Polish pilots. Both categories were excellent fighter pilots and fought very bravely, often with great success. If interested in the 1940 aerial French Campaign you can't live without the complete collection of these "Icare" issues. I understand 25,000 copies of each were printed. Some back issues can be ordered at "Icare's" Internet page, when out of print on various Internet sites.

It is perfectly possible that other excellent historians of the 1940 Armée de l'Air exist today. I admit that I don't know everything, in particular on various authors (sorry).

Here is an example of the innumerable, terrible statements made, both in France and in other countries, on this subject. I mentioned it already in one of my preceding posts but I feel it's worth repeating because the author is well-known and because of its stupidity:

Stephen Bungay (HE is the culprit) wrote in his well-known book "The Most Dangerous Enemy" (at the beginning of some chapter, probably the chapter dealing with the conditions at or before the beginning of the Battle of Britain; sorry, my copy of this book is still in a box too):

"Of course (or: "Obviously") the French aircraft designs were not of the same quality but…" (but French aircraft did inflict some losses on the Luftwaffe). "Not of the same quality" as in the UK and Germany. I already remarked that both the UK and Germany had only one excellent aircraft design each (1940) - Spitfire and Messerschmitt 109 - and that France had at least half a dozen in service. Bungay's wrong statement is very typical of all the nonsense we had to hear and read for nearly 80 years. Such people just gossip and make wind with their mouth without knowing anything, they just imagine it was like that (because France suffered an incredible defeat 1940 - but NOT in the air). Many French guys, probably wanting to look like smart experts, spread the following and are still doing so today: "The Dewoitine 520 was equal to the Spitfire and Me 109 but only 30 of these fighters took part in the Campaign." As I explained in other posts too this is nonsense: 34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 on (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth (units, like for example GC III/6, newly reequipped with D.520s, came back to the front all the time - totalling 5 Groupes de chasse, each with 34-36 D.520s, totalling a complement of 170 D.520s in first-line units. Losses were compensated for without any difficulty (production exceeded 400, "one an hour", as "Flying" put it about 1959). Add 20 D.520s delivered to the French naval aviation (they must have had plenty of them at the Toulouse factory) and about 40 to units inside France so the grand total was not 30 but about 230.

"Usual disclaimer"

[rof120]

French fighters (1940) – More books

The excellent books by Daniel and Cuny were published by Éditions Larivière in their collection Docavia.

Too bad I just forgot to mention a few French books which really are worthwhile. Text in French but photographs, technical drawings and statistical tables have hardly any language. These are three monographs on French fighter types, all published by Lela Presse:

- Le MS 406 (Morane-Saulnier MS 406) by 12 authors. Strongly recommended if you want to know more than the usual 80 years old clichés. Large size.

- Le Bloch 152 by Serge Joanne, a very big book (large size) with hundreds of photographs, a life’s work. Numerous documents from “behind the scene”, like Armée de l’Air reports on comparative trials of various fighter types including one Me 109 E IIRC. I recommend it very warmly.

- Les Curtiss H-75 français, by Lionel Persyn. A useful complement to Docavia’s fine monograph by Cuny and G. Beauchamp (éd. Larivière) with about the same number of pages (about 360).

There are other books and booklets, often aircraft monographs, mostly not that big.

To be continued.
“Usual disclaimer”.

[FalkeEins]

Originally Posted by rof120

34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 on (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth (units, like for example GC III/6, newly reequipped with D.520s, came back to the front all the time - totalling 5 Groupes de chasse, each with 34-36 D.520s, totalling a complement of 170 D.520s in first-line units. Losses were compensated for without any difficulty (production exceeded 400, "one an hour", as "Flying" put it about 1959).

400 produced, what proportion serviceable or even combat-ready ? 'Avions' no 143 article on GC II/7 page 51 and 'Avions' No 52 page 18 provide some 'context' - my translation. The picture is far more mitigé than you suggest;

" The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

(générale de brigade aérienne Duval)

**see Danel/Cuny P66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520 produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre'. By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..

[rof120]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

400 produced, what proportion serviceable or even combat-ready ? 'Avions' no 143 article on GC II/7 page 51 and 'Avions' No 52 page 18 provide some 'context' - my translation. The picture is far more mitigé than you suggest;

" The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

(générale de brigade aérienne Duval)

**see Danel/Cuny P66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520 produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre'. By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..

Quote:
Originally Posted by rof120
34 D.520s took part in the fighting from May 14 on (GC I/3), 68 from May 15 on (GC I/3 and II/3), about 102 on June 1 (add GC II/7) and so forth (units, like for example GC III/6, newly reequipped with D.520s, came back to the front all the time - totalling 5 Groupes de chasse, each with 34-36 D.520s, totalling a complement of 170 D.520s in first-line units. Losses were compensated for without any difficulty (production exceeded 400, "one an hour", as "Flying" put it about 1959).
400 produced, what proportion serviceable or even combat-ready ? 'Avions' no 143 article on GC II/7 page 51 and 'Avions' No 52 page 18 provide some 'context' - my translation. The picture is far more mitigé than you suggest;

" The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520 ("expérimentation opérationelle") and had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service.** Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union and 'maitresse d'oeuvre' at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

(générale de brigade aérienne Duval)

**see Danel/Cuny P66-73 "..l'application des modifications 'bon de guerre'.." - 228 D.520 produced by May 10..only 75 in Armée de l'air service - of which 28 were declared 'non bon de guerre'. By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost..

REPLY

As I underlined already in the very first line of this thread and repeated some time later,

(Exact quotation) “The scores of French fighter pilots (not the aces only) are a difficult field of research.”

Obviously this remark is valid of their aircraft, the serviceability of these etc. and the whole context.

I’ll start with your last words: “By 05 June a total of 138 D.520s had been declared 'bon de guerre' of which 68 (50%) had already been lost.”

I hope you’ll admit that 138 D.520s (most probably) delivered to first-line units by June 5 is higher a figure than the 30 propagated all over the Internet by well-meaning but misguided amateurs. The real number was 4.6 times higher than 30. Not a bad increase is it. (The real number on May 10 was 57 but only GC I/3's 34 fighters could be engaged as early as this (first mission on May 13). What’s more, it was in no way the end of it for deliveries of D.520s which were fit for combat continued all the time and increased by the day. In a TV interview (“Histoire de l’aviation” – this was one of the few worthwile minutes of this TV-programme) Émile Dewoitine said that he was able to double production if asked to. As you know production took place in the Toulouse factory and there was a “shadow factory” at Saint-Martin-du-Touch (or Tarbes, I'll check on this).

“68 had already been lost” (by June 5). Yes this is quite possible. You cannot wage war without sustaining any losses. What about German losses to D.520s? They were certainly much higher including the fighter losses alone. May I draw your attention on the fact that the loss of 68 of these superlative fighters is an indication of an aircraft complement of the units flying them much higher than 68. (This is valid of the fighter strength of virtually all warring parties). For the moment I am unable to have a closer look at your figures but they could be pessimistic as usual as soon as the FRENCH air force is concerned. See for example 138/30,,,

Heavy losses are not surprising because French Air HQ used the D.520s, as often as possible, in hard missions and air battles, and they often flew top cover for other fighter types. Flying top cover was even more dangerous, and resulted in higher losses, than other types of missions for clearly in most cases German fighters attacked the top cover first (in the BoB too).

1991 Paul Martin (in the book “Invisibles vainqueurs”) published figures of 32 D.520s lost in combat including 1 (one) to Flak on June 16, plus 4 in accidents (plus one before the French Campaign started on May 10). In 2000 he raised combat losses by 56 %, which means combat losses of 50. I can’t remember whether his figure for accidents was raised too. A total figure of 68 is possible indeed, taking into account the AC which came back with heavy damage, were sent to the rear and never were repaired because they were not considered worth repairing.

The negative experiences suffered by five pilots of GC II/7 on May 14 – this was only the 5th day of a campaign which lasted for 46 days - are not very surprising. The mass production of D.520s had just actually started after trials, checks (including by GC I/3) etc. There was teething trouble as usual when you start an industrial mass production anywhere in the world, in particular of such a complex product as a state-of-the-art fighter aircraft, even though the D.520 had been especially designed for easy, rational mass production needing as few manhours as possible.

I understand even at the end of the campaign around mid-June GC III/6, newly equipped with D.520s and facing menacing Italy (God knows why – D.520s would have been much better employed against the Luftwaffe for against Italian AC Morane 406s and Bloch 152s would have done the job) shot down comparatively numerous Italian AC without suffering any own losses. So even near the end first-line units were receiving D.520s which proved themselves in combat. Two or three more groupes de chasse (GC) received D.520s too but too late to see action in June and they were ordered, like all other units having the range, to fly to North Africa.

The communists (1940)

Everybody knows, or ought to know, that all communists including the French ones did their best to help Nazi Germany fighting the democracies of Western Europe because Hitler and the USSR led by the other mass-murderer Josef Stalin had signed a so-called “non-aggression pact” so the Nazis and the Communists were allies and good friends. I don’t know any words, in any language, which could express my anger, my disgust and my contempt strongly enough. There are no words. The communists started to fight Hitler’s Nazi Germany first after Germany had attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941, and they did so because Moscow had given them the order. In France after WW II they screamed everywhere, and they are till doing so, that they are “Le parti des fusillés” – to make it short, the party of the Résistance fighters. Ha ha ha. They fought for Russia not for France.

Yes 1940 the French communists hindered the French war effort as best they could, in particular in aircraft factories. Only two of these traitors were shot for this. The importance of this systematic sabotage against “the capitalist war” should not be overestimated however. French authorities were fully aware of the communist behaviour, intelligence was satisfactory on this and corresponding measures were applied. The country was at war so government had every right to force workers to work properly (no strike allowed) and to watch what they did in the factories and elsewhere. The communist traitors did some damage, it is true, but this damage was not really significant. Their propaganda and other actions among infantry soldiers were probably much worse and effective.

Have a look at the fantastic book “l’aviation de chasse française…” by the same authors as for “Le Dewoitine 520”, Raymond Danel and Jean Cuny. By the way, on May 10, 1940, French units had not got 30 or 34 D.520s but 57 (almost twice 30). On page 191 you can see that after the fighting had ended the Italian-German armistice commission counted 170 remaining D.520s in the non-occupied part of France (about 1/3 of the territory, in central, West and South France except the Atlantic coastal area). This does not include dozens of AC of the same type which were still in the occupied 2/3 of the French territory. Approximately 165 more had been flown to North Africa so there were about 280-300 remaining D.520s (not counting those which were destroyed).

All this hardly can confirm a complement of “30” D.520s in the French Campaign. In fact they were as numerous (or even more) as the “Spitfires” in the Battle of Britain, for which the British industry had one more month to continue and increase production.

Sorry – I have to attend a lot of urgent business now. Typing errors etc, will be corrected a little later, or so I hope.

[rof120]

CORRECTION:

I discovered that most GCs equipped with Bloch 152s had not got 25-36 aircraft but rather approximately 20-26.
(Later: Okay, I gave the exact aircraft complements of all French fighter units which were engaged in the Sedan air battle in post # 42, page 5.)

[rof120]

In another post of this thread I already mentioned the magnificent fight put up by the Dutch armed forces : army, especially artillery but infantry too, anti-aircraft forces, air force (fighters, bombers and recce units) and I understand the Dutch navy fought very well too (but I’m not an expert at naval forces). As you know the Netherlands were a comparatively small and NEUTRAL country with a rather small population, hence comparatively small armed forces. All this did not prevent Hitler in the least from attacking this neutral, peaceful little country with the utmost violence and ferocity, bombing and machine-gunning everything without any warning. (Even several decades later the Dutch did not intend to forgive the Germans for this – I don’t know when they did, possibly in the 1980s or 1990s.)

When looking for details in Peter Cornwell’s well-known big book “The Battle of France Then and Now” (published 2008, often mentioned as TBOFTN) I could not possibly fail to notice the very heavy aircraft losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by the gallant Dutch forces fighting very fiercely. The terrible Ju 52 losses are well-known (many photographs of Ju 52-wrecks in this book and sometimes for sale at ebay; as a whole 188 of these were destroyed in action (according to Williamson Murray’s table III) and many more damaged (damaged AC are a loss too). According to Murray only 8 were damaged in action but I consider this figure much too low to be possible. Something is wrong here. I’d guess about 70-100 were damaged in action. Dutch forces shot at the 52s with everything they had: an excellent, very effective AAA (anti-aircraft artillery), normal artillery on the airfields where the 52s had landed in order to disembark troops, hundreds of machine-guns and of course those fighters which had not been destroyed in the first surprise-attack (most of the fighters escaped: about 50 Fokker D.XXI and G.1A; obsolete fighter types fought too) as well as some bombers, which were cannon-armed and really did shoot down some German combat AC.

What particularly drew my attention in TBOFTN was the numerous mentions of Ju 88 losses. This excellent aircraft type still existed in limited numbers in the Luftwaffe, which makes these heavy losses at the hands of Dutch air and ground forces even more remarkable. About 150 Ju 88s were engaged over the Netherlands including 15 for reconnaissance. AT LEAST 9 of the comparatively rare Ju 88s were shot down by Dutch AC and 5 more by AA, 3 more damaged. These are the lowest possible figures and it is quite possible that the real figures are twice as high as these or higher for in very numerous instances P. Cornwell did not get all details and the causes of many losses are not known. Of course this is no criticism aimed at PC: he did as best he could with existing documents and possibly witnesses and veterans still alive, both German and Dutch.

To sum up, taking the adverse circumstances into account, all Dutch forces fought with great distinction and with very good results. The following is possibly obvious but those who were busy destroying almost 200 Ju 52s were not able to destroy other German aircraft types at the same time and the global results are really remarkable. It is a great pity that the Netherlands ceased fighting after only 5 days - I'm not blaming them, not at all - for otherwise they would have given those nazis an even better taste of their own medicine, in particular in the air, shooting down dozens more of German aircraft and their swastikas.

Of course various Allied forces made an important contribution too including Belgian fighters and AA but all modern Belgian fighters (11 Hurricanes) were destroyed on the ground even before they could fire one single shot; other Belgian fighters were relatively numerous but obsolete (Gladiators, Fiat CR 42s, Fairey “Fox” and “Fury”s, and others). Their pilots fought very bravely too and quite a few were killed. The British and French air forces intervened massively over Belgium and the Netherlands too (the Luftwaffe had launched massive bomb attacks on many French airfields but with very limited results – contrary to the legend repeated for 80 years by incompetent, unserious authors - and with heavy German losses). French and mainly British AC (fighters and bombers) destroyed part of the Ju 52s, possibly one or two dozen, mainly on the ground after they had landed haphazardly. Obviously the Dutch had the best opportunities to destroy Ju 52s, which they did. Allied AC shot down the rest and finished them off, so to speak, even though about half the engaged Ju 52s were able to fly back to base, but a loss rate of about 50 % in one single operation is fairly satisfactory for Germany’s opponents.

Mr. Jochen Prien uses to strongly stress that May 10, 1940 was the day of WW II in which the Luftwaffe suffered their by far worst losses: well over 300 aircraft destroyed (about 365 or something; I can’t remember exactly). Even after deducing the Ju 52s, of which most were lost in very particular circumstances, the LW lost about 163 combat AC on this single day, which should be a record too. French fighter units (not the pilots themselves) claimed a total of 36 “certain” victories and about 6-9 “probables” (this is only my evaluation). Once more the claims of French fighters don’t really look like wild overclaims – quite on the contrary. About 500-600 French fighters were involved on this day (an estimation too), mainly over France I guess, but they were very active over Belgium and the Netherlands too.

[rof120]

In a previous post I mentioned that GC I/3 (equipped with 34 Dewoitine 520s) flew their first mission on May 14, 1940, in the Sedan area, winning 10 victories (including 2 Me 109s and 4 Me 110s) and losing 2 of their number (2 pilots killed). In fact they flew a mission on May 13 already, shooting down 3 Hs 126s and 1 He 111 for no loss.

Sorry for this error.