French fighter scores, mainly 1939-1940

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CORRECTION:

I discovered that most GCs equipped with Bloch 152s had not got 25-36 aircraft but rather approximately 20-26.
(Later: Okay, I gave the exact aircraft complements of all French fighter units which were engaged in the Sedan air battle in post # 42, page 5.)

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In another post of this thread I already mentioned the magnificent fight put up by the Dutch armed forces : army, especially artillery but infantry too, anti-aircraft forces, air force (fighters, bombers and recce units) and I understand the Dutch navy fought very well too (but I’m not an expert at naval forces). As you know the Netherlands were a comparatively small and NEUTRAL country with a rather small population, hence comparatively small armed forces. All this did not prevent Hitler in the least from attacking this neutral, peaceful little country with the utmost violence and ferocity, bombing and machine-gunning everything without any warning. (Even several decades later the Dutch did not intend to forgive the Germans for this – I don’t know when they did, possibly in the 1980s or 1990s.)

When looking for details in Peter Cornwell’s well-known big book “The Battle of France Then and Now” (published 2008, often mentioned as TBOFTN) I could not possibly fail to notice the very heavy aircraft losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by the gallant Dutch forces fighting very fiercely. The terrible Ju 52 losses are well-known (many photographs of Ju 52-wrecks in this book and sometimes for sale at ebay; as a whole 188 of these were destroyed in action (according to Williamson Murray’s table III) and many more damaged (damaged AC are a loss too). According to Murray only 8 were damaged in action but I consider this figure much too low to be possible. Something is wrong here. I’d guess about 70-100 were damaged in action. Dutch forces shot at the 52s with everything they had: an excellent, very effective AAA (anti-aircraft artillery), normal artillery on the airfields where the 52s had landed in order to disembark troops, hundreds of machine-guns and of course those fighters which had not been destroyed in the first surprise-attack (most of the fighters escaped: about 50 Fokker D.XXI and G.1A; obsolete fighter types fought too) as well as some bombers, which were cannon-armed and really did shoot down some German combat AC.

What particularly drew my attention in TBOFTN was the numerous mentions of Ju 88 losses. This excellent aircraft type still existed in limited numbers in the Luftwaffe, which makes these heavy losses at the hands of Dutch air and ground forces even more remarkable. About 150 Ju 88s were engaged over the Netherlands including 15 for reconnaissance. AT LEAST 9 of the comparatively rare Ju 88s were shot down by Dutch AC and 5 more by AA, 3 more damaged. These are the lowest possible figures and it is quite possible that the real figures are twice as high as these or higher for in very numerous instances P. Cornwell did not get all details and the causes of many losses are not known. Of course this is no criticism aimed at PC: he did as best he could with existing documents and possibly witnesses and veterans still alive, both German and Dutch.

To sum up, taking the adverse circumstances into account, all Dutch forces fought with great distinction and with very good results. The following is possibly obvious but those who were busy destroying almost 200 Ju 52s were not able to destroy other German aircraft types at the same time and the global results are really remarkable. It is a great pity that the Netherlands ceased fighting after only 5 days - I'm not blaming them, not at all - for otherwise they would have given those nazis an even better taste of their own medicine, in particular in the air, shooting down dozens more of German aircraft and their swastikas.

Of course various Allied forces made an important contribution too including Belgian fighters and AA but all modern Belgian fighters (11 Hurricanes) were destroyed on the ground even before they could fire one single shot; other Belgian fighters were relatively numerous but obsolete (Gladiators, Fiat CR 42s, Fairey “Fox” and “Fury”s, and others). Their pilots fought very bravely too and quite a few were killed. The British and French air forces intervened massively over Belgium and the Netherlands too (the Luftwaffe had launched massive bomb attacks on many French airfields but with very limited results – contrary to the legend repeated for 80 years by incompetent, unserious authors - and with heavy German losses). French and mainly British AC (fighters and bombers) destroyed part of the Ju 52s, possibly one or two dozen, mainly on the ground after they had landed haphazardly. Obviously the Dutch had the best opportunities to destroy Ju 52s, which they did. Allied AC shot down the rest and finished them off, so to speak, even though about half the engaged Ju 52s were able to fly back to base, but a loss rate of about 50 % in one single operation is fairly satisfactory for Germany’s opponents.

Mr. Jochen Prien uses to strongly stress that May 10, 1940 was the day of WW II in which the Luftwaffe suffered their by far worst losses: well over 300 aircraft destroyed (about 365 or something; I can’t remember exactly). Even after deducing the Ju 52s, of which most were lost in very particular circumstances, the LW lost about 163 combat AC on this single day, which should be a record too. French fighter units (not the pilots themselves) claimed a total of 36 “certain” victories and about 6-9 “probables” (this is only my evaluation). Once more the claims of French fighters don’t really look like wild overclaims – quite on the contrary. About 500-600 French fighters were involved on this day (an estimation too), mainly over France I guess, but they were very active over Belgium and the Netherlands too.

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In a previous post I mentioned that GC I/3 (equipped with 34 Dewoitine 520s) flew their first mission on May 14, 1940, in the Sedan area, winning 10 victories (including 2 Me 109s and 4 Me 110s) and losing 2 of their number (2 pilots killed). In fact they flew a mission on May 13 already, shooting down 3 Hs 126s and 1 He 111 for no loss.

Sorry for this error.

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Hello all faithful readers,

In spite of all information to the contrary many people, possibly a strong majority, still believe that the Supermarine “Spitfire” was the only British fighter in the Battle of Britain (as I could hear recently myself in a poorly researched and managed TV-program), or almost the only one. These persons, and many unqualified authors of historical TV-programs, don’t even know that Hawker “Hurricane” fighters represented roughly 2/3 of Fighter Command’s aircraft in the BoB (excluding Bristol “Blenheim” IF twin-engined slow “fighters” and Boulton-Paul “Defiants”, both of which hardly played any significant part in the battle) and that these “Hurricanes” won roughly 2/3 of the British victories or at least a much larger part than the more brilliant but less numerous “Spitfires”. Sorry not to be more precise than “roughly 2/3” because I can’t reach my documents at the moment (but soon I hope). Of course you’re welcome to give exact, correct figures. I don’t mind: I am grateful.

In any case the “Spitfire” was an excellent, brilliant fighter aircraft 1939 and 1940 already. Almost everybody knows that it was more or less equal to her main opponent, the Messerschmitt 109, even though, of course, both fighters were not each other’s equal in all respects: one was possibly more maneuverable, the other slightly faster but this didn’t matter much because of the small difference in top speed, they didn’t have the same ceiling (German superiority IIRC), the effectivity of their armament can be discussed upon etc.

Armament? According to myself a very important, crucial element. After all a fighter aircraft was made and still is – in the first place – with the task for it to destroy enemy aircraft. To achieve this fighters were equipped with the armament considered necessary or sufficient. It is well-known that Spitfire and Hurricane were armed with eight .303 light machine-guns – four in each wing. As for the Messerschmitt 109 we always are treated almost exclusively to her two 20 mm cannon, one in each wing, forgetting the twin 7,92 mm machine-guns under the engine-cowling, firing through the propeller disc and having 1,000 (one thousand) rounds each in large boxes stored in the engine compartment. 1940 the German cannon, type MG FF, was a mediocre weapon: low muzzle velocity, comparatively low cyclic rate (firing rate) of 520 rounds per minute. In particular the low muzzle velocity was a serious drawback. As a whole Spitfire and 109 E-3 were about even.

What almost all “experts” don’t know, or don’t remember, is the fact that about one half of the German fighters (109s) were NOT cannon-armed. Messerschmitt 109 E-3s were but not so Me 109 E-1s, armed with two 7,92 mm machine-guns in the wings instead of the 20 mm cannon, which is a tremendous difference. 109 E-1s possibly were still one half of the complement or more (later on this, with some figures, some other time). In any case they were a very significant part of all Me 109 Es in the BoB.

Already in July 1940 fighter production in British factories was much higher than 109 production in Germany, at least twice as high but very soon three times as high and more (up to 500 monthly as compared to the German 140-145 ON AVERAGE for the whole year 1940 (higher in May and June and most probably this was purely coincidental for the decisions resulting in a higher production had to be taken much, much earlier). So actually the Luftwaffe never had a chance to win for soon their fighters would have been literally swamped with RAF fighters, not to mention the numerous German fighter pilots who survived but became prisoners in Britain, contrary to their RAF counterparts, who lived and fought another day if they didn’t parachute over occupied France or Belgium (only few of them flew that far from England at the time), or drown in the “Scheisskanal” – this is how German fighter pilots angrily called the “English” channel.

But what about the French fighters mentioned in the title of this thread?

The usual cliché almost everywhere and by almost everybody is totally wrong, namely “French fighters were obsolete and hopeless”. This was true… 1938 but certainly not 1940. By then most French fighters (there were four different main types) were clearly not as good as British or German ones: Morane 406, Bloch 152, Curtiss H-75. It would be a serious error, though, to believe that they were useless: they were not. A fighter’s value was not to be found in its top speed only. Top speed was very important indeed but that was not the end of the story. Other factors were just as important as that: maneuverability, armament, pilot protection (armour etc.), ability to take punishment and survive, and, not to forget, the possibility of replacing destroyed aircraft. In May-June 1940 French aircraft production, especially of fighters, was zooming sky-high at about the same rate as in Britain. The fourth French fighter type was the much-discussed (here too) Dewoitine D.520 which was being produced in numbers rising by the day. Many poorly informed persons sneer and snigger at the “30” good fighters only which could be mustered by the Armée de l’Air during the French campaign. On May 10, the first day of heavy fighting (German attack), the Armée de l’Air had received not 30 but 57 D.520s and 34 of these were the equipment of GC I/3; some sources say 36 (GC is Groupe de chasse or Fighter Groupe not “Groupe de combat” – it is hardly possible to translate Groupe with Squadron (16 fighters in the RAF) or Wing (of 2-3 squadrons).

GC I/3 fought – with their Dewoitines - on May 13 for the first time and shot down at least four German AC. On May 14 they won at least 10 victories: 2 Me 109s, 4 Me 110s, 2 Do 17s and 2 He 111s, and they lost two of their number. On May 15 already a second unit equipped with 34 (or 36 too) D.520s was engaged (GC II/3) and so it went on until the end of the French Campaign on June 24. On June 1st about 100 D.520s were deployed and this was a non-negligible factor in the air battle. The number of units equipped with this superlative fighter increased all the time. On June 24 it was at least 5 Groupes de chasse and a number of miscellaneous local units (chimney flights and the like) totalling a few dozen D.520s. The Armée de l’Air had received 402 of these fighters as of June 22 and the French Navy had got about 30 (I’ll check on this).

Without the Allied defeat of June 1940 the Armée de l’Air would have had received about 600 D.520s by the end of July-beginning of August; production was rising permanently.

In comparison with her German and British rivals the D.520 was more or less even with them. In particular she could dive with full power and virtually no speed limit - contrary in particular to the Me 109. When in trouble German fighter pilots very often, or most of the time, dived very steeply to get away but with a D.520 on their tail this was a deadly mistake for most of them were shot down and killed by the pursuing 520. The D.520’s armament was – according to myself – better than both the British and the German equivalents with one remarkable HS 404 20 mm cannon firing through the propeller hub (hence with high precision) and 4 light machine-guns in the wings. Her top speed was slightly lower with 530-540 km/h as compared with 560-570 for Spitfire and 109 (according to different sources the Spitfire or the 109 was faster – forget it, it’s not important). What counts is the general result: as an excellent, very objective expert told me, the D.520 was BETTER than the 109 in actual combat. The 109 had the edge if you compared both aircraft from the moment of brake release on the runway when taking off: the 109 took off quicker, which was not quite unimportant.

- To be continued if necessary -