RAF Cat.2 during BoB

[Shikhov]

Hello Gentlemens!
I've seen two opposed point of view for Cat.2 damaged planes - total write off or beyond repair as Christer Bergstrom mentioned in his article and damage should repared in M.U.
RAF losses during Battle of Britain could as twice as higher if Cat.2 damaged planes counted.

P.S. Seems strange enough FC lost from Do17 gunfire more or equal nuber of their fighters as from Bf110. And much less number from He111/Ju88.
May be reason is misindification between Do17 and Bf110.
Hope some examples or explains exist.

[Graham Boak]

The terms used within the RAF for damage categories did change with time, so I would prefer a fuller description, specific to period, if I had one to hand. I would suggest raising this one on the RAF Commands website, where the regulars are likely to be more aware of any hidden subtleties. But I have never seen Cat.2 described as a write-off. Cat 3 is a write-off.

If you start including Cat.2 (or whatever) in the RAF losses, then you would have to correspondingly widen the equivalent Luftwaffe losses. Try getting agreement on what %age of damage is equivalent to what.......

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Shikhov

RAF losses during Battle of Britain could as twice as higher if Cat.2 damaged planes counted.

If so, what difference would it make? New production and repair of Hurricanes and Spitfires provided Fighter Command with the aircraft it needed to maintain and increase its operational strength over the course of the Battle.

That was not the case with Bf 109 production. (See "The Most Dangerous Enemy" by Stephen Bungay for a discussion of this).

[Kurfürst]

What difference it would make? Perhaps a clearer understanding on the events, as most English literature quoting the lossess of 915 vs 1776 (or around) fails to mention they are comparing apples and oranges : whereas all types (fighter, bomber, transport, operational, non-operational, enemy, non-enemy related) of losses are included in the quoted Luftwaffe lossess, the numbers are for RAF fighter combat-related total writeoffs only.

As for the 109E production figures, I've never seen any reliable or detailed on that for the period, and given the above described tendency, it may be worth to inspect the details behind.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

What difference it would make? Perhaps a clearer understanding on the events, as most English literature quoting the lossess of 915 vs 1776 (or around) fails to mention they are comparing apples and oranges : whereas all types (fighter, bomber, transport, operational, non-operational, enemy, non-enemy related) of losses are included in the quoted Luftwaffe lossess, the numbers are for RAF fighter combat-related total writeoffs only.

The precise loss figures are interesting but the battle wasn't decided by awarding scores. The winner was the side that achieved its aim. Britain sought to survive as a combatant nation and it did so. Germany (as far as they ever really decided what they were trying to do) sought to force Britain out of the war either by negotiation, occupation or economic strangulation - they failed.

[Peter Cornwell]

Shikhov,

RAF Equipment Branch reported the serviceability state of aircraft in Fighter Command daily during the Battle of Britain. The forms employed seven columns:

Column A: Total squadron establishment - this was 20 aircraft for all Hurricane and certain Spitfire squadrons. Other Spitfire squadrons continuing to operate with 16.

Column B: Total serviceable.

Column C: Total serviceable in 12 hours.

Column D: Total serviceable in 7 days.

Column E: Total repairable by unit but not within 7 days.

Column F: Total repairable but beyond unit's capacy.

Column G: Total struck-off.

Thus, it would seem that Category 2 was simply aircraft damaged beyond the unit's own ability to repair - irrespective of time scales.

Of course, in practice, it was far easier for Squadron EOs to declare a damaged aircraft as Category 2, move it off to the repair organisation, and order a replacement.

Good luck with your research.

[Graham Boak]

I've never seen a comparison that only placed RAF Fighter Command operational losses against all Luftwaffe losses including non-combat unit losses, so I don't recognise where you are coming from. The losses I have seen are those quoted for losses in combat units involved.

The Bomber Command losses (not, I suggest, large) in the raids on the Channel ports are relevant. Losses elsewhere are not. It could be suggested that Coastal Command losses should also be included, although the direct relevance of an anti-submarine aircraft disappearance over the Faroes to the battle over Kent seems thin. However, this would also require the equivalent Luftwaffe losses to be included, so where would that get you?

RAF Cat. 2 (if that is the correct terminology) numbers should be compared with near-equivalents in the Luftwaffe - 50% damaged? 60? damaged?

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

I've never seen a comparison that only placed RAF Fighter Command operational losses against all Luftwaffe losses including non-combat unit losses, so I don't recognise where you are coming from. The losses I have seen are those quoted for losses in combat units involved.

Well if you ever happened to see the widely qouted 915 vs 1733 lost, then you have already seen the comparison you don't think you've seen.

Ie. between July-October the LW lost 1385 aircraft on operations, and due to enemy action, further 404 to non-enemy action - here's the 1789 figure. Moreover, that would include the Näh- and Fernaufklärer, the Jäger, the Zestörer , Nachtjäger, Kampffliger, Stukas, Schlachtfliger, Transports, Coastal and misc. other unit's losses.

EDIT : Wanted to post here the whole table detailing the LW losses per month, per type and per cause, but appearantly this board still doesn't like XLS tables in a post...

As a matter of fact, the LW's enemy-related, on operations losses for the SE fighters are just 502, (+19 non-enemy related, +22 not on operations) which could be compared to the British loss figures given - ie. the 962 odd figure.

Now, Wood and Dempster gives the following casulties for the British side in their book, Appendix 14 :

Battle casulties, Metropolitan Air Force, July 1 - October 31 1940
Cat 2 (damaged, rapairable) vs. Cat 3 (missing or wrecked beyond repair)

Bombers : 116 / 367
Fighters : 710 / 1140
Other Op. types : 50/96
In total : 876 / 1603

Now how's that Benjamin Disraeli bon mot go... ?

So allow me to reserve the right not to take various statistics produced in order to achieve that magic 2:1 kill rate in their own favour by British authors in relation to the national saga, aka Battle of Britiain on their face value, without knowing what they exactly mean and refer to. This brings us a little offtopic of the discussion at hand, though. Just wanted to clarify.

[Graham Boak]

Once again you are claiming a number, a ratio, as being commonly published. And hence, presumably, having some meaning, at least to you, but is so, what? Perhaps (almost certainly) I was not correct in claiming that I had not seen it - in the myriad books I have read I probably have come across it. However, it is not a number I would ever have claimed: my opinion/presumption/prejudice was that the losses of the two forces were roughly equivalent.

That a number is (in your opinion) widely published does not lent it credence. As you have shown (open to other people producing contradictory statistics, of course). It seems to me that you have set up some kind of straw man in order to claim some kind of merit in demolishing it.

Thank you for the statistics.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

As a matter of fact, the LW's enemy-related, on operations losses for the SE fighters are just 502, (+19 non-enemy related, +22 not on operations) which could be compared to the British loss figures given - ie. the 962 odd figure.

Yes, but what have the relative losses in single-engined fighters got to do with anything? I repeat, the Battle was not won by accumulating score points. The RAF needed to prevent the Luftwaffe attaining its objectives and it needed to do that until the weather was such that a seaborne invasion was impracticable (and in England that's probably going to be September/October). The British needed above all to kill bombers but to do that they had to get past the German fighters and sometines that meant fighting them.

An armed force will accept losses if it is attaining its objectives but will usually be less ready to do so if it appears to be getting nowhere. Whatever the numbers lost, the Luftwaffe was getting nowhere. If you aim to destroy your opponent's defences and they just keep getting stronger, you are not winning.

You might remember a thread on the old forum about the Luftwaffe's losses being greater in the Battle of France than in the BoB. Maybe they were, but the payback was that Germany put France out of the war and occupied much of the country. On the other hand, the aircraft and men they lost in the BoB "bought" them nothing.

Modern authors are quite capable of breaking down the figures in the way you suggest. Wood & Dempster's is an old book - written much nearer to the Battle than to the present day.

Incidentally, I don't entirely agree with Graham about RAF bomber losses being relevant (except when they were bombing airfields). Bombing the ports and canals hindered the invasion fleet's build-up but that fleet was going nowhere before air superiority was established. So in a way the bombers were fighting the "next" battle.