Did Radio Traffic Provide Warning of 8 AF Raids?

[Juha]

Hello boomerang
IIRC Germans took a heavy British radio traffic as a sure sign of fortcoming RAF night raid. Radios were essential to the bombers so they had to test. British probably knew that the testing gave up the fortcoming attack but I don't recall that they had, at least often, tried to fool Germans with false radio testing. Probably they calculated that the Germans anyway knew rather well BC procedures and conditions when the main attacks were launched.

Juha

[drgondog]

I think Juha's answer works for USAAF, except that radio discipline was pretty strong in 1944 through end of war - not just because of alerting Germans but to ensure that the Wing Commanders could issue orders as required w/o radio chatter interference, particularly on "C" channel for fighter escort.

At the end of the day, I'm not sure the USAAF cared whether the Germans really knew they were coming - It is hard to disguise a radar signature of 600-2000 ships forming up over England.. of course they DID care about shedding light on the targets - but that is why they never flew straight paths to a target, even taking into consideration known flak concentrations.

Regards,

Bill

[Bruce Dennis]

Boomerang,
The job of listening to the radio and radar transmissions of the enemy was a specialist function. The Allies called theirs the “Y Service” and the German service was “Horchdienst”. The reporting units specifically assigned to spot USAAF and RAF raids were called ‘Kiebitz’. Each branch of the armed forces had it’s own Y service, but the level of interservice co-operation among the listeners was higher than anywhere else during the conflict, more so with the Allies but very good within the German forces.

German and British Y services had had a lot of experience by the time the American 8th AF arrived in the theatre, and, to his eternal credit, Eaker was eager to take on board the experiences of the British. (This didn’t stop him from rejecting some of their standard practices where he saw fault). At the time of his arrival the people in British Y were still having trouble convincing Bomber Command of the harm their lack of radio discipline (and use of IFF) was doing, so Eaker was also slow to appreciate this need.

The definitive first hand account of the growth and techniques of the British Y Service is ‘The Enemy is Listening’, (Aileen Clayton 1980 isbn 0 09 142340 6). Aileen Clayton was a WAAF in intelligence, Ultra cleared, and a veteran of the earliest ‘radio wars’ from the Battle of Britain onwards. In her book there are many passages concerning the efforts to (a) quantify the risk of betraying information about an assembling British raid and (b) convey this danger to the higher authorities. Included in the story is an episode where she sat in as an observer in the control tower during a US operation and was able to (tactfully) pass on the official verdict that the US pilots were not security conscious and that her German opposite numbers were benefiting greatly from the on-air procedures. I recommend the book to anyone who wants to understand what was influencing the commanders of the Allied air forces.

Hope this helps,

Bruce Dennis

[Boomerang]

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your enlightening replies. Some really interesting points in there - I certainly agree that the implications of radio security for the 8AF must have changed significantly when the USAAF won daylight air superiority over Germany.

I have a vague recollection of having seen 'The Enemy is Listening' years ago - I definitely will chase it up, sounds like essential reading. Also fascinating to hear that there was close interservice cooperation on the German side for this intelligence source. That would a startling contrast with many other areas e.g. the squabbling over the Condors.

Cheers

Don (Boomerang)

[drgondog]

Don - I want to be clear (Lol) with respect to my somewhat flippant remark. USAAF doctrine vis a vis radio silence was much more focused on tactical links being kept open for the commanders - to command - not as a first priority 'don't let 'em know we're coming'

I vividly remember being a child who would sneak out of his room when the fighter pilot community was in session - and one discussion in particular between my father, Gabby Gabreski, Clay Kinnard and Bill Whisner.

The subject was how difficult it was to teach young fighter pilots when to say something and when to shut up - and all the 'lost' opportunites because a leader a.) didn't know what just became important, or b.) couldn't communicate to rest of squadron/group because of too much chatter.

It seemed the three most important bits of communication for the fighter commanders were;
1.) "lookee thar, 40 plus of them gray lookin thangs at 4 o'clock (above/below) us, or behind the bombers we're supposed to protect
2.) "354 and 358 stay with bombers, 357 go get em" or "Blue/Green flights stick, Yellow - follow me"
3.) hear 'Help' from a nearby bomb group

On the other subject of 'strike security', I still communicate with a lot of Brit friends who vividly remember a sense of ground shaking from the roar of 5000+ radial engines and 600 in-lines during take off and assembly around the airfield known as England.

And that was just a typical early morning in April 44 - for just the 8th and 9th AF. I suspect we never suprised the Luftwaffe in that regard.

Regards,

Bill