Airacobras in Tunisia

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Christer Bergström

I'm not sure the Korean air war can provide us with many valuable conclusions regarding the efficiency of the Soviet air force in the defence of the motherland in 1941 - 1945. I think that those German airmen who faced both the VVS and the USAAF/RAF are the best to judge. My posting was not aimed at proving that either of the Allied air forces was better than the other; rather, I wrote that in early 1943 the differences were not that large as sometimes is assumed - "the Luftwaffe Eastern Front veterans repeated in Tunisia what they previously had accomplished on the Eastern Front against the same kind of fighters."

I must say it's seems to me a very selective assessment of what are accurate and inaccurate bases of comparison. Your argument seems to be that a very direct head to head, planes lost in reality each side, tells us little about AF effectivenes because of some abstract motivational factor that was supposedly different, but the numerous variables between east and west in WWII as far as exchange ratio's, timelines (of when operations started and when combat experience was gained) or even subjective quotations of particular pilots, provide a better comparison. With all respect to your knowledge of WWII air combat, I really doubt it.

Anyway I also doubt anyone has ever claimed, except at a pretty low level of familiarity with the topic, that USAAF performance v. the LW at the very start of their confrontations, as in late '42-mid '43 in MTO, was far more successful than VVS performance 2 years into their war. However not long ago you yourself kindly posted exchange numbers indicating on their face (that is, assuming the majority supposed "unknown" VVS combat losses were mainly in air combat, and making no assumptions about supposed LW loss understatement without specific fact) that seem to show the LW fighters achieved a few:1 ratio against VVS fighters even in 1944, when exchange ratio's had turned against them v. the USAAF. This is broadly in line with the Korean experience of several:1 against the VVS in more or less equal a/c and numbers and tactical situation (partial sanctuary, short range to bases) certainly not against the VVS. I'm not sure given the timelines of WWII that the early Med experience illuminates this comparison better, it's seems in fact much more obscure and indirect.

Joe

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by John Beaman

Isn't the performance of the Airacobra in Tunisia also related, heavily, to the level of experience and skills of the American pilots? This was their first action, against experienced German pilots and they suffered accordingly much like the VVS pilots in 1941. In Tunisia, P-40 pilots also suffered as did P-38s and even USAAF Spitfires flown by Americans. Experience makes as much difference as basic airplane performance (within reason). Look at the number of I-16 pilots who did well when flown by an experienced and aggressive pilot. On the other side, look what happened the the inexperienced German pilots in 1944/45.

I agree. The same type of controversy exists with the Brewster Buffalo. The Finnish air force found a way to fly it effectively, but the Western Allies gave up on the Buffalo early on, and sometimes used that plane as a scapegoat to direct attention away from other problems...like inexperience and inadequate training.

Maybe the most important difference was that the Western Allies had the luxury to withdraw the Airacobra and Buffalo after a short-lived period of frontline service, while the Soviets and the Finns could not.

[Christer Bergström]

I also doubt anyone has ever claimed, except at a pretty low level of familiarity with the topic, that USAAF performance v. the LW at the very start of their confrontations, as in late '42-mid '43 in MTO, was far more successful than VVS performance 2 years into their war.

I have heard such an opinion more than once, hence my little remark in the Airacobra posting.

you yourself kindly posted exchange numbers indicating on their face (that is, assuming the majority supposed "unknown" VVS combat losses were mainly in air combat, and making no assumptions about supposed LW loss understatement without specific fact) that seem to show the LW fighters achieved a few:1 ratio against VVS fighters even in 1944, when exchange ratio's had turned against them v. the USAAF.

With all respect, Joe, but that is another topic. If you want to start a thread on that topic, please do so, and I will provide you with an answer which will explain what you now obviously regard as a contradiction. However, I have examined the reasons to this well-known fact quite recently on this board. In order to avoid straying from the topic (Airacobras in Tunisia), I will confine myself to giving you a hint by referring to my article on the effect of numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944 on the website which is linked below in my post. You can also read this article: http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/bc-rs/text.html

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Christer Bergström

With all respect, Joe, but that is another topic. If you want to start a thread on that topic, please do so, and I will provide you with an answer which will explain what you now obviously regard as a contradiction. However, I have examined the reasons to this well-known fact quite recently on this board. In order to avoid straying from the topic (Airacobras in Tunisia), I will confine myself to giving you a hint by referring to my article on the effect of numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944...

I guess that's part of the fun, we can always find an offsetting reason, numbers in Normandy (but also over the heart of Germany in any individual given encounter?, I don't think so, that requires a lot of revision, overall OOB numbers are not the major determinant of exchange ratio's anyway), something special about "defending the motherland" in 1941-45 that somehow didn't apply in 1950, etc. to counter the seemingly relatively clear basic fact: once the USAAF fighter force had gained significant combat experience, it seemed to be more effective than the VVS against the LW in WWII. And then this was further clarified when the two met head to head in Korea.

Joe

[Juha]

Oh no, again the P-39 argument.

Christer, thanks for those quotes from FOT but in matter of fact 350th FG returned to front line action and flew ground attack missions in Italy and met Bf 109s and Fw-190s later on. For example on April 6th 1944, this is from Eric Hamel's Air War Europe (1994), "...The 350th FG, in modified ground-attack P-39s, mounts all-out effort against German Army lines of supply and communication...the group mounts 75 sorties in ten missions...When a flight of six of the group's P-39s is attacked in the afternoon by 10 FW-190s and Bf-109s in the Grosseto area, 10 P-39s flying top cover down five of the GAF fighters and drive away the rest without loss." Now, I don't know the real results but at least the pilots believed that they could fight with the LW fighters with their P-39s.

To more firm turf. In the Report on actions of the Fighter Sqn 34 1.6.44 - 31.8.44 (this was the premier Bf-109 sqn of the Finnish AF, flying Bf 109G-6s during the great Soviet Summer offensive against Finland in 1944) 0n p.9 in the chapter Tactical experiences with the MT a/c (read Bf-109G-6) from 1.6.44 to 31.8.44. "...AC (P-39) is about as good as La-5 but maybe a little bit more awkward..."

Juha

[Christer Bergström]

As I wrote earlier, in late February 1943, the Airacobra-equipped 350th FG was withdrawn from first-line service and degraded to coastal patrols with the North-West African Air Force. It is not quite correct to state that "it returned to front line action", as you will see below.

In fact, the 350th FG Airacobras never were sent back to regular first-line service. From February 1943, their dominant task would remain coastal patrols in the rear area. In November 1943 it was transferred from North Africa to Cagliari/ Elmas, Sardinia.

Out of a total of 19,750 sorties on Airacobras which pilots of the 350th FG flew during the war, 15,900 were defensive sorties. It simply was judged that the Airacobra was not suited for offensive missions in an environment where there was a risk that superior Luftwaffe fighters could be encountered. (Only when 350th FG was equipped with P-47s later in 1944 did it start to fly regular offensive operations - for the first time since February 1943. I think that is quite revealing. 350th FG's pilots flew 17,270 sorties on the P-47 - of which 90 % were offensive sorties.)

In his excellent "Air War Europa", which Juha quotes, Eric Hammel (incidentally my former publisher) notes for 9 February 1944: "Corsica: 350th FG, which is still flying P-39s bolstered by a few P-38s, is transferred from Sardinia [to Corsica] to undertake coastal defense flights closer to the European mainland". When Juha quoted Hammel's note for 6 April 1944 - "mounts all-out effort against German Army lines of supply and communication...the group mounts 75 sorties in ten missions" - he forgot one key inormation which shows the 350th FG's normal task. The full sentence reads: "Operating from Corsica, the group mounts 75 sorties in ten missions. . ."

When this took place, the 350th FG still was mainly tasked to coastal patrols far from the front lines. The operations on 6 April 1944 was an exception from this. Following the Allied defeat in the third battle of Monte Cassino and in preparation for the next Allied attempt to achieve a breakthrough, the 350th FG was temporarily called to bolster the intense Allied air offensive against German lines of communication.

See this:

Extract from General Orders No. 86, War Department, Washington D.C., 8 November 1944:

". . . citation of the following unit. . . is confirmed. . . in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The 350th Fighter Group is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations on 6 April 1944. . . . Although assigned exclusively to air defense and reconnaissance because its battle-worn and outmoded aircraft were considered dangerously inferior to enemy fighters, this group . . . while flying 10 missions, comprising 75 sorties, on this day the group, in the face of intense antiaircraft fire, destroyed 1 highway bridge and 2 railroad bridges, 2 air warning installation, 1 barracks building and 2 trucks, and inflicted many casualties on enemy personnel and heavy damage on numerous other military buildings and vehicles. Just as one flight of six P-39 dive bombers was completing an attack on enemy communications in the Grosseto-Pisa area, they were intercepted by 10 or more ME-109's and FW-190's. Gallantly ignoring the odds against them, and despite damage to their own aircraft, the P-39 pilots unhesitatingly turned into the larger hostile formation and attacked with such skill and determination that five enemy fighters were shot down, two were damaged and the remainder driven from the battle area."

I agree that we don't know the real result of the single engagement between Airacobras and Luftwaffe fighters on 6 April 1944. III./JG 77 recorded one loss due to unknown reasons in the front region in Italy, but this could be due to any cause. I don't know if any Fw 190s were lost in Italy that day.

Apart from the 350th FG, which retained its Airacobras for coastal patrols over Northwest Africa or Sardinia/Corsica until later in 1944, when it finally received P-47s, the other Airacobra-equipped unit, the 81st, was relieved of its Airacobras and instead received P-38 Lightnings and returned to first-line service. While the Airacobras of the 350th continued to fly coastal patrols.

I don't know whether the pilots of the 350th FG in general "believed that they could fight with the LW fighters with their P-39s". I'd like to see Juha's source to that. I have heard nothing but the opposite. Like John L. Bradley of US 33rd FG who said that many of the Airacobra pilots were afraid of them and figured they "didn’t have a chance if they were jumped by enemy aircraft without top cover.” ("Fighters over Tunisia", p. 404)

US fighter pilot Edwards Park wrote a book dedicated to the Airacobra, "Nanette", and in it he wrote:

“The Aircobra was lazy and slovenly and given to fits of vicious temper. . . We also called her a flying coffin.”


Due to an account on the "Tuskegee airmen", the Afro-American fighter pilots of 332nd FG "felt betrayed and frustrated" when they initially were equipped with the "obsolete aircraft the Bell P-39 Airacobra" in the MTO. Later they received P-47s instead.


Reading through Hammel's "Air War Europa" (and making use of the excellent index) gives the impression that the Airacobra-equipped 350th FG was the possibly least successful among all US fighter groups in Europe and the MTO regarding air fighting. Although it later received P-47 to replace the outdated Airacobras, its final tally for the war was not impressive: 50 claimed victories against 158 own losses (95 pilots were killed, 22 shot down and becoming POWs, 16 wounded in action, and another 25 pilots were downed on offensive missions but either evaded capture in enemy territory, or bailed out over or crashed in Allied territory).

Regarding the Finnish report which states that the P-39 is about as good as La-5, I would assume that this is regarding the La-5 and not the La-5FN. Soviet 159 IAP operated the La-5 (also called LaG-5) on the Carelian Isthmus in the summer of 1944. Indeed, the Airacobra probably was on par with the La-5 (LaG-5). In "Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War", Gordon and Khazanov conclude:

"Service tests of the La-5 revealed many defects. In combat it was inferior to the Messerschmitt Bf 109." (p. 43)

The pilots of 27 IAP, which brought the La-5 into service at Stalingrad in August 1942, concluded that the La-5 was inferior to the Bf 109 F-4s and especially G-2s "in speed and vertical maneuvrability."

Gordon and Khazanov also write that "owing to [the La-5's] high weight and insufficient control surface balance, it made more demands upon flying technique than the LaGG-3" (which it was supposed to replace).

(The La-5FN, however, was a completely different story.)

[Juha]

Christer, thanks for the Extract from General Orders No. 86, War Department, Washington D.C., 8 November, but the fact that 350th flew from Corsica isn't a key info, bacause many of Allied formations flew from there bacause it was an rather ideally situated for a base for an interdiction campaign against German lines of communications, a look to a map shows that.

Yes, it is also my understanding that 350th flew mostly coastal patrols, IIRC P-39's got only 14 kills in MTO, but April 6th wasn't its only ground attack day, for example, this is from Molony et al The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V (London 1973) p. 815," ... on the 27th [March 1944] Airacobras from Mediterranean Allied Coastal AF destroyed the Ponte Mussolini just south of Grosseto. Rail traffic which already could reach Grosseto only by a detour, now could not pass south of it."

On the claims on April 6th I have nothing to add, IIRC ANR's I Gruppo Caccia operated more north on that day.

As I have wrote earlier, P-39 divided pilots' oppinion, some liked it some loathed it. Maj. Douglas V N Parsons from 35th FG wrote in Osprey A/c of the Aces 61 "Twelve to One" on p. 38 "... As the Allied ground situation improved, so did our air equipment, for we changed over to P-47s. This gave us added range, and of course potential altitude advantage. We hated to give up our P-39s, but we were beginning to reach out..."

In that Finnish AF raport La-5, La-5F and La-5FN were all La-5s, I think. In some combat reports one may see identification LaGG-5, IIRC, but generally La-5 meant all those versions as AC meant all P-39 versions.

Two sentences just before the earlier quote are "Pilots experiences were that Jak-9 [Yak-9] and La-5 were more or less as fast as MT [Bf 109G-6] but more manouvrable. Jak-9 climbs at least as well as MT, La-5 maybe climbs a little bit slower."

Juha

[Christer Bergström]

Yes, it is also my understanding that 350th flew mostly coastal patrols, IIRC P-39's got only 14 kills in MTO, but April 6th wasn't its only ground attack day

That is quite right. Following the Allied defeat in the third battle of Monte Cassino and in preparation for the next Allied attempt to achieve a breakthrough, the 350th FG was temporarily called to bolster the intense Allied air offensive against German lines of communication. 27 March 1944 was one example, as Juha mentioned. The P-39s of 350th FG also were out attacking German lines of communication on 28 March 1944. On 2 April 1944, 350th FG Airacobras took off from Alghero/Sardinia, dive-bombed and strafed rail lines at Falloncia/Italy; refueled and rearmed at Ghisonaccia/Corsica; dive-bombed and strafed rail lines at S.Vincenzo/Italy; refueled and rearmed at Ghisonaccia; dive bombed and strafed rail lines at Grossetto/Italy; returned to Alghero/Sardinia. Then followed the 6 April operations which we have already discussed. Next on 11 April 1944 the Airacobras were even used to escort B-25s to bomb targets in Italy.

Where did you find the information that P-39s got only 14 kills in the MTO? If that is true, the P-39s had an even worse victory-to-loss rate in the MTO - even if only losses due to Axis fighters are included - than I thought. Can you imagine any other Allied fighter plane with such a bad victory-to-loss rate?

I agree that pilot opinions on the Airacobra differed, although the negative opinions appear to be in the majority. I have to say that I find it hard to understand why Major Douglas V N Parsons "hated" to exchange the Airacobra for a Thunderbolt - particularly since he in the same sentence admits that re-equipping on Thunderbolts meant an improvement of the air equipment. "We got better equipment, and we hated it. . ."

Okay. . .

Now if anyone believes that the Airacobra was a fighter plane which was equal to the Bf 109 G-6 or Fw 190 A - in spite of the US War Department's assessment that the Airacobra in April 1944 was an "outmoded aircraft" and "dangerously inferior to enemy fighters" - I can agree that we disagree, as Ruy puts it in his rules. I think we have come as far as possible in this discussion. I think we can all agree on that.

Thanks a lot for your contributions, which I learned new things from!

[JeffK]

What models of the P-39 are being compared here?

I see the P-39Q being mentioned, was there an improvement in performance as the models evolved??

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Juha

For example on April 6th 1944, this is from Eric Hamel's Air War Europe (1994), "...The 350th FG, in modified ground-attack P-39s, mounts all-out effort against German Army lines of supply and communication...six of the group's P-39s is attacked in the afternoon by 10 FW-190s and Bf-109s in the Grosseto area, 10 P-39s flying top cover down five of the GAF fighters and drive away the rest without loss." Now, I don't know the real results but at least the pilots believed that they could fight with the LW fighters with their P-39s.

If you want the actual results, go to my website http://www.ghostbombers.com and click on the link for I./JG 2 in Italy: February-April 1944

There was also a P-39 action against I./JG 2 on 2 April, which is described there too.