Placing the Fairey Battle.

[Graham Boak]

The thinner Tempest wing produced less profile drag than the Typhoon, but having a larger area it had more skin-friction drag. Plus, of course, less wave drag, but this was not relevant in level flight. Induced drag was possibly worse, because thick wings are better at producing lift, although there would be a trade-off with wing area. Any value of the elliptical planform is dubious. The overall Tempest superiority varies with the flight condition, being greater at low altitude and speed, but less at high altitude.

The large Hawker factories at Brooklands and Langley spent most of the war producing Hurricanes, only changing over to the Tempest in 1944. Typhoons were entirely built at Gloster. The Tornado was intended to be built at Avro, but the Lancaster took over with the cancellation of the Vulture.

Discussion of the fighter equipment programme very much depends upon just when you consider. The delays and cost of the early Spitfire programme certainly led to considerations of cancellation in 1937/38, when the Tornado/Typhoon programme looked most promising. In the 1939/40 period programmes were in a constant state of flux, with many changes, but closure of the Spitfire line was not among the considerations. Despite Quill’s apparent later fears on the subject there seems to have been no real suggestions of closing the line before A&AEE’s harsh comments on the early 20-series, and it is unclear how far that went beyond the initial flight reports. Over six years of war, with fluctuating fortunes in service and on trials, continual reassessment and redesign of competing projects, and not least the rotation of strong-willed individuals through the various staff posts, it would be astonishing if there had been a single policy held steadfastly throughout. It wasn’t that way and could not have been. Quill worries about bias in favour of the Typhoon, but Beamont speaks of a Spitfire mafia that continually belittled the Typhoon and its potential. Behind the scenes, great hopes are placed on Folland’s project. Conspiracy theorists may suggest that this was a deliberate policy for spurring on each manufacturer.

It is one thing, undeniably true, to say that the Typhoon did not meet the RAF’s perceived need for high-altitude performance in 1942/43, though it did meet the specification as written before the war. Like the Defiant, should we blame the specification for failing to foresee the future? Perhaps. It is quite another thing to write the Typhoon off as a failure overall. High-altitude air-superiority over Western Europe was not the only role or theatre for a fighter, and it was not a failure in the low-level fighter and fighter-bomber roles. As were other fighters excluded from high-altitude roles. There is an attitude that only the fighter-fighter combats count, and that mud-moving isn’t a proper role for an aviation hero. I disagree.

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Perhaps. It is quite another thing to write the Typhoon off as a failure overall. High-altitude air-superiority over Western Europe was not the only role or theatre for a fighter, and it was not a failure in the low-level fighter and fighter-bomber roles. As were other fighters excluded from high-altitude roles. There is an attitude that only the fighter-fighter combats count, and that mud-moving isn’t a proper role for an aviation hero. I disagree.

Graham.

Noted. But you will have to provide evidence of the Typhoon's accuracy in mud-stirring to be persuasive. Raising morale amongst the brown jobs is an argument in favour of CAS in general and not Typhoon CAS in particular.

If you have the inclination I would appreciate yours and others' ruminations on the P39.
Had the British army been permitted its own air arm, the P39 would surely have had a role. The Russkies seemed to like it, but they were not hung up on high altitude performance. A British army air force would have left the upper atmosphere to the RAF.

[Jukka Juutinen]

Graham, would you mind letting us know the CORRECT CMN data? After all, mr. Brown was personally involved in those CMN tests so he supposedly knows what he is talking about.

As for the 20,000 ft: it is because Mason gives the data for this altitude.

[Graham Boak]

Re P-39. I suggest you raise this as a separate thread. A very interesting subject. The effectiveness of the Typhoon is well recorded - see Nick's postings - and accounts of the battle of Mortain (?), amongst others.

Re Critical Mach Number: I refer you to Hoerner's Fluid Dynamic Drag, which presents the equation of the curve defining this parameter, and how the results from a wide range of aircraft fit closely on it. I forget the chapter/page number, or quite where I placed my copy of the relevant pages (I don't own a copy of the book, unfortunately). If I get the time, and remember, I'll look for it tonight, but I think I'm on family ferrying duty.

[Juha]

Jukka
AFDU seems to have thought that the Tempest V was a great improvement on the Typhoon IB.
See http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...mpestafdu.html

Juha

[Graham Boak]

Without knowing the Pressure Error Correction it is impossible to be certain, but it looks as though the Tempest had an critical mach of 0.9 or higher, which seems to be fairly equivalent to the Spitfire with a similarly slim wing. That's assuming no safety margin was applied - but if there was, then that's a remarkable figure.

There's no doubt the Typhoon would be unable to get anywhere near that with its thick wing: even Mustangs and Me 262s only get to 0.84 or thereabouts.

Incidentally, if you follow the links you'll find that the RAF considered the Typhoon and Tempest to have very similar turning circles, whereas the USAAF pilot considered the Typhoon significantly superior. An indication of the problems in using comments from a single pilot and/or a single flight.

[Steve49]

Graham, It wasn't my intention to suggest the Skua's should have done better, rather to point out even dive-bombers of the 1940's were not that accurate. Lets not forget the cruiser was alongside a quay at the time of the attack.

As for the BC attack I guess the reported 'two squadrons' relates to 12 Wellingtons (from 9 and 115 Sqn) and 12 Hampdens (from 50 Sqn) launched on a general anti-shipping strike in the Bergen area on the afternoon of the 9th (not the next day). Not clear how many of the aircraft actually attacked the cruiser, as some attacked nearby shipping, 50 Sqn claiming one vessel sunk (though none appear to have actually been lost). The lack of success was hardly surprising considering the aircraft used and the limited training in this type of mission.

There is no denying that dive-bombers in the face of limited air defence offered a better weapons platform for 'precision' attacks and the failure to provide dedicated ground attack aircraft hampered the Allied forces in the first half of the war. The fact that squadrons of Cannon/bomb armed Hurricanes/Spitfires were the only aircraft available to support the ground forces during Dieppe raid in 1942, is a case in point. They suffered heavy losses to flak whilst providing little effect support. It is a fact that unprepared as they were, most parts of non-Axis world suffered painful lessons as they tried to catch-up and even the vaunted Red Army only survived to learn its lessons through trading land and at a terrible cost.

Imperfect though the Typoon may have been, to suggest that a dedicated ground attack aircraft would have been any less vunerable to flak is questionable. And in the absense of a fighter arm, by 1944/45 flak was the only reliable weapon available to the Germans.

Regards,

Steve

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Steve49

The lack of success was hardly surprising considering the aircraft used and the limited training in this type of mission.
Steve

There seems to be a pattern.

Information is provided to justify a statement that has been questioned.

The comment comes back that the information is "not surprising".

I find that surprising.

[Kutscha]

I have to ask, was the P-47 a failed fighter, for it to was transferred to ground pounding duties?

[Steve49]

'tcolvin', to quote me out off context is fine, but did you bother to read the post. If you had you would have noticed that I was agreeing that for a 1940's 'precision' attack dive-bombers would probably have offered the most accurate platform. All I was questioning was the use of the sweeping statement that Bomber Command 'failed' to sink the cruiser as a means of supporting your dive-bomber crusade. Using the failure of two squadrons that were not even specifically attacking the KONINGSBERG as evidence hardly supports the claim in itself.

Regards,

Steve