Impact of Allied fighter-bombers

[Graham Boak]

I refer you to Francis Mason's book on the Typhoon/Tempest, where at least one photograph is printed showing the armour fitted to late production Typhoons around the cockpit (not just pilot back armour) and, IIRC, the engine. Liquid cooled engines are vulnerable to "the golden BB" as our US friends put it, but the Sabre installation was less vulnerable than most because the close mounting of the radiator to the engine resulted in shorter piping.

The vulnerability to small arms is of course one reason for the use of the rocket, permitting operation at greater stand-off distances. You may like to study the recently published history of 351 (Yugoslav) Squadron, with its interesting comments on the much higher loss rates of its Spitfires than its sister squadron with rocket-firing Hurricanes.

The Il 2 was indeed in a different category of armour, but given the number of Il 2s shot down by Bf 109s and Fw 190s, it clearly was rather less invulnerable to 20mm cannon than General Pickert believed. Perhaps his flak was also less accurate? The similar IL.10 proved vulnerable to the 0.5in machine gun fire of US fighters in the Korean War, and was driven from the skies by mainly a mix of P-51s and F-82s. Not a great advertisement for the concept, and closer to the loss rates of the Battle in 1940.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

[/list]One 10cent 7.92mm bullet downed Robert's Typhoon, and sent him to the Stalag. And you say his Typhoon was armoured?
... direct hits with 20-mm shells frequently had no effect on the plane".
The IL-2 is what I call armoured.

A bullet in the radiator or a coolant line can stop a liquid-cooled engine. You cannot fully armour a radiator because it must have a free flow of air over it to function and if it doesn't, you engine seizes anyway. This is as true of an Il-2 as it is of a Typhoon.

I wonder how Luftwaffe fighters, primarily armed with 2 cm cannon, managed to shoot so many Il-2s down?

In your retrospective advocacy of armoured (and thus relatively slow and non-agile) aircraft, I think you'd do well to apply an "all-resources" analyis: to factor in the cost of producing and crewing the escorts necessary to keep the skies clear enough for your armoured machines to reach their targets and operate at acceptable cost, either as close escort or sweeping ahead.

[Franek Grabowski]

Tony
I am not sure what do you mean by Polish blood resources. Could you clarify?
Concerning Russian/Soviet experiences, they were actually born in Poland in 1920 when dare attacks of Polish Brisfits decimated and panicked Budenny's cavalry. Proper conclusion of this highly manouverable war were drawn and ground attack aircraft secured their place in Soviet aviation. The question is if the way chosen was always perfect, but that is another matter.
Here is the point of widespread Il-2 myth. An armoured capsule was created and fitted with the most powerful engine available to get airborne. The problem was that in field conditions Il-2 could take some 500-600 kgs of bombs. Not very impressive. Due to weight and engine performance, mission profile was always quite low and the aircraft was exposed for a prolonged time to enemy groundfire. That said it is interesting note, those comments of that German guy. According to Soviet data some 4,500 aircraft were lost to Flak, 2,500 to fighters and 3,500 missing to unknown reasons. In 1944 alone those numbers were respectively 900, 1,900 and 600. Tremendous numbers considering rather limited presence of Luftwaffe and their allies. It is also a fact, Soviets returned to the concept of fighter-bomber, increasing their numbers, but the problem was in insufficient range of their designs.
That said, the concept of an armoured aircraft must be considered a wrong way, and it is confirmed by the concept of following ground attack aircraft, slightly armoured in weak points but with a strong structure, able to withstand a punch of enemy fire. Such aircraft is lighter and thus has better performances, the penalty being a higher damage rate. This is not that problem, however, as long as the pilot survives.

[Juha]

Tony
a) British even had a separate category for the slow and heavily armoured tank, Infantry tank. Have you never heard on Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda? First use in combat in May 40. Max armour thickness was 78mm when the German tanks at that time had max armour thickness of 30mm. Now Cruisers main problem was poor reliability and a gun which had optimized for anti-armour work but Cruisers armour protection was usually in same order than the German tanks they met, that means before Tiger and Panther and Panther's side armour was weak. But those late German tanks were much heavier and much more complicated than British and so needed much more materials and working hours to produce. It's true that between 1940 and late 44, so between A13 and Comet British Cruiser thanks were not as good as the best German tanks but majority of German tanks were not Tigers and Panthers during that time and with Tigers and Panthers one could not have made the dash through France and Belgium in August and Sept. 44, they were too unreliable for that.

b) there was not a big difference between number of claims made by Finnish 20mm and 40mm AAA troops on Il-2s in the summer 44. Finnish experience was that 20mm AAA fire when gun used both HE and AP rounds was effective against Il-2s. Il-2 was a hard nut but not invulnerable. Each troop also had a twin 7,62mm AA-mg and they even figured out a useful use for that against Il-2s.

Juha

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

The rate of losses on the Continent is indeed recognised in 2nd TAF, and other works on the Typhoon. Consider the reference to the rebuild programme, and the withdrawal of aircraft from training units. But this is war, Mr. Colvin. One Typhoon loss per day in a month? It hardly compares with the Battle of Britain, does it? Or the defence of Malta, with many fewer units? Or any other period in the war with equivalent operational pressure and continuous action. Please consider the context of your statements.

Considering they were probably flying 2 to 3 missions a day Graham, would that not mean a loss every 2 or 3 days?

[Graham Boak]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

Considering they were probably flying 2 to 3 missions a day Graham, would that not mean a loss every 2 or 3 days?

Kutscha: I read the statistic as 27 losses for the whole of 2TAF, not for a single unit.

Nick: The radiator of the IL 2 was placed in an armoured duct between the engine and the cockpit, so it was much less vulnerable than the more conventional external installation of Typhoon or Spitfire. Possibly it took advantage of the ducting to reduce the drag of the installation, but it does not seem to have gained any advantages from the exit flow.

I would agree with those suggesting that the slow armoured route is indeed one justifiable answer to supplying CAS, given the rest of the system to support this. However, it is certainly not the only way, and history suggests not the optimum. Not least the Soviet abandoning of the approach post-war, despite having it as an intrinsic part of their war-winning approach.

However, the fighter-bomber claims of self-defence capability can be exaggerated. Fighter bombers are generally more heavily armoured, and thus less agile than a “pure” fighter. They are normally flown by pilots trained in ground-attack tactics not air-to-air, and will usually be encountered in an inferior combat position. These characteristics can be seen in the late combats over both Western and Eastern Fronts. In the lack of air supremacy, the use of escorts may be minimised, but not abandoned completely.

[Jon]

Reading many accounts from pilots attacking the IL2 they all agree that the best route was from behind and underneath, away from the gunner and directing fire into the tailplane from close range. The 20mm was perfectly capable of bringing down the IL2 provided pilots ingnored the usual areas to target such as the engine with its heavy armour.
Nick has hit the nail on the head, all liquid cooled aircraft can be brought down by a single rifle bullet, the Typhoon with its massive inviting radiator surrered considerably from ground fire as well as flying into derbs from its own kills / ground attacks. Placing armour infront of a radiator is not even an option as the engine will simply over heat in seconds.
I still think the Typhoon was the best ground attack aircraft of World War Two with its ability to hit targets hard with cannons bombs and rockets but have the ability to revert back to a fighter should it encounter enemy aircraft. The IL2 although superb at dishing it out apperas to have only been able to lumber along and defend itself by flying low, allowing mutual covering fire from its gunners

[Juha]

IIRC Finns tried first to eliminate the gunner and then
a) high side attack aiming where wing merged to fuselage because 20/MG151 ammo was capable to penetrate the side armour of Il-2 and one was able to punctuate the fuel cells and ignite the fuel or
b) shoot the plywood tail/rear fuselage to pieces.

Now Il-2 was a hard nut and not easy plane to shoot down and could absorb great amount of hits and survive but it wasn’t impossible target and sometimes it was possible to get multiple kills on one sortie.

To give some info of penetrative power of 20mm AAA
20mm AP round of Flak 30 and 38, the main light Flak guns used by Germans, was able to penetrate 20mm of homogenous armour when hitting at 30deg from vertical from 100m distance and 14 mm from 500 m.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Jon

I still think the Typhoon was the best ground attack aircraft of World War Two with its ability to hit targets hard with cannons bombs and rockets but have the ability to revert back to a fighter should it encounter enemy aircraft. The IL2 although superb at dishing it out apperas to have only been able to lumber along and defend itself by flying low, allowing mutual covering fire from its gunners

Surely the 400mph Typhoon was vulnerable to the 452mph Bf109K, to the 472mph FwTa152C, to the 474 mph Ar335, and to the 541mph Me262. It was another myth, and RAF rationalisation, that the fighter-bomber could revert to being a fighter and defend itself. For a start the RP rails could not be jettisoned.

Pierre Clostermann flew the 440mph Tempest, and said this about the Typhoons' vulnerability in February 1945 in his book 'The Big Show'; "Typhoon formations frequently lost six or seven machines out of twelve in encounters with Fw190s and Bf109s. The Spitfire was powerless. It was to remedy this state of affairs that 122 Wing was sent to Volkel equipped with Tempests. It was a crack unit and on it depended the entire offensive and tactical system of the British front".

[Juha]

Tony
you need a reality check. How many Ta152Cs or Ar(surelyDo)335s there were around at any time of war in combat formations? And can you give even one date when even 2 Typhoons was lost to enemy fighters from 2nd of Jan 45 to end of Feb 45?

Juha