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Originally Posted by Juha
"from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow" Now do you really believe that if the LW had had plans for a knockout blow against UK, Stumpf would have admited it to British in 1937 when asked on it? So if Stumpf said that LW had not such a plan, it didn't matter.
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Oh dear. It wasn't just Stumpf. Canaris and Milch said the same to Col Malcolm Christie. Maj Desmond Morton was reporting the same. Hitler said it also, and offered to exchange production data with the British to prove it. And it was also true. And the RAF toured German factories, and watched their manoeuvres in which they practised all-arms with the LW giving tactical support. It was obvious then and it's obvious now.
What is your problem? Do you thnk the RAF was right to believe the Germans were hatching a knockout blow and were right to believe all the evidence against it? If you must argue each point please say why. Don't just repeat RAF propaganda. It is obvious in hindsight that the RAF played politics, and would say anything to keep money coming in to pay for their Bomber Command fantasy. Even if it meant Britain had no army.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Juha
Tony, read a good book on British political history on 30s and you will see that the possibility to get funding for a ground force to invade the Low Countries was nil in 1936. RAF meddling or not.
Remember, Germans defeated both the French and British armies and the British were very junior partner in ground war then. Just as the British had hoped. It's not because of RAF, historically British didn't like permanent armies and over that came the experiences of WWI trench warfare.
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Juha.
You're wrong and all other contributors who deny it are also wrong; the army suffered because of RAF promises. Germany very nearly won the war because of RAF promises that were not worth a damn.
From 1933 to 1936 Montgomery-Massingberd was CIGS. He wrote this: "I feel that the biggest battle I have had in the last three years is against the idea that on account of the arrival of air forces as a new arm, the Low Countries are of little value to us and that therefore we need not maintain a military force to assist holding them. Those belonging to this school of thought desire therefore to concentrate all our efforts on a strong air force firstly to act as a deterrent to Germany, and if that fails as our sole contribution to making good our guarantee under the Treaty of Locarno. The dangers of such a policy and the importance of the Low Countries to us I have pushed forward again and again, but the elimination of any army commitment on the Continent sounds such a comfortable and cheap policy to those who are ill informed as to its real implications, that from time to time it gains fresh adherents especially amongst the air mad".
Do you recognise yourself as being "amongst the air mad"? If not, then perhaps you and the others can agreed that air madness is perhaps the longest-lived delusion of all time. It continues to this day.