Operation Steinbock question

[RT]

In fact the discussion is not , at my sense , the loss are worth the damages caused ??, but is there any sense to throw bombs as near blind, just to obliged ennemy to build-up its defence, compare to WWII the qties of bombs dropped over vietnam was quite more considerable without having caused the expected results
Yes the losses suffered by the KG during the Baby-blitz were soft , more serious hv been the high consume of gasoline, to prepare nd conduct those raids, not speaking of the relatively poor response bombers gave after to the Normandy "raid",
Even Goering at the time of "baedecker" was not convince of utility of these bombings

remi

Germans were never in position to conduct a Strategic war, people could also thing that even England don't hv the means of this politic, just the US with the atomic-bomb....

[Brian Bines]

Further to the loss question on Steinbock aircraft looking through the lists shows the following - 18 aicraft on transfer flights ( including 1 which fell to fighters over the UK), 72 Steinbock aircraft falling on or near the UK ( plus the one on transfer flight and non-Steinbock related desertion ), 110 crashes on the Continent, 129 further aircaft listed as missing, 5 aircraft on recon. missions plus the 1 desertion (not Steinbock).
Transfer Flights - 17 of the 18 aircraft were lost as follows 9 to Allied Fighters, 3 to own Flak, 4 to engine/technical problems and 1 to Fighters over the UK. Of the 83 aircrew involved in the 17 incidents 50 were killed and 17+ injured/wounded. Addtionally there were casualties amongst groundcrew carried on some of these aircraft
Crashes on the Continent while on Steinbock attacks - 93 incidents with some form of loss of aircrew. Of these 25 were to aircraft returning with NF/AA damage, 23 crashed following technical/ engine trouble, 9 fell to intruders, 3 fell to own Flak, at least 15 crashed on landing/take off, and 6 crashed followng weather/navigation problems. Of the 356 aircrew in these incidents 176 were killed and over 70 injured/wounded.
Recon. Flights - a Ju 88 ( 3 POW's and 1 killed), 2 Ju188's and a Bf 109 (crews missing) lost on missions to Scotland plus one Bf 109 (pilot Killed)shot down over France returning from a mission to London/Thames Estuary (checking Steinbock bomb -damage ?)

Aircraft not included in the 335 losses, 2 Ju290's shot down by fighters while on sea-recon near Ireland, a Ju 52 of KG6 crashed on transfer flight killing 11 groudcrew passengers, Ju88S of KG66 on domestic flight, 3 Me410's of KG51 on non-op. flights, 4 Ju188's of operational staffels of KG2 on non-op. flights, a Ju88 of KG6 and a He177 of KG100 shot down by fighters while on workshop flights, a Arado 96 plus 5 Fw190's of I/SKG10 on domesic/non-Steinbock missions

[Graham Boak]

A couple of comments.

Steinbock losses were not "soft", however they compare with cherry-picked examples from Bomber Command, as they have to be compared with the available forces and the overall loss rate. Soft or not, they did not produce results proportional to the effort, even by the standards of other bombing campaigns, even if discussed only in terms of civilian damage. As for bombing seaports, wasn't the main effect of the bombing of Bristol the destruction of the shopping centre?

The British did not attempt to win the war by strategic bombing alone, although much effort was placed behind this as the one direct means of hitting Germany between 1940 and 1944. Unable to field an Army capable of facing the German one, or indeed of transporting one to any point of contact, in the early years they did manage to defeat Germany's main ally on two different fronts. The Army was continually expanded and improved, not an effort that would have been needed had a genuine attempt at winning by bombing alone been intended. The Navy carried out a trade blockade of Germany which was successful in preventing the supply of war materials such as key metals, rubber and fuels, amongst others. Later they had to fight the Japanese as well. All in all, Britain was rather busy even without the bombers.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Two things need to be considered.

Firstly, those 300+ plus bombers appearantly include aircraft lost in the accidents/non-enemy related causes ... and yet the bomber force alltogether stood at some 2200 aircraft by the end of January.

The losses to all causes are important because accidents in France and in the training units were all part of the cost to Germany of conducting the Steinbock campaign. The numbers of aircraft that were sent over on the first raids could nor be sustained as the campaign progressed. The first raid involved about 400 aircraft, within a month 200 or less was more typical and in the last few raids less than 100.

Units brought back from Italy for Steinbock but had to be returned after the Anzio landing. Typical raids in Italy in early 1944 involved about 100–110 aircraft.

If the whole bomber force was 2200, a much smaller number could actually bomb targets on a given night.

[Bombphoon]

In the back of Simon Parry's excellent 1987 book Intruders over Britain it mentions that a book about Steinbock was due to be published by the same company. It never came to light.

I spoke to an aviation artist last September at the Victory Show in Leicestershire UK and he told me that - finally - he knows that somebody is writing a book about Operation Steinbock for publication. Sorry, I haven't got anymore details than that, but when I next see him, I'll ask again and post more info.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

The '60% lost' figure is also nice, save for it appears to be a smokescreen for the fact that overall, the losses were not particularly heavy by any standard - we`re speaking of a period of five months here, which works out to 60 bombers lost per month, of which about 40-50 lost per month to enemy action over Britain. That`s considerably less than the losses suffered between July-October 1940, and quite miniscule compared to the big picture. Bomber Command lost as many, or even twice as many during single raids over Germany, rather than a month..

This is weird logic as the LW didn't have the a/c to spare while the RAF did. Would say the real smokescreen is the RAF numbers shot down.

LW bomber losses:
Jan 44 loss rate was 7.8%
Feb - 5.2%
March - 8.3%
April - 8.7%

For comparison, RAF BC losses for the same months:
Jan 44 loss rate was 5.6%
in Feb - 5.2%
in March - 3.6%
in April - 2.6%

[Kutscha]

The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44

Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters - 1063
Twin-engined fighters - 151
Night fighters - 572
>> Fighter-bombers - 278
>> Ground-attack aircraft - 352
>> Night harassment aircraft - 305
>> Twin-engined bombers - 840
>> Four-engined bombers - 97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft - 153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft - 210
Coastal aircraft - 123
Transport aircraft - 719
Kampfgeschwader - 200 (misc. aircraft65
Total - 4928
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaver...html#Jagdwaffe

I would say that 2200 number is not so factual as includes a/c that can carry bombs but are not actually classed as bombers.

What do the number of bombers and their losses on other fronts have to do with the Baby Blitz?

[Juha]

Hello
As RT wrote the main point is was the damage done worth of resources used. And IMHO they were not. The 2 late Feb attacks on London were rather successful and time to time some railway infrastructures were hit or blocked but usually bombing was very bad and the British got idea of intended targets only after interrogating PoWs and/or from maps found in wrecks.
On the attacks on harbours which Kurfürst mentioned, according to Ken Wakefield in his article on Oper. Steinbock in The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3
29/30 April on Plymouth, 101 sorties flown by LW, 8 tonnes of bombs hit Plymouth
14/15 May on Bristol, 91 sorties, 3 tonnes hit Bristol
15/16 May on Portsmouth, 106 sorties, 1,4 tonnes hit Portsmouth
22/23 May on Portsmouth, 104 sorties, 1,5 tonnes hit Portsmouth
27/28 May on Weymouth, 28 sorties, 13 tonnes hit Weymouth
28/29 Mat Falmouth, 51 sorties, missed altogether but 18 KIA, 6 MIA and 6 badly injured in Torquay

With that sort of accuracy IMHO the attcks were not worth of fuel used, even less so to crews lost. To my understanding the critical factor to LW was crew casualties, they had difficulties to replace combat ops capable lost crews.

Juha

Ps Brian Bines
Thanks a lot for Your statistics.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Juha

On the attacks on harbours which Kurfürst mentioned, according to Ken Wakefield in his article on Oper. Steinbock in The Blitz Then and Now Vol 3

29/30 April on Plymouth, 101 sorties flown by LW, 8 tonnes of bombs hit Plymouth.

What was the target that night ? Plymouth itself or dock installations and warships in the harbor ...? If I understand correctly Mr. Beale`s Kampfflieger book, it would seem that at least the Do 217s of III./KG 100 were targeting the harbor and warships on that night, and this series of raids on ports in late April/early May aimed at invasion shipping gathering in British ports and certainly not in British cities. Disraelihas a fitting quote about statistics, but it escapes me at the moment, yet it does make me wonder if your other statistics were arrived at in a similiar fashion.

There`s, of course, no arguement about that the Steinbock operation was a small operation, using very limited resources - ie. compare the ~4500 or so sorties flown in five months to the ~3700 night bomber sorties flown in September 1940 alone - yielding limited losses and limited gains.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

The losses to all causes are important because accidents in France and in the training units were all part of the cost to Germany of conducting the Steinbock campaign.

Undoubtedly, but since the practice has been, at least when it comes to Bomber Command operations to count only enemy related losses (see Nürnberg raid, where only the 96 lost over the target is counted, and not those being written off back in base, lost over the sea or to accidents), I`d go with a similiar practice when it comes to Steinbock.

If the whole bomber force was 2200, a much smaller number could actually bomb targets on a given night.

The ca 2200 would of course include the entire Kampfflieger fleets, ie. all aircraft present with all KG units in all theatres. It is just to put the Steinbock losses into a broader perspective. Steinbock has been occasionally as some sort of a decimation of the LW bomber force, yet looking at the loss statatistics, and the rate of montly losses in the previous years, such statements cannot be justified.

As you`ve pointed out, the raids were of typically rather small scale.