Cobras, Mustangs, Thunderbolts, Eastern vs Western front, Franek vs ...

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Hm, my number is from Prien JG1/11. It could be other mission or combined mission with 15th Air Force. Or my memory is not good
I can not verify your info about range of P47 but it was primary escort fighter until march/april and in this time the 8th Air force attack e.g. Eisenach, Marburg, Magdeburg,Schweinfurt, Stuttgart, Regensburg, all points deep in Germany. Who provide the escorts?

The P-47 was used for the short/medium range escort.

At the end of July 1943, the P-47s got the leaky 200gal drop tanks. This allowed the P-47 to reach the German/Dutch border. In mid Jan 1944 the much better 150gal d/t was introduced. This allowed the P-47 to reach the Dummer Lake area.

On May 8 1944 the 56th FG claimed 6 enemy a/c while the 352cd FG claimed 27 enemy a/c out of the total of 44 enemy a/c claimed that day. The ascendancy of the P-51 is clearly shown.

Source of my data for May 12 1944
http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/usaf/html/

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

The P-47 was used for the short/medium range escort.

On May 8 1944 the 56th FG claimed 6 enemy a/c while the 352cd FG claimed 27 enemy a/c out of the total of 44 enemy a/c claimed that day. The ascendancy of the P-51 is clearly shown.

Source of my data for May 12 1944
http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/usaf/html/

But without this short/medium escort the success of operation was not possible. Only with few P-51 the 8th air force only repeat the desaster of october 43 again and again.

Generally I am confidence, that LW in the west was not destroyed during strategic bomber operation in jan-may 1944. It suffers high losses but was still able to fight back. And only landing in the Normandy( and opening of 4rd major air front) bring LW to death. And in tactical air war was the role of P-51 no more significant as Spitfire or P-47

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Generally I am confidence, that LW in the west was not destroyed during strategic bomber operation in jan-may 1944. It suffers high losses but was still able to fight back. And only landing in the Normandy (and opening of 4rd major air front) bring LW to death. And in tactical air war was the role of P-51 no more significant as Spitfire or P-47

You certainly have a point if we consider the night battle. Not a little part of the strategic (bomber) offensive. The major factor in the shift of balance was the loss of France and its forward airspace.

Not sure if you have a point regarding the P-51 though. Although I tend to agree that its impact is sometimes overstated, it was nonetheless the increase in numbers of (strategic / long range) escort fighters that shifted the balance in the West during the day. This also allowed for a massive increase in tactical fighters, or fighter-bombers. Perhaps the increase in tactical air power was more significant in defeating the Germans in the West than the Strategic element etc.

The air war is unfortunately more complex in terms of events than for instance the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic, where May 1943 can be clearly pointed as a turning point. But even this event is the culmination of many factors, including numbers, type of, weapons and tactics used by the allied escorts.

In the air war we don't have this clear cut situation. Day vs Night, East vs West. Tactical vs Strategic etc.

Of course there is an abundance of figures, but even hard data is prone to interpretation that suits the argument.

A good example is how the early fighting in the West in 1940 is not taken into the Battle of Britain equation. Whereas the first of the few did include the French (or like some may argue Poles), we barely regard them as such.

Instead of growing for a strategic offensive against Britain, the Jagdwaffe barely managed to regain the number it started the war with (an error to repeated in 1941 against the Soviet Union). There wasn't any significant growth until it was already too late to turn the combined Allied tidal wave, culminating in the huge discrepancy in numbers by 1944.

The most significant early turning point was of course the day the Third Reich invaded the Soviet Union, spreading its Jagdwaffe to the point where it operated beyond its capacity to maintain an offensive on any front: the western front, the Atlantic, North Africa, the Mediterranean and Eastern Front. The Western Allies would of course profit most from this early phase since they could concentrate significant forces on the periphery whereas the Reich could not. Even the main western front was a peripheral air front in the eyes of the Luftwaffe (until mid 1943).

The role of the Soviet Union, or Russia, in absorbing the main fighting strength in the critical 1941-42 years, in the air, but most importantly on land and the industrial output that had to go with it, can't be overstated enough.

Without Barbarossa however the chances of Britain standing alone to widthstand a continued and concentrated German effort were IMHO bleak, let alone the chance of any offensive posture on the periphery.

In short the Third Reich, like the Luftwaffe, chewed off more than it could ever hope to swallow.

All IMHO, of course.

[Graham Boak]

Copying is rarely seen as obviously as with the Tu-4. I don't see a lot of direct copying in the Soviet airframe industry - the abortive attempt at the Storch aside - but their engine industry was highly dependent on the development of licence-built and copied engines. The Klimov series was based on the Hispano-Suiza, and the large radials on the Cyclone. It was the Soviet parallel development of the Double Cyclone what made copying the Tu 4 feasible at all. There was perhaps some adoption of fresh concepts, such as the twin-engined monoplane fighter which became the Pe 2 was initially inspired by the Potez 63 and Bf 110, but the design was not a copy. Adopting fresh ideas, whatever the source, was hardly unique to Soviet industry.

Re the like/dislike of the Spitfire. My understanding is that the deliveries of Spitfire Mk.Vs to the Southern front were unpopular, because the aircraft was already outdated and not suited to the rough operations of the Soviet front line (although it seems to have coped well enough in the Western Desert, the Indian/Burmese jungles and Italian dirt strips!). Some of the early deliveries were also second-hand and somewhat well-worn, which didn't help. However the Mk.IXs were another matter, and retained for PVO units because of the failure of Soviet designs for the higher-altitude intercept role after the MiG 3.

It certainly is unfair to suggest that the Yak 3 was only equivalent to a Spitfire Mk.Vc Trop - the overweight dragmaster of the Spitfire series. A better comparison would be to the LF Mk.Vb, with the Merlin 55M. Although often dismissively referred to as "clipped cropped and clapped" this was the fastest climbing (and hence accelerating) fighter at low-level to see service in WW2, and had a roll rate equal to the best (the Fw 190), was faster at sea-level than most. There was a very significant difference in performance between the two versions - as indeed there was between the Bf 109F and the G. It is differences in performance between types that drives the choice of tactics and these should not be dismissively cast aside when discussing options in the air war.

I'm not sure just which recent (or indeed older) books on the Battle of Britain neglect the effects of previous struggles. Such throwaway comments have previously been directed at not allowing for German aircraft losses in this period: however British losses in this period (particularly of light bombers, Army co-operation aircraft and Hurricanes) were no less significant. The movement of German bombers into France and Norway, accompanied by their fighters, gave the Germans a massive tactical advantage for any airwar over the UK. Britain was no longer faced with unescorted bombers operating at fairly long range from a single direction. Much of the defences had be re-directed over a much greater front, and the value of two front-line types (Defiant and Blenheim fighter) severely downgraded. Or isn't that what you meant?

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Re the like/dislike of the Spitfire. My understanding is that the deliveries of Spitfire Mk.Vs to the Southern front were unpopular, because the aircraft was already outdated and not suited to the rough operations of the Soviet front line (although it seems to have coped well enough in the Western Desert, the Indian/Burmese jungles and Italian dirt strips!). Some of the early deliveries were also second-hand and somewhat well-worn, which didn't help. However the Mk.IXs were another matter, and retained for PVO units because of the failure of Soviet designs for the higher-altitude intercept role after the MiG 3.

Hi Graham,
in this case I would say, the problem is on your side :-) IIRC the Britain has always production problem with Spitfire therefore you can not deliver the necessary number. What is 150 SpitV for VVS? It 3-4 week fights you need the new delivery. If you were able to deliver 2000-3000 planes in the middle of 1943, they were welcomed. Btw, the second hand SpitfireVB again new G-2 and G-4 was also not a wunderwaffe, therefore I don't beleive that pilots from 57 GIAP requested it intensive :-)
Maybe you already read about Spitfire over Kuban:
http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/englis...spit/index.htm
If you have question, Igor Zlobin maybe can help you.

What SpitfireIX concern, it delivery was elementary to late. The introducing of new plane type, especially foreign type, is not easy for VVS technical service and therefore if you have equal or even better own type, you will avoid the introducing. The test with IX show the advantage of La-7, Yak-9U, Yak-3 in low and middle attitude, therefore the Spitfire were not sent to the front line but delivered to Home AD and IIRC they shot down one german recce plane over Leningrad in 1945.

[kalender1973]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

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Not sure if you have a point regarding the P-51 though. Although I tend to agree that its impact is sometimes overstated, it was nonetheless the increase in numbers of (strategic / long range) escort fighters that shifted the balance in the West during the day. This also allowed for a massive increase in tactical fighters, or fighter-bombers. Perhaps the increase in tactical air power was more significant in defeating the Germans in the West than the Strategic element etc.

Ruy, I am fully agree with you. But it is not charackteristic of "wunderwaffe". Wunderwaffe is something, that allow you with limited ressources shift the situation to your advantage. Nuclear bomb is one. Mustang is only step forward in the right direction. Maybe big and important. But only one. The ally must process many another( and many painful) until they reach their goals. Btw, I try to remember, if I read from former LW member about overwhelming technically superiority of Mustang again german type. And can not found. But about numerically superiority very often. One of the (Reschke??) wrote something like: "..In the west we fight fighter again mass of fighter and in the east fighter again the fighter"

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

The role of the Soviet Union, or Russia, in absorbing the main fighting strength in the critical 1941-42 years, in the air, but most importantly on land and the industrial output that had to go with it, can't be overstated enough.

The focusing of LW in the east give the west engineers time, develope and produce technically advanced planes. The german also very limited ressources go for the bomber, transports etc, and avoid the buildup of effective day AD system in Germany. IMHO the roots of west air superiority and success lay anywhere between Moscau and Stalingrad.
And for this, the soviet pilots pay there live... and died in technicaly not so fine planes...