Book on French AF 1939-40?

[Sylvester Stadler]

Yves aka Grozibou wrote:

"It should not be forgotten that the key to the 1940 German success was the big breakthrough at Sedan, across a rather big and wide river (the Meuse) mainly with 7 of the 10 German armoured divisions! This operation was incredibly risky : it was simply madness. No reasonable C-i-C would have accepted these terrible hazards but Adolf Hitler was not reasonable, he was a fanatic and a lunatic. Nonetheless he had foreseen that the French would be too slow and not react properly in time. So to speak, the French moved on foot when the Germans attacked with fast vehicles at 30 mph or so. Too bad Hitler was so right. If the French generals, mainly Huntziger and Georges, had reacted simply in a normal way (without needing to be military geniuses) the German forces would have been stopped in their tracks BEFORE crossing the Meuse and they would have suffered appalling losses, their offensive would have been dead by 14 May... This same Huntziger became the French C-i-C after the defeat!
To sum up, this unique German victory was the result of a madman's gambling. It worked fine this time, afterwards it didn't... All discussions about the respective air forces etc. are very interesting but the German victory was won on the ground, mainly with ten armourded divisions deploying about 1,000 real tanks plus 2,000 small, vulnerable tankettes (the French alone had got 3,300 real tanks, all with a good armour and most of them with a good gun). The German air force supported the army and made their victory quicker and easier but it didn't win the French Campaign : the German army did, mainly thanks to a crazy attack plan which worked."

The German victory in May-June 1940 was not the result of some madman's gamble but it was the result of careful and thorough planning which was carried out by a superb military force which had a modern military doctrine and the modern combined arms tactics to carry out the mission. The "madman" was not Hitler but it was the outstanding military mind of General Erich von Manstein, the author of Operation Sichelschnitt, who saw that the standard strategy of attacking through Belgium and Holland would not result in a decisive military victory (the old Schlieffen plan), but that it would result in prolonged campaign which might not achieve a German victory. Every military operation involves a degree of risk especially more so when the German Army had no superiority of numbers or quality of weapons. What the German Army had which the French, British, Dutch and Belgians did not have was the doctrine of subordinates deciding on how to carry out a mission which is called Auftragstaktik. When I was in the USMC, the one organization which was admired by Marines was the German Army and the Waffen SS, not the British Army or the French Army or even the U.S. Army (Marines have nothing complimentary to say about the Army).

The war games and map exercises, with the input of the creator of the Blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian, confirmed that armor could travel through the Ardennes forest. Guderian had fought there during WW I, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the road network, and he stated that it would be no problem of moving a panzer division through there. When his corps, the XIX, was given the mission, he stated that he wanted all three of his divisions, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 10th PD, to move in mass. Klotzen, nicht kleckern (Mass, not dispersion). He was also given the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment. Guderian was the right officer in the right place at the right time. His armor,infantry, engineers, artillery, anti-tank, flak, etc. had perfected the combined arms doctrines as a result of the Polish campaign and the additional training prior to May 1940. The French and British had not learned the lessons of the Polish campaign, prefering to believe for various reasons that the Poles were simply too weak and not capable of stopping the German Army. The Allies believed they would have no problem stopping the Germans since they had a superiority in numbers.

The German Army had another tremendous advantage in that the leaders of combat units fought at the front and could immediately size up the situation and take immediate action. The U.S. Army finally learned this after the Vietnam war and prior to Desert Storm. Books on this war credit the Isaraelis with this concept but they themselves had studied the armored warfare of the Wehrmacht. In Desert Storm, the battalion commander was with his leading company; the brigade commander with the leading battalion; the division commander with his leading brigade; and so on. This was nothing new to the Germans.

The armored divisions of the XIX Corps moved faster through the Ardennes and reached the Meuse at Sedan and when the first units arrived, they immediately crossed the Meuse without waiting orders from higher HQs. Immediately, the Stukas and bombers were called for fire support and all available weapons used--machine guns, mortars, a few artillery pieces, a few tanks, assault guns, flak(especially the 88mm)--to pin down the French on the opposite shore. The first to cross were the infantry and assault engineers who destroyed the French bunkers. This made it possible to build pontoon bridges to get the tanks across. But it was the infantry of the 1st Rifle Regiment, 1st Panzer Division, commanded by Col. Hermann Balck and the Grossdeutschland Regiment which made this possible. He faced the French 55th Infantry Division and the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Men such as Feldwebel Rubarth and eleven men of the 10th PD performed heroic tasks in eliminating many French bunkers and firing positions. He was awarded the Knight's Cross. His performance was typical of the German soldiers at Sedan. Once across Guderian's forces had achieved the prerequisite to the successes which were to follow.

The armed forces of France, Britain, Belgium and Holland were actually superior in numbers to that of the Wehrmacht. The Allies had four million men versus three million of the German Army. Other comparisons are as follows:
151 Allied divisions v. 135 German (inc. 42 reserve)
14,000 artillery guns v. 7378 German guns
4204 Allied battle tanks v. 2439 German tanks
Aircraft have been covered elsewhere.

The French have not been able to win a war on their own since Napoleon. They have required the assistance of the British Empire, Russia, and finally the U.S. which came to their rescue in two world wars. The Germans fought more effectively in WW I when they knocked out Russia but the U.S. was required to turn the tide for the French and British Empires which outnumbered the German Empire. During the 40-day campaign in 1940, the German fought more effectively as demonstrated by the casualties of both sides:
Germany lost 43,110 KIA and MIA
France: 124,000 KIA and MIA
Great Britain: 11,010
Belgium: 7500
Holland: 2890
Allied total dead and missing: c.145,400
The ratio of German to Allied dead and missing is 1:3.37.
This demonstrates a German superiority in skill and doctrine since they did not have the superior firepower that might have caused such a disparity.