German & Allied radar

[Crumpp]

Patrol flights around 13 Group

13th Groups contribution to the fighting is spelled out by the RAF. In a 10 day period they made 138 operational sorties not including the action on the 15th.

They were not included in the SWAG.




All the best,

Crumpp

[Kutscha]

You do have your troubles don't you Crumpp? Look up the histories of those squadrons in 13 Group and tell me how much aerial combat, er fighting, they participated in, in those 10 days.

[Crumpp]

You do have your troubles don't you Crumpp? Look up the histories of those squadrons in 13 Group and tell me how much aerial combat, er fighting, they participated in, in those 10 days.

Drop the personal attacks when the facts do not go your way. It is not very mature.

The document is just what it states, a comparison of the operational burden of the fight. It is from the RAF's official history of the battle.

In short it is self explanatory.

What is your source that 13th Group did nothing? Why don’t you try posting that so it can be compared and discussed?

Is it the same one that told you 11th Group fought the battle alone??

All the best,

Crumpp

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp

Quote:” Juha, I think you are thinking of the old system the RAF used. That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.”

No, I’m thinking of the system used during the BoB, badly damaged a/c were of course exchanged for new/repaired aircraft and even more lightly damaged if the sqn’s own maintenance and repair organisation was unable to cope.

Quote:” In December 1940, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the squadrons' servicing personnel to station maintenance units, significantly increasing the mobility of the Fighter Command squadrons…”

From your own quote, the second change was made after the BoB.

Quote: “It was common for squadrons to make multiple sorties from early in the morning on. By the morning status, some squadrons were embarking on their second combat of the day. Battle is a dynamic state while the status is frozen in time.”

Now the earlier morning of 15th Sept had been quiet apart some LW recon flights, that’s according to Price, I don’t have any original ORBs on that day or maybe that of 603 but have not time to go through my copies. Anyway LW was preparing for their big attacks on London. And the first FC loss happened at 11.40 am.

Juha

[Crumpp]

From your own quote, the second change was made after the BoB.

By the English dates sure, but the Germans have a much later date of May 1941 for the end of the Battle of Britain when they transferred their bombers east.

Hence my statement: That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9. it seems that that had not happened. Most sqns didn’t scramble the supposed 12 fighters but 10-11 fighters. Only 11 Group reserve sqns at Tangmere sent oversized sqns and they scrabled exactly same number of fighters than they had had serviceable in the evening of 14th.

I see what happened. The RAF expanded the number of squadrons in the force and in the week of the 15th reduced the size of squadron to 18 A/C. This is why you did not realize the larger size of the earlier organization.

The RAF began to replenish the ASU and reserve holdings as well.

Now it is easy to see that the RAF was at 96% strength with 83% of that operational at 152400 SEP 40. That does not mean we will not find outliers in the individual squadrons.




All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

badly damaged a/c were of course exchanged for new/repaired aircraft and even more lightly damaged if the sqn’s own maintenance and repair organisation was unable to cope.

We are thinking of the same system then.

In the Luftwaffe, the Geschwaders did not charge off anything that was repairable and owned the airframe even when it was transferred to organizational level maintenance. The US Army has a similar system depending on the warranty. Items sent for repair remain on the books and the unit does without that equipment until it is repaired.

If the RAF used this same system the squadron would continue to own the aircraft while it was at the ASU for repairs. It would mean the squadrons did not get a new aircraft until the airframe was repaired and returned.

The RAF's system allowed the operational unit to exchange the damage airframe for a new/previously repaired aircraft on the spot. Thus they maintained a higher operational readiness at the tip of the spear.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Franek Grabowski]

You must be kidding. Where in the paper is the increase of number of Squadrons, that would justify changing of establishment? By the way, the increase might be four foreign Squadrons that had been established at the time.
You seem to fail to note actual problems experienced by the RAF, as well as servicing structure. Otherwise, you obviously do not understand what an operational sortie is, and what is the difference between it and combat sortie. That said, Squadrons in the north did a lot of operational flying, but engagements were quite rare.

[Crumpp]

Where in the paper is the increase of number of Squadrons, that would justify changing of establishment?

Under the column labeled "Number of Squadrons".

You must be kidding.

Your emotional display is tiresome and I will ignore you if you cannot display some maturity to discuss the facts.

You seem to fail to note actual problems experienced by the RAF,

This is the RAF's own documentation and their official History. Perhaps some post war author knows better than they do the state of their forces?

operational flying,

Operational flying is a combat sortie credit. Wordsmithing does not change that fact. The bullets fired at 13th Group Operational Sorties are just as deadly as though fired at 11th Group.

The purpose of the table the RAF constructed was to show the operational burden of the Groups.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

The actions of 13th Group are a complete sideshow and are not figured into my earlier SWAG and the conclusions of the RAF are their own.

The US Air Force Journal Of Logistics article makes use of the same documentation the RAF referenced in their official history. Part of that documentation is presented in this thread.

I fail to see the fascination with 13th Group operations except as some sort of straw man detracting from the overall conclusion.

That conclusion being the RAF started with numerical parity in single engine fighters and quickly moved to numerical superiority during the battle due to more efficient repair systems and higher production rates.

Most air forces agree that only fighter aircraft can win air superiority.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

It is interesting that the USAF draws the same conclusion as the RAF about the relative state of Single Engine fighters during the Battle of Britain.




http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered...es/1012421.pdf

All the best,

Crumpp