May 14th 1940 and few little things

[Franek Grabowski]

Well, there is another issue. Those 45 reports cover virtually all assigned airmen - they were filed by commanders of sections dispersed across France. I estimate that about 75 percent of reports representative for about 75 percent of 190 Polish fighter pilots, contain negative remarks against Frenchmen. The remaining 25 percent does not have any remarks, be it positive or negative. I presume authors did not like to write too much, more than necessary. It is worth to note that in many cases French pilot are described as great friends, and very pleasant people, this not referring at all to their combat abilities.
As an aside note, Lionel asked about GC II/1. Polish pilot of the unit, Marian Trzebiński noted, that the French officers avoided combat at all cost, and that it looked like within the month most Poles had more flights that those officers since the start of the war. He was nonetheless full of admiration for French NCO pilots, who led flights and squadrons instead of officers.
Certainly an extreme situation, nonetheless another piece of rather complicated situation in France.

[Rob Philips]

Thanks, Franek. So the matter is definitively significant. Could you summarize the multitude of possible explanations for this complicated matter? Perhaps, with input from others, this may lead to a well developed view on things.

Regards,

Rob

[Birgir Thorisson]

A few points about the officers of CG II/1, drawn from S. Joanne, Le Bloch MB 152.

The Poles joined on mai 19 1940, when the unit had suffered heavy losses.
Looking through the day-to-day accounts, I do not see the commandant (Robillon) leading the unit.
The leader of 3 escadrille, Capitaine Veniel is very active, especially before may 19th. He was wounded on june 3rd. Of the other 4 officers, 3 were wounded. S/L Fontaine is especially active.
Of the Sous-officiers, (8) 3 were killed before the Poles arrived.
4th Escadrille.
The leader (Capitaine Coiral) was killed on mai 14th. On the same day, 2 of the other 4 officers were wounded. Of the 8 "sous-officiers" 3 had been wounded before the poles joined.
One wonders what 50% attrition in one week does to a unit?

Birgir Thorisson

[Franek Grabowski]

Rob
I was just saying it all the time.
In regard of reasons, I think that such situations like cowardice or unfair approach was in minority. In most cases it was some sort of passive lazines, that means Frenchmen were not willing to work in wartime conditions. For example there was no will in having patrols since dawn, and tendency to have peace-like dinners with lots of wine. There were also many problems with organisation, both in getting equipment, and to arrange properly functioning observation posts. Simply, the system did not work, and the Frenchmen were not willing to introduce any changes. Lack of discipline is also mentioned. Sometimes this was combined with arrogance, but I would not say it was a general observation.
In regard of aircraft, a lot of criticism in case of GC I/145 flying Cyclones. There were some problems to get them working, and I recall a story, that a factory mechanic was unable to set those aircraft properly, having no documentation. Several pilots complained about low performance of MS-406s, and I know at least one pilot complained of the pneumatic firing system. On the other hand it seems few pilots loved D-520s.

Birgir
Yes, this could have been a contributing factor to the situation in GC II/1.
It does not change the fact, Poles have seen that unit in a terrible condition, and that their description causes the concern.

[Rob Philips]

Thanks, Franek. I'm aware that you have said all that, or implied it, before. It is just that I'm not too happy with this snapshot treatment of such matters. I had hoped to seduce you to more accurate statements, given in a more organised manner, as that could lead to a clearer result, that would make it easier for others to understand and to participate in the discussion. I was rather hoping for that. However, you continue to use many fuzzy expressions that do not fit in well with a subject that is complicated, and that has potentially sensitive undertones. If you would use your extensive knowledge of the Polish military aviation in clearer ways, then more people would benefit. As happily as we may disagree, you know that you have at least one reader who is genuinely interested in what you have to say.

Regards,

Rob

[Franek Grabowski]

I am simply in no position to undertake a serious study of all incidents that occurred in 1940. The thing that you expect from me is to spend several hours on books, and I cannot do that at the moment. You will find quite a good summary in the book The Lost Hopes that covers operations of Polish fighters during the campaign. It is bilingual, Polish and English. This will not give you a complete picture, but at least part of the picture.
As to laziness, if you consider that fuzzy, those were situations like: we will not put flight at stand by at dawn, because it will make men tired, we will not camouflage aircraft, we will not dig trenches because no bombs are going to fall with our defences, we will not connect you to the early warning system, we will not provide you with necessary equipment because it is here to be stored and not to be used by you, we are not going to allow you to fly defence patrols of this place, it is not our problem the early warning system does not work, etc.

[Ruy Horta]

Not meant as an insult, but wasn't there anything these Polish airmen didn't know better or at best agreed with?

(how familiar, must be endemic... )

It does surprise me that there isn't a single mentioning of the fact that they were grateful for being given a second chance to fight the germans in a fighter aircraft (how did these types compare with the Polish front line fighters of '39?).

Those who survived France got a third chance in Britain, where they probably didn't agree with everything they encountered either, but were save from the Wehrmacht and a quick defeat, hence having less to criticise at the end.

Birgir's post was very enlightening, thanks for filling in some gaps in our one sided picture.

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

Not meant as an insult, but wasn't there anything these Polish airmen didn't know better or at best agreed with?

I think that many were just impressed with the British organisation. Also, after initial snags, they had the feeling that their experience will be used properly. Ant there are indeed some comments like we should learn this or that.

It does surprise me that there isn't a single mentioning of the fact that they grateful for being given a second chance to fight the germans in a fighter aircraft (how did these types compare with the Polish front line fighters of '39?).

Well, they could have been angry that they did not receive promised French aircraft, that there was no French offensive on Germany, that French aircraft did not attack Berlin, etc. Actually, their journey to France was a part of mutual agreements, and I am surprised, why they should have seen that in other way?

Those who survived France got a third chance in Britain, where they probably didn't agree with everything they encountered either, but were save from the Wehrmacht and a quick defeat, hence having less to criticise at the end.

Well, if you ever read Polish memories, you will find comments in kind it is all other way than in France, at last, etc. There were some tensions, there were some complaints, but nothing that could be considered as general as in France in 1940. Here, we can really talk about no generalisation.

[arnaud]

Fairey Battle of 142 Sqn shot down by french pilots on the 14th May 1940 : someone said that Mr Lorant has evidence to say that this is not true !

What evidence ?

[Petitpoucet]

Originally Posted by arnaud

Fairey Battle of 142 Sqn shot down by french pilots on the 14th May 1940 : someone said that Mr Lorant has evidence to say that this is not true !

What evidence ?

Mr Gillet,

Time has passed since i wrote it, and i must correct it. The original sources were not found by Mr Lorant but by Many Souffan.

Sorry for this little mistake, but i'm sure that this evidences do exist. And in fact, i cannot believe that nine different french pilots identified Fairey Battles as Henschel 126s and repeated the same error four times.

Regards