Me's vs Spits over North Africa: Who were those guys?

[Andreas Brekken]

Hi.

One should probably then go to the existing primary sources, and try to use them, especially concerning the timelines here.

The only target information given by the original poster was 'around the battles of El Alamein' --- according to my information, the second battle of El Alamein STARTED with an allied barrage on October 23 1942. I thus find it quite interesting that the above mentioned information by me is totally disregarded, that it has no relevance. If You at all had bothered to check existing sources mr. Boak, You would have seen that the picture mentioned by me regarding the influx of aircraft to the JG 27 units show a uniform picture from March 42 through October 1942 (when they were at a low point, but still over 25 aircraft per Gruppe, and received a heavy complement of brand new Bf 109G-2/trop), and that the pilots I mentined in the above post for a large part scored heavily (according to their claims listings) from early in 1942 and up until the date I mention in my earlier post.

I am not stating that the average german airman of the time would be able to outfight the best allied aces. I only stated that the JG 27 at the time had a VERY long list of aircrew that I do believe was adequate at handling a Bf 109. Also, I have not seen any evidence that the flight we are talking about here (from 92 Sqdn probably?) comprised the best allied pilots of the time? If this was the case, it would then of course be very interesting to try to identify the pilots that were able to in a Rotte formation totally dominate the best 8 or 9 aces on allied side.

Remeber also mr. Boak, that I am trying to find out what happened, and also try to answer more than Your messages only. The quote about a few battle-worn aircraft were directed at the message by NickM.

You also have to look at the time period when trying to make conclusions here. The collapse of the Luftwaffe had not started by autumn 1942, the pilots were still doing full training courses befor being posted to an operational unit.

That is my point.

And further - a discussion like this is totally fruitless unless a source is quoted. All other is just talk.

My suggestion for further work on this matter is that we try to establish the date, and we can then focus on the available sources from that time. I know for a fact that a lot of information from Fliegerführer Afrika is available in original at BA/MA, and mr Beale is also correct, this incident should have been mentioned in the Squadron ORB, which should be available at Kew. (will start to search for it in the PROCAT tomorrow).

Regards,
Andreas

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

I totally agree that it was a generalisation; however it is described in almost every book on the Jagdwaffe, and particularly those covering the desert campaign. Is it not true that Marseille's companions - including several of the aces you name - would stand outside the combat to watch the great man in action? Was his gruppe not withdrawn from action after his death on the grounds of fallen morale? Which no doubt had deeper roots in the operational tiredness of a hard-worked unit, but proverbs about camels seem appropriate here.

I don't recall any comments about a few battle-worn aircraft. However, all the dates you quote for massive reinforcements for JG53 and JG77 are after Alamein - after the incident reported, and hence totally irrelevant. How many of the pilots you name were operational in this area and at this time?

You criticise me for requiring a "star" - no sir, I merely point out that actions described would fit such, that the entire Jagdwaffe was not populated by superbeings, and that at least one such action involving a star can be found that fits the description. Whereas no other has been suggested, as yet.

You in turn would appear to think that the lowest German pilot would obviously outclass the best Allied one - if you think that a misrepresentation, I can only recommend you study your own postings in the same light.

[Graham Boak]

The date is stated in a later post as just before the El Alamein breakthrough. It is then, even later, stated as being after Marseille's death. This does narrow the possible dates (and units) down somewhat.

When dealing with the death of Marseille, Shores and Ring state that September 1942 had been a very bad month for I/JG27, three of the unit's most successful pilots having been killed. (Presumably this includes Marseille himself.) That would certainly weaken the unit's experience level.

Evidence of the operations of the remaining three Jagdgruppe in this period suggests that they regularly operated in small numbers, and could only assemble any significant number by combining elements from all three units. This is entirely consistent with units at the end of a long and troubled supply line, having difficulty maintaining serviceability.

I certainly make no claim for 92 squadron being a collection of aces: most RAF units in the Desert at this time were suffering from the massive expansion of the RAF and the inevitable dilution of experience. However, 92 does seem to have a fairly creditable record against the Jagdwaffe in this period. Certainly a number of successful pilots flew with this unit, not least Neville Duke, one of DAF's top scoring pilots. Sadly, Fighters over the Desert does not have an index to aid any kind of checking.

[NickM]

So...I guess that means that no one knows, eh? Sigh! Too bad! Oh well...Until the reprint of FOTD or someone gets into 92 squadron's ORB, this matter is closed...

NickM

PS: Andreas, I didn't mean to imply that the JW had only a few wornout Fighters on hand; I was only under the impression that, during the rush for the Egyptian border, the Axis forces had not only begun to outstrip their supplies, but that offensive forces stationed in Malta were sinking a greater percentage of their supplies & that this also led to a supply pinch for the LW as well...

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi,

I spent last year researching the basic topic in this thread, the Luftwaffe in North Africa in 1942, so I thought I might add my opinion about some of the issues raised.

Regardless of the exact date of the combat, we can assume it was October or early November 1942.

Graham’s point about the loss of morale in I./J.G. 27 is valid. It was no doubt a combination of combat fatigue and the loss of senior pilots, Marseille, Stahlschmidt, and Steinhausen, that saw the Gruppe withdrawn from combat in October 1942. But don’t attribute the withdrawal too much simply to Marseille, because the Gruppe had seen 17 months of continuous combat, which was surely significant. Perhaps we can consider Marseille’s death the final straw, as Graham says.

As for lack of aircraft for the Luftwaffe in North Africa, yes, this was becoming a problem in October and November 1942 in Egypt, but it was certainly not bringing operations to a standstill. On 21 March 1942, when the Axis supply system was almost at its best, there were 159 Luftwaffe sorties in North Africa, on 6 September 1942 there were 130, and on 22 October 1942 there were 142.

To look at it simply in terms of number of aircraft available:

Luftwaffe Aircraft Strength in North Africa

17.01.42 168
04.04.42 169
10.06.42 233
20.08.42 266
20.10.42 241

What should be noted is that the DAF was consistently getting bigger, and was getting more aircraft with greater performance, notably the Spitfire.

Regarding the idea that the Luftwaffe in North Africa was dependent on a few ace pilots, I calculated that between February and 23 October 1942, the top ten Luftwaffe aces claimed 424 of the 930 victories in North Africa. To me, that indicates an over-reliance on a few pilots.

Nick’s point about bombing of airfields is very important as well.

Luftwaffe losses on the ground in North Africa, February – 23 October 1942

To bombing: 64 aircraft destroyed, 89 aircraft damaged
To special forces: 37 aircraft destroyed, 19 aircraft damaged
Total: 101 destroyed, 108 damaged.

These figures are far from complete, but are all accounted for in German records.

Serviceability is also an important issue. The Luftwaffe in North Africa was always behind the DAF in this regard. The DAF consistently maintained serviceability of 70-75%, while the Fliegerführer Afrika never rose above 67%.

Fliegerführer Afrika Serviceability

17.01.42 - 51.7
04.04.42 - 50.2
10.05.42 - 67.3
10.06.42 - 61.3
27.07.42 - 54.3
20.08.42 - 60.1
20.10.42 - 53.5

Cheers,
Andrew A.

“You’ll never silence the voice of the voiceless” – Rage Against The Machine

[LWulf]

Regarding the idea that the Luftwaffe in North Africa was dependent on a few ace pilots, I calculated that between February and 23 October 1942, the top ten Luftwaffe aces claimed 424 of the 930 victories in North Africa. To me, that indicates an over-reliance on a few pilots.

These are some of my thoughts on this:
1.The flight leaders often took the kill even if the wingman was in a good position
2.What was the total of LW fighter pilots that flew in N Africa in the mentioned period?
3.The number of kills of the top aces vs other pilots should always be high imho
4.What was the number of damaged aircraft attributed to aces and other pilots?

I think that the kill ratio should always favor aces. The difference in the score of 10 pilots vs all the others might seem huge but I think that if there were, for example, 210 pilots in all in N Africa flying in that period and that each of those would be responsible for 2+ kills you could hardly say the others were not successful or able fighter pilots. Especially if you count that they survived and scored kills in a numerically disadvantageous situation.

While I don't think the LW pilots were by themselves super pilots compared to other, allied pilots, I know they were well trained in tactics, had excellent planes and at least some could watch aces in combat from up close and learn from them on the front when they needed 'em.

Also, I think many people forget about all the 1+ kill pilots that fought and survived. One kill might seem little, but it's still one kill and in war every kill counts. In a numerically disadvantageous situtation only the best pilots can hope to rack up many kills. Still, those with fewer kills that are still able to survive in such an envoriment for a certain length of time can be hardly described as rookies.

This is, of course, only my humble opinion.

Cheers,
Wulf

[Ruy Horta]

For these kinds of statistics I can recommend The Ace Factor, by Mick Spick.

Part of his thesis is that only 5% of pilots actually get kills.

One of the more interesting titles by Spick.

Frank Olynyk was kind enough to send me a copy of the original study that Spick used (at work, hence the lack of details).

Regards,

[NickM]

Hey, Andrew:
For curiosity's sake who were the top ten scoring LW pilots you mentioned in your post?

thanks

NickM

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi,

The question of whether it is good for a few pilots to dominate the scoring could be argued about for hours without a definitive answer.

The British and Germans in North Africa were opposites in this regard, with the Germans relying on a handful of aces, and the British relying on many pilots gaining a few victories each.

Nick, I did have the ten high-scoring German pilots listed somewhere, but can't find the list. Sorry.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

"You'll never silence the voice of the voiceless" - Rage Against The Machine

[LWulf]

I really can't agree with you Andrew. The top ten pilots you mention were the peak of the iceberg. As a ship runs into the peak of the iceberg, there still needs to be a solid base beneath the peak for the iceberg to damage the unlucky ship. There were many other able pilots that were skilled enough to down enemy aircraft and formed the base of the LW.

Reading the debate about how good or bad the attacking LW pilots were I am curious about the skill of the Spitfire pilots. They got bounced and lost two of their number in the first attack. Than they got themselves boxed by two enemy aircraft. Even if they were still in six. This really doesn't remind me of experienced fighter pilots! If my reasoning is correct, I don't think that we need two of the top ten LW aces to bag them.

Another question that keeps bouncing in my head is, what if there were two pairs attacking? The successful bounce, than a frantic defence, possibly inexperienced Spitfire pilots. Could it be that there were 4 109s Boom 'n' Zooming them? It's not that hard to lose sight of an enemy aircraft in a fight. I know, it's unlikely but I am just thinking aloud.

Cheers,