Questions re Polikarpov-fighters.

[Graham Boak]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

I initially thought that several Soviet decisions were irrational, but this turned untrue, when my knowledge deepened.

Not just Soviet, I'd like to add. The more study that is made of the wartime decisions, and all the factors acting on the decision makers, the more understandable and reasonable their decisons become. Not always right, no, but very rarely (if ever) irrational. Certainly the "bureaucrats and politicians" come out much better than enthusiasts for given types rush to claim.

Which isn't meant to claim that the I-180 decision was necessarily right.

One point that could be made, following on from comments earlier. It was suggested that the Russians would have been better off with an interim type, of known limitations, than waiting for something that promised to be better. When this is done, the interim type tends to stay in production for too long and the better type may never appear. It is all too often assumed that more of the same is better than the loss of production from the changeover to the superior type. The decision point for such a changeover must always have been one of the most difficult in military procurement. I doubt whether many cases could ever be proved either way, but they do provide lots of discussion points for we who follow on!

[Birgir Thorisson]

That is my "hunch" too, with the exception that in cloudy skies, it can become irrelevant, (as happened a certain day over Dunkirk in 1940, when the topcover (Spitfires) above the clouds save nothing, but a fierce battle raged below. (Hurricanes and Defiants).
Somehow, (never having been there), my "hunch" too is that the weather on the Eastern Front was clearer than in the West. (Continental climate, versus Oceanic). May just be my prejudice.
Soviet aircraft were noticably short-legged. That, as well as low altitude rated engines, may explain there disregard of altitude advantage. Too much fuel would be used up in climbing to altitude.

The "rational" explanation for the soviet aircraft production program, must be based on construction factors, primarily engine supply. Now, M-88 were available for DB-3F (Il-4), and BB-1/Su-2. Maybe there was a situation akin to the DB600 situation in Germany, where the engine was just not good enough for fighters. Or, that so much productive capacity had been invested in in-line engines, (M-105 and AM 37/38) that uses had to be found for them. But then, what was the M-82 intended for? The soviets found themselves trying to attach it to all fighter projects, because it lacked application, (but seemingly had plenty of production capacity). I haven´t noticed cancelled programs, that would explain this anomaly of supply and demand.

Birgir Thorisson.

PS, on the translation. Could the "Lamp" be the glass, enclosing the cockpit? Cleaning the tailwheel be retracting the tailwheel?

[Birgir Thorisson]

Graham Boak.

I think there is ample evidence that Stalin erred during WW2 by always preferring quantity to quality. The best case in point being the decision not to put the I-185 into production. If the I-180 had been produced, it would have been a natural progression to move towards the 185, in the winter of 1942/43.

I also tend towards the opinion, shared at it seems by the person using the name Arsenal VG 33, that indeed, the I-185 would have been equal, or better than Yak-1 and LaGG-3, where production aircraft were of far inferior performance to the prototypes. In fact, it took until late 1943, for the last LaGGs to match the prototype performance. Being "older" in production terms, would mean lesser retrogration from prototypes to production. Thus, soviet pilots would have had a better mount, giving better chances of survival, with the resulting cumulative effects on the airforce efficiency. Then there is the unresolved issue of the value of greater altitude capability.

Birgir Thorisson

[kurlannaiskos]

I've seen 'Lamp' and 'Lantern' used to describe the canopy.
(glass around the cockpit)
as for 'cleaning the tail-wheel' , making it retractable would be my guess as well.

[Graham Boak]

Originally Posted by Birgir Thorisson

I think there is ample evidence that Stalin erred during WW2 by always preferring quantity to quality. The best case in point being the decision not to put the I-185 into production. If the I-180 had been produced, it would have been a natural progression to move towards the 185, in the winter of 1942/43.
Birgir Thorisson

What would the losses of fighter production have been in this scenario, with two cycles of production changeover as opposed to one? What would have the cost been for the additional (re)training of aircrew and groundcrew, and the establishment of different logistical chains, with additional stores capacity required? How did the I-180 and I-185 compare in production costs (time, money, output) with the Yak/LaGG family? Did they use more of materials (e.g. aluminium) that were in desperately short supply? If so, how would this affect other priorities with in the Russian system - other military production and/or mobility over the railway system? More significantly, perhaps, what would have been the losses in bomber production if the limited engine supply was diverted from Ilyushins and Sukhois to Polikarpov? What would all these factors have done to operational effectiveness?

The suggestion that it was a better fighter is not sufficient in itself, even if true.

I have no doubt that better decisions could have been made at the top - show me a country claiming a perfect procurement policy and I shall laugh. However, proving any particular policy wrong takes a lot of evidence, and proving the alternative superior has to depend much on supposition and belief rather than facts. There is, after all, only one history that can (theoretically) be fully described with all the implications known.

[Birgir Thorisson]

I posted this question because I wanted to know if more recent information than I posessed, (mainly the book by Gordon and Khazanov) would throw further light on the issue.
The merits of the various aircrafts do not seem to be in question. Engines are a different matter. The Polikarpovs would seem to be better choices all-around than the others, both from the standpoint of operational efficiency, and producton.

The Polikarpov series were progressive developments of the same basic design, moving towards more use of higher quality materials, which as you say, was in short supply. The decision NOT to produce the 1-185 caused disruption in the production process in 1940/41.
The decision to replace the I-180, (with metalworking share in the airframe construction of ca 1/3 with the LaGGs with only 8% share, meant that factory 21 had to turn metalworkers into woodworkers, and suffered from drastic shortage of skilled woodworkers. As result, production quality was so poor, that a lot of aircraft delivered were useless. Same in Swerdlovsk. It is reported (admittently by a self-serving source, Yakovlev), that when the snow melted in 1942, the around the factory airfield was littered with LaGG aircrafts, and aircraft parts. (It is so veird, that I cannot really believe it, that Factory 31 was turned over from producing all-metal flying boats (including the Consolidated Catalina) to producing wooden fighters. There simply must be something wrong with THAT story).

One could compare it with Britain converting the factories producing Typhoons to produce Mosquitoes rather than Tempests.

As the war progressed, the Yak and Lavochkin design bureaus worked on refining their aircrafts, using superior material. Still, it was only in 1944/45 that their products matched the I-185, the preproduction batch of which was reportedly tested in combat in 1942.
Opportunity cost? By autumn 1942, the Soviet Union was receiving sufficient numbers of Lend Lease fighters, to do without the production lines devoted to producing Lavochkins, for 3-6 months. One must bear in mind that it really only with the La5FN version, that it became a viable fighter, in the second half of 1943.
When you have fighter that your experts tell you that is by far the best fighter in the world, (I-185 as reported in spring 1942), it is really strange not to put it into production.
I would argue that the increased efficency that would be garnered from allowing young pilots to survive and aquire skills to challenge Luftwaffe would in very real "near-term" prove superior to trying to keep the skies full of planes, that only provided convenient cannon-fodder for Luftwaffe experts.

The problems with engine supply is less clear. The I-180 competed with other designs for the M-88 engines. Production of Su-2 was stopped, and the DB-3F continued to be the main user of them, until replaced by the ubiqutious Shvetsov M-82. The M-71 versus M-82 is a complex issue. They were closely related design, and produced in the same factory. Could even be 14 and 18 cylinder versions of the same designs. I dont know. Bearing in mind that both Yaks and MiGs with M-82 failed, and that the LaG-5 and early La-5 were indifferent fighters, the M-82 didn´t become a war-winning asset right away. The opportunity cost suffered by the Red airforce in doing without them for say 6 months, in order to get an even better engine that would provide a fighter that would reverse the quality gap vis-a-vis the Luftwaffe, doesn´t seem great to me.

Regarding material shortages. The priority projects in 1940-41, were the MiG fighter and the NKVD sponsored Samolet 100, (designed as fighers, but became the successful Petlyakov Pe-2). The MiG was then cancelled in favour of Ilyushin Sturmoviks. I would tend to think that the Soviet airforce would have been better served with 1000 I-180s rather than 500 MiG-3s (the exchange ratio is a pure guess), or 1000 I-185, and a thousand fewer Sthurmoviks.

The assumption of rational behavior doesn´t mean that the decisions were right. Looking at a decision, one always finds that there were reasons for the decisions. (Although it can sometimes be hard to figure out what exactly were the reasons for Stalins decisions. A very interesting case is provided by Rohwer and Monakovs book, Stalin´s Ocean Going Fleet, were the authors attempt to deduce from the decisions themselves, what was the thinking behind them.)

If one reduces oneself to only looking at why the one and only history we have, played itself out as it did, and say, this was done for that reason, or not done for this reason, one really puts on a blinker, that prevents oneself from seeing the elements of free will and choice in history. I happen to think that Stalinist Russia was atrociusly managed, and the the peoples of the Soviet Union paid with millions of lives for the inefficency of the system, (and this leaves out completely the deliberate acts of repression.)
I visited Russia two years ago, and I was shocked by the adulation shown for Stalin, mainly for winning WW2. Spending Victory Day at the site of the mass graves in Leningrad (St.Petersburg) brought home to me that the people of the Soviet Union defeated the Nazis, not Stalin, or Zhukov, or the leadership. The shear tenacity of the workers, largely female, who slaved like logs to outproduce the enemy, and soldiers who endured enormous hardships, and died in proportions unknown in the west, produced the vicory, despite a leadership which wasted their work, and threw away their lives with callousnes only rivaled by Hitler or the Japanese.

There is a lot more to be said, but this forum is probably not the place for it.

I am off for the Christmass holidays, and will not be checking back until next year. Thank you all who cared to comment.

Happy holidays to everone who seas this post, and may you all prosper in coming years.

Birgir Thorisson

[Arsenal VG-33]

Hello Birgir

Sorry for being so late, a lot of job here!
Happy new year anyway!

About sources in other languages. How good is the french Polikarpov I-16 book by LELA press? (Cony, Ledet, Cerda, Louie & Kulikov). I guess sources have become rapidly outdated recently, so you should always look for the latest.

Avoid it as much as you can, a very low level of knowledge, too much errors. The same for Polikarpov Fighters in action, squadron signal n° 162.
Polikarpov I-16 Fighter from Gunston and Dexter, is a little better but less than average in all and...quite boring.

In my opinion the best book for the I-16 in english translation would be the J Kytka editions one, because il’s the closest to the original Mikhail Maslov’s book:
http://www.aerostories.org/~aerobiblio/article18.html
but there is a very little information about the I-18/185.

Now, specific topics that you might be able to shed further light on. Re. the M-88 engine. Had the problems been solved in the USSR, at say, decision-time of july 31 1940, (or november for that part.) That is to say, did engine supply questions affect (or determine, if you want to word it more strongly) the aircraft production plans in late 1940/early 1941.

AFAIK, the M-88 was "put in production" again on automn 1940, after it had passed with success the second batch of state tests on previous summer. In fact, no production was stopped, only deliveries during the state investigation due to numerous complaints from VVS units.

Do you know if the M-88 was a copy of the Gnome-Rhone 14N or a seperate line of development of the 14K. Bearing in mind, the strength of the french communist party, and the fertile ground for soviet espionage in France, either direct official technology transfer, or "industrial espionage" could easily have passed information from France to Russia. (And, yes, let no-one hijack this thread to discuss interwar french politics

)
M-88, was different since soviet engeeners ware ambitious and developped it on a different way. Even too much ambitious... Blum governement idea was to exchange french technology against soviet production in 1936. Not a bad idea, but unfortunatly with no continuation.

And on a similar theme, and prompted by your nom-de-plume, Do you know if there is any connection between the french interest in "non-strategic materials", (wood), which produced among others the Arsenal VG series in France, and the soviet efforts that led to the Lagg series? Was there anything common in either material, or process of production between the wooden aircraft projects?

I only know that zavod 301 in Khimki was preparing (slowly) the Caudron 690 production in Russia (and about the high opinion of Yakovlev for french wood designs) , when it was roughly occupied by Lavotchkin bureau and quckly turned to the LaGG production. But the later was rather a composite plane, than a wood one because of the delta D materials.

A third point of interest. If you compare two designs with a common(?) engine, the Polikarpov I-180, and the Bloch MB 152, the I-180 is much superior in every respect (except, arguably, firepower). Yet the Bloch is a "modern" all-metal monocoque design, the I-180 an obsolete mixed construction. How could that be?

In fact I-18 was tremendously small, see its dimensions. Even with an equivalent or slightly worse Cx value it would be faster. Moroever, it was light: there is no interest in the “modern” or “obsolete” definition, but only on the strenth vs weight ratio. The highly stesses stainless steel 30Kh GSA used on the I-18 airframe (120-140 kg/mm²) was very effective on that way. “Modernity” is a kind of industrial problem, and technically not always the best. In 1939, light alloys were giving 40 kg/mm² resistance, at best. And they were riveted, not glued or welded, with certain loss of resistance on stress lines.

How credible are the I-180 performance figures? In Gordon and Khazanov´s book, Soviet Combat Aircraft, the tables at the end give the preproduction 180s superior performance to the third prototype, (albeit with no range information). Yet it seems the pre-production planes were closer to the second prototype than the third.

There is nothing to discuss about, it’s only physicall measurements. As for the Eiffel tower lengh or weight. I don’t understand your question. Furthemore, The plane was equipped with the M 88 R (R for reductor) engine that was calculated for 3.6m propellers. The use of propellers less than 3.2m was generating an important loose of the output.

(I must confess that I have never been able to figure out just what was so wrong with the MB 152).

There is nothing specially wrong with the MB-152, it was not worse than the american curtiss H-75 (P-36). Of course, it had some developpement problems as for all planes in the world but finally it could withstand without substantial modification the powerfull 1500-1700 hp Gnome le Rhone engine (MB 157).
Polikarpov, was obliged to design a new plane for the use of M 82 and M 71 engines: the I-185.
I-180 itself, had no no more developpement opportunities, except for the Shvetsov M-89 engine.

Best wishes

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Arsenal VG-33

M-88, was different since soviet engeeners ware ambitious and developped it on a different way. Even too much ambitious... Blum governement idea was to exchange french technology against soviet production in 1936. Not a bad idea, but unfortunatly with no continuation.

Never ending romance with communism it seems. I would be very cautious with terms like unfortunately here.

In fact I-18 was tremendously small, see its dimensions. Even with an equivalent or slightly worse Cx value it would be faster. Moroever, it was light: there is no interest in the “modern” or “obsolete” definition, but only on the strenth vs weight ratio. The highly stesses stainless steel 30Kh GSA used on the I-18 airframe (120-140 kg/mm²) was very effective on that way. “Modernity” is a kind of industrial problem, and technically not always the best. In 1939, light alloys were giving 40 kg/mm² resistance, at best. And they were riveted, not glued or welded, with certain loss of resistance on stress lines.

What resistance it is supposed to be? I am not sure what do you want to prove by those numbers. If that steel is stronger than aluminum, then you forget to add, that the former is a little bit heavier than the latter. The same about wood or wood composite. That is why all modern fighters were built of aluminum, and Soviets turned to the technology as soon as it was possible and feasible for them. Otherwise, velocity is only one of parameters defining fighter aircraft, the range being often much more important.

There is nothing to discuss about, it’s only physicall measurements. As for the Eiffel tower lengh or weight. I don’t understand your question. Furthemore, The plane was equipped with the M 88 R (R for reductor) engine that was calculated for 3.6m propellers. The use of propellers less than 3.2m was generating an important loose of the output.

The question is very simple. While performance measurements indicated overall increase of parameters, series aircraft had them substantially worse. The question is valid, but the one must have in mind different configuration, loss of quality caused by series production, possibly less experience of pilots, etc.

There is nothing specially wrong with the MB-152, it was not worse than the american curtiss H-75 (P-36). Of course, it had some developpement problems as for all planes in the world but finally it could withstand without substantial modification the powerfull 1500-1700 hp Gnome le Rhone engine (MB 157).
Polikarpov, was obliged to design a new plane for the use of M 82 and M 71 engines: the I-185.
I-180 itself, had no no more developpement opportunities, except for the Shvetsov M-89 engine.

I understand MB-152C-1 was underpowered, and I think it was not liked by pilots, contrary to H-75. I cannot say for MB-157C-1 though. The point is valid, however, with the lack of development potential. It looks like I-180/I-185 were overstressed, and cancellation was the right decision.

[Birgir Thorisson]

Arsenal VG-33

Thank you for your input.

The problem I have with the relative performance of the pre-production series I-180 relative to the third prototype isn´t about the expected fall in performance with mass-produced aircrafts versus hand-crafted prototypes, as Franek Grabowski deduced. The pre-production aircrafts are less developed than the third prototype. They have the same powerplant, (M-88R), but are heavier, and are without the aerodynamic "improvements" of the third prototype. Yet, they are supposed to be faster, and with a higher rate of climb.
Are you saying that the difference is due to the pre-series having larger propellers?

The alternative explanation is that performance measurements are in some way "doctored", as is alleged that Yakovlev did for the Yak-1, and as Bloch did for the MB-152. (I bought a rather expensive book; Joanne´s Le Bloch MB 152, mainly in order to find out the details of that story, but although superbly detailed in almost every respect relating to the MB-150 series, he just mentions it in passing, confirming that the test figures were indeed faked, and then goes on to other subjects.)

I disagree with you about there being nothing wrong with the MB 152. As the late Gaston Botquin argued 30 years ago, the Curtiss H 75 was a far more effective fighter.
In industrial terms, the MB-152 should have been France´s Bf.109. It was a big mass-production project. It had all the features of a modern fighter, and it had as powerful an engine as was available at the time. The GR-14, N-49 is comparable to the DB-601 and RR Merlin III. Now there is a tendency to argue that radial engines need to be more powerful than inline engines, for the same speed, but, if so, how do we explain the Mitsubishi A6M2? The Curtiss was slower, even with it´s best engine, (H75-A3), but then, it was a much bigger plane. (I have 1/72 scale models standing side by side). The MB-152 was actually slower than the twin engined reconnaisance-bomber MB-174, which is much more than twice the size in the terms of volume and surface area.
Therefore, there must have been something seriously wrong with the aerodynamics of the MB-152. (And yes, the MB-157 was as much a new design as the I-185).

Compared to British, American, and Japanese designers, French and Russians (and even Germans) went for the biggest engines, in the smallest airframes, with the smallest wings they could get away with.
It is therefore understandable that Polikarpov was incrementally enlarging the wing, as the I-180/I-185 series was evolving. It seems that the I-185 was an incremental development of the family that started with the I-16, using mixed construction, but going for more advanced materials in the wings. The same path was followed with the La-7 and La-9 and Yak-3.
I do not see a logic in Franek Grabowski deduction that the designs was in some way overstressed, and therefore not viable. The FW-190 is also a very compact design, with high wing-loading. The primary "cost" of this configuration is high landing speed, and a long landing/take-off runs.

To recapitulate my line of reasoning.
1) There is a choice between optimal, and the best technology. In 1940 Soviet authorites decided to go helter-skelter for the most advanced protypes (Yak, Lagg, and Mig) and cancelled the seamingly inferior development (I-180) of there now obsolescent standard fighter, (I-16).
As result, the bulk of the trained soviet figher pilots was lost in 1941, in a battle of attrition, flying either old and obsolete aircraft, (I-15 & I-16), or uncombatworthy production examples of unfinished prototypes. (Yak, Lagg, Mig). (This is a hypothesis, I have not been able to find data about a) numbers of pilots, b) standard of training, or c) rates of attrition, in 1941).
I would argue, that more pilots would have been able to survive, and improve their skill, while inflicting more damage on the Luftwaffe, in a mount like the I-180, rather than actually happened historically. On paper, the I-180 is comparable to the Spitfire I. Production versions should have lesser retrogression than the new types, so production versions should be rated as better than the Hurricane II, and comparable to the Tomahawk II. Not quite a match for the Bf.109F, but better than what they had.
2) There is choice between quantity and quality. Historically Stalin issued a dictum, which I have seen expressed so in english; Don´t touch the production line! As result, the soviet aircraft industry was mass-producing huge numbes of Il-2, Yak1/7/9, and La-5 from 1942-44, with little improvents in performance. Real advances coming mainly with the Yak-3 and La-5FN in 1944. (Yes some La-5FN were produced late in 1943). Superior types were available, from the Polikarpov and Mig bureaus. The earliest, and the most promising was the I-185. If the I-180 had been produced, it would not have been question to switch over to the I-185 in the winter of 1942/43. That is why the decision to cancel the I-180 is so important. But even in hindsight, it would have been preferrable to switch, IF the M-71 could have been produced. That is the one technical issue that really is obscure. Zavod-21 was turning out about 400 La5 a month. These aircraft were still suffering from teething troubles, resulting from the shotgun marriage of a big radial engine to an airframe designed for an inline engine. If the change-over had taken 3 months, the loss of output would have been 1200 planes, if 6 months, the loss would have been 2400 aircrafts. These are large numbers, but in the end, what matters is the effective frontline strength, not the numbers of unsatisfactory planes sitting at depots, repair facilities, or training centres. If the Soviets had fielded a few chosen IADs with 2-300 I-185s at Kursk, my estimate is that they would have done a lot better than what the 2400 mostly absent, and inadequate La-5s bought them.


PS
Wasn´t the M-89 of the Gnome-Rhone lineage, (Nazarov/Tumansky), rather than Wright Cyclone/Shvetsov? Maybe related to either GR-14P or GR-14R?

Birgir Thorisson

[Arsenal VG-33]

[quote]

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski

Never ending romance with communism it seems. I would be very cautious with terms like unfortunately here.

I would be very cautious in my turn about your knowledge in the catastrophic situation in the french industry in 1936. We were desesperatly trying to resolve problems, by different ways. I personnaly think that the Polikarpov I-17 produced in the USSR with licensed tree-bladed Ratier prop and hispano engine could have been a good temporary solution.

then you forget to add, that the former is a little bit heavier than the latter. The same about wood or wood composite.

Oh, really? You see that...
Well read my post again...about 1940, thin tubes, chromansils end etc...

The question is very simple. While performance measurements indicated overall increase of parameters, series aircraft had them substantially worse..

Stap'me! Did you find it by yourself once more, without any help?
Thank you for all this "Lapalissades"* (*trivial evidencies from Lapalisse a french Phylosoph from the Rennaissance aera).
But read Shavrov, Kosminkov: sometimes it was the opposite.

It looks like I-180/I-185 were overstressed, and cancellation was the right decision.

Are you still kidding? I-180, was no more overstressed, understressed either hyperstressed than the others soviet fighters of its time. It was just responding to the soviet specification standarts of the year (7,5-8G, i thing). Maybe more, but NOT LESS. Furthermore before building a plane you have to send a complete file of calculations to the state acceptance commission, and theorycally wait for a positive answer.

But you might be very youg, ask to your older poles what was it to be leaving under soviet (heavy) administration. Even Kafka, would have not enough imagination...

Your Faithfully,
Arsenal

Stay high!