Why did 10./JG 2 bomb a school in Catford?

[dp_burke]

I don't know if this will help or hinder but last night I used Geoff Sullivans CWGC search Engine to find the civilian casualties connected to this date and the days following. I popped them into a spreadsheet and a PDF file, the PDF can be seen at this link.

I've sorted the list by District of Death Registrations, of which there are
Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough (MB)
Deptford MB
Greenwhich MB
Lewisham MB

Lewisham is the only one which CWGC has people and children connected to a school specifically.

The link is
http://www.skynet.ie/~dan/war/20011943.pdf

It is sad to note the number of brothers and sisters lost in the school that day.

A note on Deptford is that 89 Evelyn St is or was the Chicester Arms Bar, hence the concentration of casualties there. This is from a google search only. There may have been a bomb shelter there.

regards

Dennis

[Bombphoon]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On further reflection I agree it's unlikely the Catford School was bombed due to XX. Probably it was the revenge (Vergeltung) or Terror attack as argued by Austin, Brian and Chris.

The change of mind is due to the following reasons.

1.The London barrage was hauled down on January 20, 1943 'for essential maintenance' (according to a statement in the HofC). According to Eric Brady, this turned out years later to have been a cover story for calibration of new gun laying radar that required clear sky from London to the coast. The GAF could not have known about this in advance, but took advantage of the operational freedom it gave them to bomb the school from 80 m.

2.The full flowering of the fashion for Jabo occurred in early 1943. A skit by Monty Python, or the Goons (I can't remember), appears to have become actual GAF strategy. The skit had a pilot officer being ordered by a Wingco to fly to Berlin at tree-top height, to bomb the Chancery and to return to base, “because we need a useless gesture at this stage of the war”. Fighter aircraft were first ordered to perform Close Air Support in Poland in the 'exceptional circumstances' foreseen in the Air Manual. Kesselring preempted von Bock's attempt to gain operational control over the LW by ordering Bf109s and Bf110s to support the Heer on the Tucheler Heath and at the Bzura with mg and cannon fire performing Tiefangriff. The next development was Goering's face-saving order that fighters fitted with bomb-racks be used to replace day bombers over England. Finally there occurred the strange case of Frank Liesendahl, who having developed a taste for shooting Polish soldiers on the Bzura and British troops at Dunkirk, and having mulled it over for some time in hospital, persuaded first himself and then Oesau to let him shoot up British troops or, in their absence, British shipping. His reward for sinking a 3,000-ton ship was the formation of 10 (Jabo)./JG 2 which together with 10./JG26 under Erwin Busch became a dumping ground for the undisciplined and insubordinate. The analysis by Chris Goss of the tip-and-run campaign from March 1942 to June 1943, which included the Catford bombing, showed that 68 out of 118 Jabos were lost in achieving what Galland had said in 1940 “had little of any military value”. Jabo attacks did, however, fulfill the psychological need for revenge against Bomber Command's campaign to burn out 100 German cities. The Jabo was therefore the V0, to be replaced by the V1 and V2. This comes across clearly in Eric Brady's book, “Class War”. Eric was severely wounded by the V0, but escaped narrowly from both V1 and V2, so in the end he could say to Hitler's shade, “Yah – missed me!”.

3.In discussion this evening with a distinguished military historian, it was said that in Britain during the war it was commonplace to believe that schools were targeted, to such an extent that a German historian once asked why British people believed Hitler deliberately attacked their education. It seems likely, therefore, that Eric Brady's hearsay evidence that six schools were attacked on January 20, 1943 was part of this urban myth.

Tony

Tony

Phew - glad to see the Masterman, 6 schools, aircraft design plans etc have gone for a burton and you have seen the light! **wink**
You will be surprised to hear that, in that posting at least, I agree with all the theories you have put forward, with the slight proviso/exception of describing the Jabos as a 'useless gesture': although they had a high Luftwaffe attrition rate and did no lasting/great military/economic damage, proportionally they were worth it because:
a) they made the maximum use of the limited forces available to the Luftwaffe's Western Front force: with the KG units moved to the Eastern Front, there was little other offensive operations against Britain the Luftwaffe could do, so the Jabos were the only alternative.
b) disproportionately achieved front page headlines all round the world for the limited number of aircraft used (e.g. 30 Luftwaffe a/c achieved a front page headline, the same as 1000 RAF Bomber Command a/c),
c) tied up RAF Fighter Command a/c, fuel, resources, AA defences etc in Britain that could otherwise have been moving onto the offensive.

Incidentally, the sketch was Beyond the Fringe's cutting 'Aftermyth of War' with Peter Cook & Jonathan Miller and voted 9th in C4's Top 50 Greatest Comedy Sketches.
http://www.channel4.com/entertainmen...ches/1-25.html

Austin

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Bombphoon

Tony

You will be surprised to hear that, in that posting at least, I agree with all the theories you have put forward, with the slight proviso/exception of describing the Jabos as a 'useless gesture': although they had a high Luftwaffe attrition rate and did no lasting/great military/economic damage, proportionally they were worth it because:

"the useless gesture at least raised the whole tone of the war".

That's what you meant to write, Austin, wasn't it?

BTW I'm not surprised you agree with my post.

But what does continue to surprise me is that the GAF ever became so unprofessional as to squander their scarce resources on Jabos.
The only positive effect of that for the Wehrmacht (which might be evidence that the Boche was actually damned clever) was the seduction of the RAF/2TAF to follow the Jabo example with a larger version of the FW 190 Jabo. The Typhoon Jabo likewise achieved little of military value but precluded the possibility of 21 Army Group ever receiving effective CAS when the Vengeance dive-bombers were condemned to finish their days tugging targets in Cornwall.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by dp_burke

I don't know if this will help or hinder ...............
Dennis

Thanks for that, Dennis.
Negative information is always a help.

Tony

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by dp_burke

I don't know if this will help or hinder but last night I used Geoff Sullivans CWGC search Engine to find the civilian casualties connected to this date and the days following.

The link is
http://www.skynet.ie/~dan/war/20011943.pdf

Dennis

There's this one too: http://lewishamwarmemorials.wikidot....-war-memorials

Brownhill Road School had a war memorial too but for the Great War.

[Kutscha]

Why did I just know the Vengeance would find its way somehow into this thread?

[Bombphoon]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

"the useless gesture at least raised the whole tone of the war".

That's what you meant to write, Austin, wasn't it?

Tony

No idea what you mean by that Tony.

Interesting unedited footage of the newsreel report of the bombing and interviews with RAF pilots who intercepted the escaping raiders:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&h...&v=1aNE3MH77mk

[tcolvin]

Sorry about the delay in replying, Austin.
I've been away, done some reading and solved the problem - see next post.

To answer your question, I was quoting Peter Cook's reason for making a futile gesture in war;
"Perkins, I want you to lay down your life.
We need a futile gesture at this stage.
It will raise the whole tone of the war.
Get in your crate, hop over to Bremen, take a shufty, and don't come back".

Thank you very much for the newsreel footage - indeed very very interesting.

Tony

[tcolvin]

There appears to be available a definitive answer to what Chris Goss writes in his two published accounts; a) “The reason for the sudden cessation of 'tip and run' attacks has never been satisfactorily explained” (page 287 in 'LW Fighter-Bombers over Britain'), and
b) “inexplicably 'tip and run' attacks had finished. After 15 months, the campaign was over.” (page 24 in 'Schlachtflieger. LW Ground-Attack Units 1937-1945').

The answer is given by JC Masterman (pages 191, and 97/98 in “The Double Cross System. 1939-1945”) where he discussed agent CARELESS.
Agent: CARELESS.
Method of communication: s/w (secret ink)
Main tasks: RAF information, especially delivery of American aircraft. Also production of AA defences.
Date of starting work: July 1941.
Date of finishing work: January 1943.
Reason for conclusion of case: Refused to continue to work.
Remarks: His personal conduct and the consequent impossibility of controlling him except in prison spoiled a promising case.
“CARELESS was a Polish airman who was shot down by the Germans in 1939, subsequently lived in France, found his way to Spain, and there got in touch with the Germans. His case was complicated by the fact that he was denounced by three Polish companions after his voyage to this country in July 1941, but he succeeded in establishing himself and communicated with the Germans by secret writing. CARELESS was considered to be difficult and temperamental; but he promised well as a double agent. His questionnaire was concerned mainly with the supply of aeroplanes to England from the USA, including the methods and routes by which they were brought here. He was also asked for general information about the RAF in Britain, and in November he received a letter urging him to get into an armament factory and obtain production figures and so forth there. His traffic, however, was particularly concerned with AA defences, since he was notionally placed by us in the balloon barrage. He had considerable success in building up the AA defences in general and the balloon barrage in particular, and was thus able to instil into the Germans a wholesome fear of the strength of our passive defences”.

NB; the dates fit, the subject fits, and Masterman makes big claims for the success of CARELESS.
It is clear that when Tip-and-run became an embarrassment for the government and the RAF, with questions in the House of Commons, Churchill would decide to use every means to counter it and would refer the matter to the Twenty Committee.

Masterman's original prefaratory note was redacted and first published in the 1995 edition in the introduction by Nigel West.
In his preferatory note, Masterman listed the M.I.5 records that should be consulted if more detail is required.
More detail is now required.
There is no one more qualified to ask to see these records and to assess their content in this case than Chris Goss.
The M.I.5 records contain, in Masterman's words,
- The complete traffic of the agents, which is of paramount importance
- The personal files of the individual agents
- The minutes of the XX Committee from January 1941 to May 1945.
- A series of subject files dealing with policy in regard to special agents and their traffic
- A series of files containing weekly summaries of current cases.
What follows from all of this, of course, is the opening up of the whole subject of the Catford bombing.
Other agents were in touch with the Germans by wireless during this period reporting on RAF and defence matters – DRAGONFLY, FATHER (reception only), FREAK, GARBO, JEFF, MUTT, TATE, TREASURE, TRICYCLE and ZIGZAG.
The M.I.5 records for these agents might reveal that the Germans were told in advance about the balloon barrage being down on January 20, 1943 for radar calibration (an obvious cover-story).
This would have been done in order to raise confidence further in the bona fides of the XX agent who supplied the information, who was probably DRAGONFLY.
This paid off when the daylight hit-and-run raids were finally abandoned due to XX misinformation that was accepted by the Luftwaffe Command, and the jabos switched to night operations.
The XX information from DRAGONFLY would have been received through Kliemann of I. Luft Paris, who controlled TREASURE and DRAGONFLY - see Masterman page 143.
The Jabo pilots, on the other hand, were incredulous about the switch to night operations – see Chris Goss page 23 – but no one listened to them.
For the RAF it was win-win; either they would tempt the GAF to raid London so they could be ambushed and destroyed by the Typhoons, and/or the agent would build up such a reputation with the Germans that they would believe anything, including misinformation that what they were doing was having no effect.
Which is what actually happened since the RAF made a pig's ear of the ambush.
Note that one of the pilots in the newsreels, referred to by Austin, said he was late getting airborne because he was somewhere else when the scramble came.
But everyone should be aware that the existence of the Double Cross System was known only to a tiny number of people; its great success was persuading the Germans to keep seven divisions in the Pas de Calais during the Normandy invasion to counter the mythical FUSAG (First US Army Group).
Certainly RAF pilots would never have guessed about XX in a million years.
It has not been fingered until now in the tip and run cancellation, as far as I know.
Finally the M.I.5 personal files might explain why CARELESS refused to continue to work after January 1943; perhaps he felt responsible for the carnage in Sandhurst School, Catford.
It is possible Polish readers of this thread may know the identity of agent CARELESS; it would be interesting to know it and his fate.
Nigel West maintained the anonymity of CARELESS while naming almost everyone else, including DRAGONFLY who was a German born in England called Mr George.
CARELESS must be dead by now.

Tony

[Nick Beale]

"He ... was thus able to instil into the Germans a wholesome fear of the strength of our passive defences”.

And how exactly was this "wholesome fear" assessed? Is it evident in the long-available PoW interrogation files and SRA reports or was it, rather, inferred from the German cessation of tip-and-run attacks? The Germans were well able to gauge the strength of the AA defences from the reports of their airmen and their actual losses.

"For the RAF it was win-win; either they would tempt the GAF to raid London so they could be ambushed and destroyed by the Typhoons ..."

Was there a "win" in diverting the Germans to an extremely densely-populated conurbation crammed with high-value targets? Even if you shot down three times as many enemy aircraft as in a coastal raid, you wouldn't get into "profit".

If you seek a reason for the bombing of Sandhurst Road School, try architecture. In an area of two-storey houses, a typically imposing LCC school stood out. If he didn't see that in time, it could have have been Hither Green Hospital (700 metres NNW).