Luftwaffe data from ULTRA

[Jan Bobek]

Guys,

thank you guys, would you please describe me the procedure how to pucharse ULTRA microfilms?

thanks

Jan

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Jan Bobek

would you please describe me the procedure how to pucharse ULTRA microfilms?

I think that the UK National Archives website will explain the ordering system.

If it wasn't clear from the other posts, the file series with the "Main series of reports to Allied Commands" is DEFE3. (This is the series that I have spent most time with).

Details of each file are on the NA website.

Someone mentioned that the messages are in date order but that is the date the decrypted report was issued. This could be some days after the original message was sent, so if you are interested in a particular event, you may need files for a few days later to see if there is a decrypt.

Files contain 250 signals each (usually the traffic from about 3 days) and there can be from one to four files on a single reel of microfilm.

[Kari Lumppio]

Hello!

Excuse me stepping into your thread. I'd like to use the opportunity to as a ULTRA question from mr. Beale.

Do the ULTRA decrypt messages catch anything of the transfer of Stab., I and II Gruppe SG 4 from Italy to Baltic area? Transfer taking place 1.7.1944 (July 1st). I would be especially interested if there is anything about the markings (changes) of the planes.

Photos also show SG 4 Fw 190s in field apllied (brown?) camouflage just before the period (May-June?) and it is of interest if this was retained. Similar interest for the I/SG4 (Stab?) Mickey Mouse emblem.

Yes, I have asked this even before. Lost some data in HD crash year or two ago plus am interested if anything new has appeared since.


With Best Regards,
Kari Lumppio

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kari Lumppio

Do the ULTRA decrypt messages catch anything of the transfer of Stab., I and II Gruppe SG 4 from Italy to Baltic area? Transfer taking place 1.7.1944 (July 1st). I would be especially interested if there is anything about the markings (changes) of the planes.

I plan to put something about SG 4's last days in Italy on my website before too long. I have not got all the data in order yet but Ultra gives a lot of information on the markings of aircraft as the I. and II. Gruppen were rebuilt on airfields in northern Italy. These are mostly data I collected in the early 1990s when researching "Air War Italy" so I din not pay much attention to what happened after units moved elsewhere, I'm afraid. I can't say for certain whether Ultra covers the period of the transfer.

[Kari Lumppio]

Of the SG4

Thanks in advance, mr Beale. I'll monitor your great site - have been doing so all the time anyway.

As of the unit's actions in Baltic area, unfortunately in the material I have it is mostly impossible to sort out the individual SG units. And during July-August there was many of them in the Luftflotte 1 area: SG 3 and SG 4 in the whole plus I/SG5 and III/SG2 (the latter for a shorter time).


Regards,
Kari Lumppio

[Jan Bobek]

Thanks, I go ahead with 1.8.1943

[RodM]

Firstly, SES, thanks for your feedback on the Air Ministry report. As mentioned previously, such reports are the best estimate of what Air Ministry Intelligence thought was going on and you have highlighted perfectly the pitfalls of using such material - it can be used as a starting point but all such information should be checked and validated against another independant source.

Anoher such example are the Operational Research Section estimates of cause of loss for missing Bomber Command aircraft on night raids (as contained in the ORS Interception Tactics Reports and Final Reports of Night Raids). Of course, these are based on reports by returning crews but even in March 1945, for example, 30-50% of losses at night are still attributed to flak. IMHO, this figure includes attacks by night fighters from below using dim tracer (and thus being described as light flak by returning crews).

However, some clarifying points:

The intrepretation by ADI of the captured Duisburg flak map was that it had the potential Oboe course lines marked on it, based on the positions of the Oboe ground stations. It was assumed that to correctly predict the course of an Oboe-equipped aircraft, the broadcasting stations being used would have to be known in order to know which course lines were being used. It was further assumed that this technique could be more accurate than straight plotting by interrogation. I am not saying this is neccessarily a correct assumption but only what the report is saying.

With regards to the late war H2S usage, the operational orders and Interception Tactics reports that I have for Jan-Mar 45 make it clear that signals silence was imposed up to the frontier so that H2S etc was only used in enemy territory. In March 1945, for example, the PFF was generally NOT laying ground markers for turning points (and I have confirmed this with ex-aircrews) and the radar signals ban equally applied to them. Of course, individual crews did break the rules and thus gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to detect signals. In the main, many bomber streams, based on W/T sigint, were not clearly plotted early, or at least not until after they had passed through the mandrel screen and when the usual tactics of ,firstly, sending in a shallow penetrating force, followed by a deeper penetration force, both via France and/or Belguim, the latter force was usually not heard to be plotted until well over the frontier. The trend that followed is that if the initial penetration was shallow (i.e. to the Ruhr), losses where generally light as the night fighters could not get into position to intercept in time but when the penetration was deep, or took a deeper route, the first bomber stream often suffered heavy losses while the later stream had a comparitively easier time of it.

IMHO, some of the successful inflitrations of night fighters into the bomber stream in March 1945, owed just as much to fortuitous initial positioning of n/fs around beacons and/or correct analysis of intentions (based on repeated operational patterns of Bomber Command) as to early and clear detection of the bomber stream route.

If you are prepared to wait for the publication of Dr. Theo Boiten's 'Nachtjagd War Diaries', late next year, you will find some quite detailed descriptions of the course of some of these nightly air battles, including details of the moves by the fighter controllers.

For Jan,

With regards to ordering microfilm duplicates of ULTRA from DEFE 3 at the British National Archives, firstly, you will need to find the files that you are after in the online catalogue. You can either search or browse the DEFE 3 entries (of which there are many!). To search, for example:

http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search.asp

Word or Phrase: German
Year Range: the year range you are interested in
Department or Series code: DEFE 3

Such a search should bring up all the entries for that year so you need to find the correct dates. Beware, any reference you find must be under the "MAIN SERIES OF SIGNALS CONVEYING INTELLIGENCE TO ALLIED COMMANDS. BASED ON INTERCEPTED RADIO MESSAGES." - you can verify this if you open an individual entry and look under the 'Full Details' Tab.


Copies of documents, in paper, microfilm and digital format can be ordered via:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...e=ddmenu_shop3

You will have to register first to make a request for an estimate. The ordering system is easy to navigate and:

1. a request for an estimate for paper copies costs GBP10 (deducted from total payable if you go ahead and order). Copies from up to five different files can be requested.

2. a request for an estimate for microfilm costs GBP20 (deducted from total payable if you go ahead and order). With ULTRA, the microfilm original already exists and thus costs GBP1.80 per metre to duplicate (where no microfilm exists then it costs an arm and a leg to get a file microfilmed (GBP58 per hour) so whoever gets it done first pays and 'arm and a leg' while anyone requesting a copy once the microfilm is made will only pay GBP1.80 per metre!). Because the DEFE 3 ULTRA material is in roughly 3-day lots, it would pay to get material for at least a week after an event you are looking for and even that is no guarantee that the material is there.

Once you make an estimate and payment is processed (by either credit card or cheque) it will take up to two weeks for the estimate to be completed. You will be e-mailed once it is done so that you can login to their ordering system to view the estimate. Then you can make the order and payment. Once you place an order and they have processed the payment, the target turn around time for duplicating the microfilm is 19 days.

'hope this is of assistance...

Cheers

Rod

[SES]

Firstly, SES, thanks for your feedback on the Air Ministry report. As mentioned previously, such reports are the best estimate of what Air Ministry Intelligence thought was going on and you have highlighted perfectly the pitfalls of using such material - it can be used as a starting point but all such information should be checked and validated against another independant source.

How truly spoken. I was trying to make this point in another thread, but it got lost in personal quarrels. “These accounts cannot be trusted without cross reference to original German documents on the same subject”. http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=1874&page=2&pp=10



Anoher such example are the Operational Research Section estimates of cause of loss for missing Bomber Command aircraft on night raids (as contained in the ORS Interception Tactics Reports and Final Reports of Night Raids). Of course, these are based on reports by returning crews but even in March 1945, for example, 30-50% of losses at night are still attributed to flak. IMHO, this figure includes attacks by night fighters from below using dim tracer (and thus being described as light flak by returning crews).

Yes a very odd conclusion. How on earth could anybody believe that 20 mm Flak could make it all the way to 20.000 ft AND be effective? But both parties did. During allied raids the light Flak was firing madly and I guess ineffectively, and allied crews concluded that 20 mm holes had been made by Flak.

However, some clarifying points:

The intrepretation by ADI of the captured Duisburg flak map was that it had the potential Oboe course lines marked on it, based on the positions of the Oboe ground stations. It was assumed that to correctly predict the course of an Oboe-equipped aircraft, the broadcasting stations being used would have to be known in order to know which course lines were being used. It was further assumed that this technique could be more accurate than straight plotting by interrogation. I am not saying this is neccessarily a correct assumption but only what the report is saying.

The Naxburg was very accurate, 1 degree in azimuth and elevation is the quoted figure, but the true give away was the Morse signals exchanged between the ground station and the aircraft.



With regards to the late war H2S usage, the operational orders and Interception Tactics reports that I have for Jan-Mar 45 make it clear that signals silence was imposed up to the frontier so that H2S etc was only used in enemy territory.

When doing shallow penetrations, the Stream was over newly liberated territory most of the way, here GEE and radio beacons could be used for navigation. For deeper penetrations H2S was used over enemy territory.

Signal silence may have been imposed by the higher-ups, but each crew had their personal opinion and it seems to me that they exercised that. A grievous example was the use of IFF. Early on a superstition spread among bomber crews that the IFF had some sort of interfering effect on the Würzburg used for directing Flak. So the crews left it on and the sets were even modified with a “J”-switch in order for the equipment to transpond even if it was not interrogated. This led to the German development of the Freya Flamme, which could receive the transponded signal and thus track a/c’s utilizing IFF.

I June RAFBC conducted an evaluation of the Luftwaffe Control and Reporting organization (Exercise POST MORTEM). The system was intact in Denmark and all the personnel had been retained with this exercise in mind. The evaluation consisted of a number of raids being flown by about 200 a/c with or without ECM support. “In all exercises except (1), (11) and (12) radio silence is to be imposed i.a.w. normal BC practice” (quote from OPORD). In spite of this IFF and H2S was intercepted and exploited by the German organization on almost all the exercises. Old habits die very hard indeed.



In March 1945, for example, the PFF was generally NOT laying ground markers (my understanding is that the route markers were Skymarkers) for turning points (and I have confirmed this with ex-aircrews) and the radar signals ban equally applied to them. Of course, individual crews did break the rules and thus gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to detect signals. In the main, many bomber streams, based on W/T sigint, were not clearly plotted early, or at least not until after they had passed through the mandrel screen and when the usual tactics of ,firstly, sending in a shallow penetrating force, followed by a deeper penetration force, both via France and/or Belguim, the latter force was usually not heard to be plotted until well over the frontier. The trend that followed is that if the initial penetration was shallow (i.e. to the Ruhr), losses where generally light as the night fighters could not get into position to intercept in time but when the penetration was deep, or took a deeper route, the first bomber stream often suffered heavy losses while the later stream had a comparitively easier time of it.

I agree completely with this assessment.



IMHO, some of the successful inflitrations of night fighters into the bomber stream in March 1945, owed just as much to fortuitous initial positioning of n/fs around beacons and/or correct analysis of intentions (based on repeated operational patterns of Bomber Command) as to early and clear detection of the bomber stream route.

And you cannot argue with success. If in golf you do a “worm-burner” of 125 yards it’s actually immaterial how the ball got there. You are 125 yards closer to the pole (almost).

If you are prepared to wait for the publication of Dr. Theo Boiten's 'Nachtjagd War Diaries', late next year, you will find some quite detailed descriptions of the course of some of these nightly air battles, including details of the moves by the fighter controllers.

I will look forward to that with great expectations.
bregds
SES

[RodM]

Hi SES,


thanks for your reply. I should point out that many of the raids analysed in March 1945 re: the L/F claims were relatively low level affairs (i.e. 8,000 - 14,000 ft). In one case the ORS made the statement that the L/F reported by crews for one loss could've been actually a night fighter.

Also, on the scant number of reports that I have, the ORS damage teams who inspected damaged bombers that returned home, were well aware of the damage caused by night fighters and the calibre of the weapons used. An interesting ORS Report, finished in May 1945, analysed in detail the contributory factors that lead to the loss of the bombers shot down during 'Gisela' on the 3/4 March 1945. It was seen as an unprecedented opportunity, mainly because they could analyse a number of shot down aircraft that they normally wouldn't have access to (for obvious reasons!).

The report concluded from inspection of the wreckage and interrogation of surviving crew members that:

(i) fire is the major agent for the destruction of aircraft shot down by night fighters (as opposed to hitting the pilot or a vital aircraft component)

(ii) there was no significant difference between the damage suffered by the shot down bombers and the damage suffered by bombers returning from raids

(iii) a significant proportion of fighter attacks are a complete surprise to the crew.

Cheers

Rod

[SES]

Thanks Rod,
Yes the Schräge Musik was a nasty piece of kit.
bregds
SES