Response to Glider and Juha.

[yogybär]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

The SC 1800 was one of most widely used bombs on the Eastern Front. I have a table somewhere about the number of bombs dropped, and the SC 1800 was indeed dropped in insane numbers (not only by Stukas, as 111s, 88 etc. were also well capable of carrying them).

This is indeed extremely surprising for me, i.e. as
- pictures with SC1800 loaded on planes or lying around are very rare
- all KTBs / Leistungsbücher / .. I know don't contain such entries.
I was under the impression that SC250 and SC50 were most widely used. I'd be happy to see the table you mention.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by yogybär

This is indeed extremely surprising for me, i.e. as
- pictures with SC1800 loaded on planes or lying around are very rare
- all KTBs / Leistungsbücher / .. I know don't contain such entries.
I was under the impression that SC250 and SC50 were most widely used. I'd be happy to see the table you mention.

My wrong, it seems my memory is failing me; managed to find the table, it certainly wasn't used in insane numbers, but still, in surprising numbers I'd say. Of course most targets did not require it.

As per the an 1 April 1940 document about what bombs to be used against what targets, steel bridges called for SD 1000 or SC 1800 from high altitude attack from apprx. 1000 m altitude, no delay; beton and stone bridges for SD 500 or PC 1000 from high altitude or diving attacks, apprx. 1000, with delay fuse.

Below is the monthly avarage of SC 1800 and other types in Q3 1941 and Q1 1942: roughly 50 were dropped per month. OTOH the PC 1000 was indeed used in large numbers. Source u/k; I pulled it off from a forum years ago.

[Juha]

Hello Kurfûrst
as you can see from message #6 in this thread, at least some CAS Typhoons had substantial extra armour, more specifically according to older message by Chris Thomason 26th July 2007 17:11, see:Impact of Allied fighter-bombers (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=9525)

Quote: “…the Typhoon was armoured. Mod 346 (55 lbs of fixed armour) and 347 (496 lbs of removable armour) were introduced in spring 1944. I am not sure of the exact disposition of this armour but photos show trial installations of sheet armour applied to the cockpit sides and floor and around the radiator…”


Juha

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Kurfûrst
as you can see from message #6 in this thread, at least some CAS Typhoons had substantial extra armour, more specifically according to older message by Chris Thomason 26th July 2007 17:11, see:Impact of Allied fighter-bombers (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=9525)

Quote: “…the Typhoon was armoured. Mod 346 (55 lbs of fixed armour) and 347 (496 lbs of removable armour) were introduced in spring 1944. I am not sure of the exact disposition of this armour but photos show trial installations of sheet armour applied to the cockpit sides and floor and around the radiator…”


Juha

Thanks for the heads up. The key sentence seems to be (continued): "...Nor do I know to what extent this armour was employed on operations. However many photos of Typhoons from D-day onwards show stencilling on the radiator fairings - "This fairing is armoured" - as a warning to groundcrew who might be removing the fairing.'"

If it was present, common etc. it would certainly make them as armored as say 190F Schlacht planes (400 kg or about 850 lbs iirc), protecting engine, pilot from below, sides from small caliber fire.

[Juha]

Hello again, Kurfürst
thanks for the bombtable, it is very interesting.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
re your message #150, that’s was why I began my message #148 “…at least some CAS Typhoons…”

Your message #152“…even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter…”
In fact 617th and 9th had no great difficulties to hit Tirpitz if they saw it, on the first attack one of the first bombers which succeeded to drop the Tallboy towards rapidly under smokescreen disappearing Tirpitz put the end of Tirpitz career as a seagoing warship and when Germans were surprised and there was no time to generate adequate smokescreen, Tirpitz was sunk rapidly.
On CAS planes from 60s to 80s. RAF and French AFs used Jaguar for decades as their main CAS/Battlefield interdiction a/c, RAF alongside it Harrier, standard NATO CAS plane for long time was Fiat G-91, IAF used A-4s etc.
Juha

[tcolvin]

Glider, to respond to your questions of May 15.

1. The construction of the Wesel bridges was not the problem. Nor, as Kurfuerst says in Post 140, was it lack of the right ordnance. The problem was 2TAF's lack of an accurate delivery vehicle and/or procedure to deal with Flak. Shores & Thomas state that “all types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing (they mean glide-bombing) but it required a high degree of accuracy” which of course 2TAF lacked with its glide-bombers. 2TAF's answer was to ask for Heavies that could fly above the Flak, but the B-17s and B-24s failed.
2. “Postwar they plumped for Mediums.” This statement was misunderstood by you. What happened was that a postwar RAF audit decided 2TAF should have used its own Mediums on the Wesel bridges and not relied on the strategic Heavies. The Mediums were even less accurate than Heavies, so it was no real answer.
3. I neither rate nor overrate 2TAF's Flak suppression. 2TAF saw nor need for a Flak suppression capability, relying on aircraft speed rather than armour. Arsenal in this thread has been posting overdue correctives to the predominant RAF opinion. IMHO the RAF should have armoured and up-engined the Fairey Battle while dropping two of its three crew members, to create a British IL-2 that could have done the job of concerted Flak suppression. In the air-superiority environment that existed in NW Europe, the field would then have been clear for the Vengeance dive-bomber. Shores & Thomas would presumably agree with this conclusion, stating that “it was not considered advisable to take on Flak positions in a direct attack unless absolutely necessary as the odds favoured the gunners”. The obvious need was to create a combination of equipment and technique that would move the odds in favour of the attackers, but 2TAF never addressed the problem and thereby showed it was unfit for purpose.
4. You contradict my statement that MGs and PAKs were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing, and you believe a fast in-and-out pass by 4 x 20mms could destroy them. Such an attack might puncture the tyres of a PAK, I suppose, if caught in the open, but entrenched MGs and PAKs needed accurate bombing. Shores & Thomas would seem to agree; “Typical targets for the Spitfires would be strongpoints, dug-in tanks or artillery, while the Mustangs and Typhoons with their ability to carry 1,000lb bombs would also take on more durable or larger targets such as bridges, HQs or communication centres”.
5. I don't need to provide examples of calls for support being declined to justify the statement that 2TAF's Spitfires and Typhoons would not press home attacks against defences heavily defended with infantry weapons. The RAF reserved the right to decide how to respond to calls for support, and losing a Typhoon to an MG42 would not be risked if the support could be delivered outside MG42 range. The ORB wrote up such missions as having been successful simply because ordnance had been carted to the map reference provided by the Army. Accuracy and effectiveness never part featured among their success criteria.
6. Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.
7. Hardened defences were beyond 2TAF support. You ask for an example; how about Hillman. 2TAF's weapon of choice was a Medium and not a dive-bomber with a bunker-busting hollow-charge bomb that we discussed above.
8. You ask for specifics about Mediums, but I can't help and neither can Shores & Thomas who exclude Mediums from consideration in their Chapter 12 'Operational Techniques and Tactics”.
9. You are right in general that the Hurricane IV replaced the Hurricane IID, but wrong in implying that this occurred in Europe.
10. The relations between 2TAF and 21AG were flawed at the personal level (Coningham hated Montgomery and the feeling was mutual), at the operational level (decided at nightly meetings at Army/Group level which was far too elevated for effective cooperation at the unit/squadron level), at the relationship level (2TAF was 'in support' and not 'under command' so the Army had to accept the air's ineffectiveness and could never insist on an operation being repeated even when it could be proved to have failed) and at the equipment level since the RAF refused categorically to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft in spite of Army pressure to do so.
11. Slow speed in terms of vulnerability to enemy fighters was not an issue in an environment of air superiority, and nor would it have been an issue if 2TAF had taken seriously its obligation to find a way of suppressing Flak, so your objections to the Vengeance hold no water.

Tony

[glider1]

Again I thank you for the effort that has gone into this. I may not agree with some of it but the effort is appreciated. Taking them one at a time

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider, to respond to your questions of May 15.

1. The construction of the Wesel bridges was not the problem. Nor, as Kurfuerst says in Post 140, was it lack of the right ordnance. The problem was 2TAF's lack of an accurate delivery vehicle and/or procedure to deal with Flak. Shores & Thomas state that “all types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing (they mean glide-bombing) but it required a high degree of accuracy” which of course 2TAF lacked with its glide-bombers. 2TAF's answer was to ask for Heavies that could fly above the Flak, but the B-17s and B-24s failed.

The Issue I had was that you used the Wesel Bridges as an example of the failure of the 2TAF. However they were never attacked by the 2TAF, the 2TAF were never asked to attack them during the battle and in the Air Plan decided before the battle it was assigned to the 8th Airforce so I don't see how it could be seen as a failure of the 2TAF.

1. “Postwar they plumped for Mediums.” This statement was misunderstood by you. What happened was that a postwar RAF audit decided 2TAF should have used its own Mediums on the Wesel bridges and not relied on the strategic Heavies. The Mediums were even less accurate than Heavies, so it was no real answer.

I agree with you that the mediums would not have been sufficient. The Wessel Bridges were exceptional structures and a medium wouldn't have been sufficient

1. I neither rate nor overrate 2TAF's Flak suppression. 2TAF saw nor need for a Flak suppression capability, relying on aircraft speed rather than armour. Arsenal in this thread has been posting overdue correctives to the predominant RAF opinion. IMHO the RAF should have armoured and up-engined the Fairey Battle while dropping two of its three crew members, to create a British IL-2 that could have done the job of concerted Flak suppression. In the air-superiority environment that existed in NW Europe, the field would then have been clear for the Vengeance dive-bomber. Shores & Thomas would presumably agree with this conclusion, stating that “it was not considered advisable to take on Flak positions in a direct attack unless absolutely necessary as the odds favoured the gunners”. The obvious need was to create a combination of equipment and technique that would move the odds in favour of the attackers, but 2TAF never addressed the problem and thereby showed it was unfit for purpose.

As I have said before I would have dropped the battle pre war and replaced them with Skua's. For the 1943-45 period aa defences were such that an armoured Typhoon was in my opinion a very good option. Dive bombers or IL 2 aircraft would have had serious losses. On this we will have to agree to disagree

1. You contradict my statement that MGs and PAKs were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing, and you believe a fast in-and-out pass by 4 x 20mms could destroy them. Such an attack might puncture the tyres of a PAK, I suppose, if caught in the open, but entrenched MGs and PAKs needed accurate bombing. Shores & Thomas would seem to agree; “Typical targets for the Spitfires would be strongpoints, dug-in tanks or artillery, while the Mustangs and Typhoons with their ability to carry 1,000lb bombs would also take on more durable or larger targets such as bridges, HQs or communication centres”.

With the tyres go the crew but you supply the details in your posting. You keep calling a 2TAF fighter bombers glide bombers, a 60 degree dive attack is no glide, I have done similar approaches a number of times in gliders and feel as if you are going straight down. I believe that these are accurate enough but agree a 90 degree dive would be slightly better.
The 2 TAF were as accurate as most, examples include the following attacks XV Armee HQ 23rd October Amsterdam Gestapo HQ November and Rotterdam Gestapo HQ all individual building, if you could hit these then an individual strong point is just as vulnerable.

r support being declined to justify the statement that 2TAF's Spitfires and Typhoons would not press home attacks against defences heavily defended with infantry weapons. The RAF reserved the right to decide how to respond to calls for support, and losing a Typhoon to an MG42 would not be risked if the support could be delivered outside MG42 range. The ORB wrote up such missions as having been successful simply because ordnance had been carted to the map reference provided by the Army. Accuracy and effectiveness never part featured among their success criteria.

I do belive that you need to support this accusation. Of course the RAF reserved the right to have the final say as other things can get in the way such as other missions, availability, weather. I can only repeat that German airfields and shipping were being attacked on the last day of the war, the most heavily protected targets around, to say they were afraid of losing aircraft because of an LMG is beyond the pail.

1. Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.

Typhoons were well protected, the modified armour fitted to these was on a par with the Fw190F, Spits were as far as I am aware were not. PS there is a photo of an armoured Typhoon that has crash landed in Shores and Thomas.

1. Hardened defences were beyond 2TAF support. You ask for an example; how about Hillman. 2TAF's weapon of choice was a Medium and not a dive-bomber with a bunker-busting hollow-charge bomb that we discussed above.

Hillman wasn't attacked by the 2TAF, neither was it requested. However I do agree that a hollow charge bomb would have been ideal.

1. You are right in general that the Hurricane IV replaced the Hurricane IID, but wrong in implying that this occurred in Europe.

The 2TAF had one squadron of Hurricanes which was quickly replaced with Typhoons but these were mk IV

1. The relations between 2TAF and 21AG were flawed at the personal level (Coningham hated Montgomery and the feeling was mutual), at the operational level (decided at nightly meetings at Army/Group level which was far too elevated for effective cooperation at the unit/squadron level), at the relationship level (2TAF was 'in support' and not 'under command' so the Army had to accept the air's ineffectiveness and could never insist on an operation being repeated even when it could be proved to have failed) and at the equipment level since the RAF refused categorically to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft in spite of Army pressure to do so.

I certainly agree that Coningham and Monty were at each others throats But the evening meeting was also to ensure that both the RAF and Army knew what was happening the next day/days so plans could be made by both parties. If the Army were asking for something that couldn't be done then that was raised then and adjustments made.

I have never heard of the Army suggesting what aircraft the RAF should be equipped with, have you any example?

1. Slow speed in terms of vulnerability to enemy fighters was not an issue in an environment of air superiority, and nor would it have been an issue if 2TAF had taken seriously its obligation to find a way of suppressing Flak, so your objections to the Vengeance hold no water.

Sorry but on this I firmly believe you are wrong. Slow Speed at low altitude in an unarmoured Vengence after coming out of a dive, is a recipe for disaster, the AA fire would tear you apart. I still feel that you exagerate how easy it is to supress flak, its very difficult.

David

[Juha]

Hello Tony
on Flak suppression. It was difficult during WWII. Rockets were inaccurate, low flying a/c had to fly inside AA range before they could drop their bombs against those AA guns. So it was, at least during the first attack, up to onboard cannons and mgs. I wonder why you thing 2x23mm + 2x7,62mm better in that situation than 4x20mm (Il-2 vs Typhoon). One clear plus, aside better protection, to later Il-2s was that they had rear gunners who could try to suppress the AA position after a/c had overflown the position. Cluster bombs were one answer, napalm another, but they were effective only after attackers were first flew through the flak,
Finnish AA gunners thought that odds favoured them against Il-2s, so Il-2 was not an ideal answer to flak suppression.
Juha

[John Beaman]

I am closing this thread. It has no socially redeeming value,