Response to Glider and Juha.

[tcolvin]

Glider's question;

Tony
I still don't see how you can blame the 2 TAF for not attacking the bridges when they were not asked to attack them in the first place. According to the records I have seen (which are not conclusive I admit) the 2 TAF were never asked, tasked or ever planned to attack the bridges. It wasn't a case of the 2ATF passing the buck, they never had the buck to pass over in the first place.

Its a similar situation re the Hillmen strongpoint. How can you blame the 2TAF for not knocking it out when no one asked for it to be attacked? Had they been asked to so, then they would have attacked, flack or no flack.

I didn't know about Gen Horricks decision to ban mediums but I do know that 38 Brigade prepared a detailed report on the fighting and no problems with the air support were mentioned.
http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_R...d%20Report.htm

No one would deny that the achilles heal of the Typhoon was its radiator, the same wen for the Tempest and P40, all of which performed well in the GA role. However I would still argue that its smaller size, higher speed and better maneouverability would balance the additional vulnerability. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter and if he hadn't hit the radiator, the german would not have done much apart from knock a couple of holes in the plane.
As has been pointed out a large number of IL2's were shot down but the Finns who were on the receiving end of the IL2 noted that against pin point targets they were pretty ineffective due to a lack of accuracy.

As for why the Spitfire and Typhoon were chosen for GA I believe there are two different reasons.
Typhoon because it was fast, robust, well protected, exceptionally well armed and capable of carrying a heavy payload plus, by RAF standards it had a good range.
Spitfire, because we had planty of them, and as time went on the Mk IX could carry a respectable payload but not as much as the Typhoon or P47, whilst the XIV became the fighter to give top cover.

Finally can I ask where you get the information that the Typhoon and Spitfires were withdrawn from attacking defended targets?
I say this as on the last day of the war Spits and Typhoons were attacking ships and airfields both of which were amongst the most heavily defended targets you could find."




My responses:
1. On the Wesel bridges' question, 2TAF was asked to destroy the bridges.

In the planning of Veritable, 1 Canadian Army asked for the destruction of the Wesel bridges by air attack. All air support of 21 Army Group was the sole responsibility of 2TAF, and the only place 1Cdn Army could address its requests. If 2TAF wanted Heavies, then they put the request either to the BC LO at 2TAF, who passed it on to Harris, or to SHAEF who passed it on to VIIIUSAAF. If the answer was no, then 2TAF had to find another way from its own resources.


2. On the questions of Horrocks' banning all air support including Mediums, and the restrictions placed on CAS, I will quote from my draft book if you don't mind;



At this time (February 28) stresses long in the building came to a head. Their genesis can be traced to events earlier in the month. Horrocks was never happy with his decision to use heavies to 'take out Cleve', as Crerar described it. Horrocks wrote in 'Corps Commander' that he felt almost physically sick when he saw the bombers do another Caen. His rationalisation was that he was in a race to the Nutterden feature, and destroying Cleve might give him an advantage by slowing up the German reserves. This was the same argument used for the destruction of Caen and Winnekendonk. His overriding objective was to save British lives. He added that he was blessed with too much imagination and that it was fortunate for the British Army that he never rose above the level of Corps Commander. For years after the war Horrocks had nightmares about Cleve, and the destruction turned out to have been far worse than he had imagined because the RAF used HE instead of the incendiaries he had specifically requested. Even worse, the craters held up his advance and cost British as well as many German civilian lives.
The destruction of Cleve was on February 8. A fortnight later on February 21, 2 Group despatched a box of mediums comprising 35 Mitchells and Bostons to attack Weeze. Due to a mistake in navigation, thirty aircraft dropped 96 bombs on British troops in Goch and Üdem. Horrocks exploded, having,
'a sudden revulsion to all types of air support and requested the removal of all 84 Group assistance from his Corps front. This outburst of indignation upset the planning and consequently aircraft of 131, which were to have attacked strongly defended positions and troop concentration areas on the front of 51(H) Div, were diverted to alternative targets at Weeze and Sonsbeck'. Source: 84 Group ORB
Both Horrocks and Shores are silent about this in their books.
2 TAF was overstretched and its commanders were worried about losses. On March 1, 84 Group's Ops' Log reported a conference during that night with the Army, leading to a decision to impose a severe restriction on the,
'liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots. The automatic use of aircraft in the counter-battery rôle, for instance, would be discontinued during static or semi-static periods, and indeed only accepted in special cases in an advance when our artillery could not take on the rôle, or if the menace of enemy guns was having a really serious effect. Moreover, the prolific use of Rocket Typhoons in cab rank under FCP control would have to be reduced and the scope of the FCP limited to a definite sector of front; for example a Div(isional) or B(riga)de front rather than as at present on an entire Corps front. A further check was to be kept on the acceptance by GCC of targets so that effort would not be wasted'.
Ironies abound in this assessment of chickens roosting noisily. The high speed of unarmoured Typhoons and Spitfires was now recognised as providing no defence against the powerful Flak defending German gun batteries, so 2 TAF simply abandoned that most important target without mentioning their previous refusal to consider aircraft armour. It was back to 1917. Furthermore, 2 TAF now mentioned the idea of supporting specific divisions or brigades when previously no formation smaller than a corps or army had been recognized. 2 TAF had been defeated and withdrew as surely as the U-Boats and the Flying Fortresses had been forced to do in 1943.


I would now add this;

A clue as to how the decision of the conference on March 1, 1945 was interpreted can be found in Ziegler's 'The Story of 609 Squadron', on pages 312/3. Squadron Leader Roberts checked with Group Captain Baldwin as to whether it was alright to attack, and was given permission because of the absence of FLAK.
“.....on 9th March, 609 had lost yet another CO on a supposedly 'easy' mission against barges ..... Johnny Baldwin, who had recently succeeded Desmond Scott as airfield commander, decided to 'go along for the trip', and here is part of the last entry in Eric Roberts' diary: “Because of the lowered cloud base I checked with Baldy as to whether to attack, and received the expected OK owing to the scarcity of FLAK. Turning west, I spotted the barges and led the boys down”.


Tony